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Other than the great limber stands of the Menominees and the Klamaths, 
and the rich oil fields of the Osages, the Place of the Falling Waters on the 
Flathead River just below Flathead Lake in western Montana, represented 
the most desireable and potentially profitable resource left to the American 
Indians by the white man, on tribal lands, after the establishment of the 
reservation system in the nineteenth century The white man s desire to 
own, exploit, and profit from these falls, and their potential hydroelectric 
energy, the last of the lucrative resources left to his Indian brothers, created 
the perfect setting to play out one of the biggest and baddest chapters in the 
story of socioeconomic underdevelopment, and forced indigenous 
enculturation, through colonialism and capitalism, in our nation s history. 
The stories of the domination of Indian peoples by Europeans certainly 
contains common themes which are not unfamiliar to those with even a 
modest awareness of history. This particular story is no exception in this 
regard. However, its script does contain rather unique characters and 
surprises in the plot. On the one hand, it epitomizes the imperialistic 
methods for conquering America s indigeneous peoples. On the other hand, 
it represents a success story in the perserverence of collective cultural 
identity, socioeconomic independence, sovereignty, and self-determination. 
The history of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes involves 
enculturation through missionaries, boarding schools, domestication, 
capitalist economics, the establishment of a reservation, the allotment of 
lands, the selling of surplus reservation lands, and later, white settlement of 
the reservation; all permitted by a paternalistic government, self-appointed 
as financial trustee and political gaurdian over its unwilling wards. 
Conversely, it has happened on a picturesque reservation, in an isolated 
region, rich in natural resources, the battle over which involved corrupt 
government officials, a transnational corporation, a power monopoly, locally 
solicited competition threatening that monopoly, support from national 
Indian lobbyists, dissent from local intrest groups: and an Indian nation, 
vanquished, but growing in political awareness and sophistication. For its 
commonality, as well as its eccentricity, it is a story worthy of recognition. 
Chairman: Gregory R. Campben^ 
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This is a portion of a speech given by Frank M. Kerr, president of the 
Rocky Mountain and Montana Power Companies, following his adoption into the 
ConfederaUed Tribes, May 31, 1930, after the license to develope the Flathead 
power site was granted to the Rocky Mountain Power Company. The Tribes gave 
Mr. Kerr the Salish name A-Kult-Muc-Ouait, meaning "Light" (White Man 1930; 
Kerr Adopted 1984). 
It is a great pleasure for me to meet you and your people today here in 
your home land, at this place of falling water, where water has fallen idly for 
ages, the gift of the great Creator. 
It is only yesterday, as time goes, that our progress has made it 
possible to put this falling water to work for your people and my people. 
It has been my pleasure to represent my people at Washington, and I 
think more than some will admit, your people also. 
It has been decided that my people make this great development of 
your property; make use of this idle water for you and all who may be able 
to use its power. 
If it shall fall upon me to carry on this work, I ask that you send your 
young men to help, that you come and set up your tepees and visit us when 
you can, and watch the great work grow. 
There have been differences of opinion as to who should do this work. 
I trust now all will join to make it a great success. 
It has been said that others would bring industries to the site. I think 
that no one is better able than we, to do this desirable thing for all 
concerned. 
I want to thank you and your people for all your kindness. I hope the 
work will be successful and bring to your people many comforts as Jong as 
whaler faJIs (Frank M. Kerr). 
We thank Mr. Kerr for the work he has done for us and for the white 
people. We know he has worked hard for us. Today we thank Mr. Kerr and 
w e  s h a k e  h a n d s  w i t h  h i m .  I  a m  g l a d  t h a t  W a s h i n g t o n  h a s  a p p r o v e d .  l a m  
glad that so much work is to be done for my people. I give him many 
congradulations that he has won, and all his people I congradulate. I hope 
he makes a success of it for my people and for the whites, who are all my 
friends (Chief Charlo). 
The Kootenai people want to shake hands with Mr. Kerr. We know 
him and we like him. We thank you Mr. Kerr for what you have done for our 
people and we want you to be one of us. We like you and want to adopt you 
into our tribe (Chief Koostatah) 
V  
The softest thing in the universe 
Overcomes the hardest thing in the universe. 
That without substance can enter where there is no room. 
Hence there is value to non-action. 
Teaching without words and working without doing 
Are understood by very few. 
The highest good is like water. 
Water gives life to the ten thousand things and it does not strive. 
It flows in places men reject and so is like the Tao. 
Under heaven nothing is more soft and yielding than water. 
Yet for attacking the solid and strong, nothing is better; 
It has no equal. 
The weak can overcome the strong; 
The supple can overcome the stiff. 
Under heaven everyone knows this, 
Yet no one puts it into practice. 
Therefore the sage says; 
He who takes upon himself the humiliation of the people 
Is fit to rule them. 
He who takes upon himself the country's disasters 
Deserves to be king of the universe. 
The truth often sounds paradoxical. 
A man is born gentle and weak. 
At his death he is hard and stiff-
Green plants are tender and filled with sap. 
At their death they are withered and dry. 
Therefore the stiff and unbending is the disciple of death. 
The gentle and yielding is the disciple of life 
Thus an army without flexibility never wins a battle. 
A tree that is unbending is easily broken. 
The hard and strong will fall. 
The soft and weak will overcome. 
-The Tao Te Ching 
chapters 43.S,78, & 76 
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The Theory of Underdevelopment, the Method of 
Ethnohistory, and Their Application in this Thesis 
The Flathemf Imiiaos have been involveti for several centuries in a process of 
political evolution. Change pi-ecipitatedby outside forces has been a. constant in tJieir 
lives, from the time they governed tJiemselves on the Plateaus of the Continental Divide 
to the last quarter of the twentieth century when they have struggled against the 
presstfres of external go vernments and corporations Native American life generally, 
of course has been a ŝ ory of attempted î co very fntm sa vage assanlts of various kin .̂ 
and in this respect the Indians of the Flathead reservation are typical What is 
distinguishing in their lives is an openness to change — a native disposition to borrow 
and adapt — marked by pt̂ gressim admisti/re and assimilation. As a result, the 
contemporary politics of the /lathead reservatjon are based upon values and expressed 
in woixls which are the common currency of any progressive American government. 
Fighting few rear gamxi actions against tradtionalists from within. Flathead 
government has made significant progress towatd achieving political sophistication 
and administrative competence (Lopaeh 19^11 
Preliminary Theoretical Tenets 
Prior to the decision to pursue tlie specific issues pertaining to this 
project, two theoretical and methodological pricipies were first brought to 
the table. They were not specific to this topic. Rather, they served as 
cornerstones in the foundation of any approach that would have been 
employed, independent of the subject matter. 
Because, as it is gennerally know, that history is WTitten by the 
conquerors, and further, that any thorough study of a conquered people is 
1  
therefore incomplete without an accurate portayal of their own view of 
themselves and their own history, or more specifically, their cuJturaJ 
idenuty, a degree of interpretive skill is required of the scholar in these 
post-modern times to properly tease or coax the truth' out from behind its 
politically, economically, historically, socially, and culturally contextualized 
veils. As a result, social scientists have been trying to incorporate as many 
different ways of "knowing' into their research as did the people he or she is 
attempting to interpret; while the subjects of the inquiry were engaged in 
the perpetual process of identifying themselves. 
In recent decades, most approaches to ethnographic portrayals of 
people have been opened to not only acknowledge, but also to employ, these 
culturally different ways of "knowing.' grounded theory is an approach 
which has, in a sense, reversed the traditionally Western "hard" scientific 
approach of developing and testing a hypothesis, and thereby introducing a 
theory In order to avoid a logical fallacy which sometimes occurs when a 
hypothesis renders testable, and causing, as a result, the scientist to 
find what he was looking for. grounded theory allows for, and encourages, 
emergence and discovery." In other words, applying a grounded theory 
allows the data to influence, and subsequently alter, the original theory, as 
the data continues to be born out of the research (Strauss 1998). 
Additionally, if the scholars need to uncover information obscured 
2  
through the historical domination of one people by another, due to the 
fallacies of traditional scientific method, or through the loss of cultural 
identity from forced ethnocentric enculturation, then the researcher may 
feel the need to provide a voice for the people; whose plight may be 
obscured by the same cultural forces which created it. Consequently, those 
ethnographic portrayals which are both interpretive and advocative, or 
"hermeneutic and emancipatory.' emphasizing persuasion, political purpose, 
and advocacy of agency, fall under the unbrella of what has come to be 
called critical ethnography' (Thomas 1993). 
So with these two basic theoretical and methodological tenets in mind, 
grounded theory and critical ethnography, 1 began to research the history 
and the identity of the Confederated Saiish and Kootenai Tribes of the 
Flathead Indian Reservation of Western Montana, I found that the 
domination and exploitation they endured was exemplified by. and 
encapsulated in. the construction of a mammoth dam and hydroelectric 
generating plant on their reservation: and the resulting reemergence of their 
cultural identity, through the practice of their traditional tribal ways 
reinterpreted through the modern political ways and means of their 
hegemonic aggressors, represented the cultural and political sophistication 
for which they were respected in the days prior to their domination. 
What has transpired on the Flathead reservation has been unique in 
D 
some respects, as indicated in the opening quotation. These will be 
presented as the work progress. However, some of the aspects of the 
Flathead Indians history is quite similar to, and has followed certain 
formulas of. the histories of many peoples who have been the victims of the 
sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and sociocultural domination, enculturation, and 
exploitation, which has followed the spread of colonialism for the past five 
hundred years. For this reason, the concepts surrounding economic 
development, and socioeconomic underdevelopment, will serve as the 
theoretical basis for this thesis. 
Development and Underdevelopment 
Cultural anthropologists have been studying the results of the so-called 
development" which accompanies much of the pursuits of the modern and 
post-modern, or colonialist and post-colonialist, industrialist, mercantilist, 
capitalist world; because much to do with the practice of subsuming or 
subjugating another people under the guise of freeing, liberating, or civilizing 
them, is "couched" within the language of economic development. That is to 
say. economic development is the supposed goal of those who promote it, 
and use it to explain why others are not developed, while simultaneously 
using both of these notions to justify the paternalism associated with forcing 
it onto others who do not have it. and may not want it or even need it. 
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The dictionary of anthropology will provide a clear definition of 
economic development to begin this discussion. 
Development refers to a process of change through which an increasing 
proportion of a nation s citizens are able to en joy a higher material standard of 
living, healthier and longer lives, more education, and greater control and 
chioce over how they live. Development is generally believed to rest on rising 
levels of labor productivity, which can be achieved through the application of 
science, technology, and more efficient forms of economic and managerial 
organization. Virtually all government leaders profess commitment to 
promoting development understood in this way. Leaders, policy makers, and 
academics disagree, however, about the relative importance of technical, 
economic, and political barriers to development and hence about priorities in 
achieving it, (Hoben 1997) 
This serves as an adequate definition except lor the last sentence 
wliich is somewhat incomplete. Academics not only disagree with the 
priorities in achieving economic development, they also question how it is 
created, as well as the methods through which it is sustained. This is based 
on the simple fact that, according to their own criteria, the proponants of 
economic development s plans and practices ought to be improving the lives 
of those who come in contact with it. when in reality their lives are 
deteriorating. In other words, while policy makers, and the industrialists 
who back them up, are promoting the benifits of development, academics 
have been pondering why there is so much socioeconomic inequality in the 
world; Why it is increasing; and why we have not been able to completely or 
even partially reverse or redirect this phenomenon tHobart 1993) 
To begin answering these questions it is critical for the reader to 
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realize that economic development, and its by-product socioeconomic 
underdevelopment, as well as any promotion, explaination, or justification of 
it. have traditionally stemmed from a fundamentally biased, eurocentric 
cultural perspective; and therefore, are inextricibly intertwined with 
capitalism and colonialism. In other words, if the same people who 
voluntarily left their home lands to "colonize' others, that is. to impose, with 
brute force if necessary, their politics, economics, and religion onto others, 
are also the same people who created the ways and means of the 
socioeconomic inequality which now exists in these colonized societies, and 
are furthermore the same people who have been explaining and justifying 
all of this to the world, then it is clearly necessary for academics to study 
and to voice the pre-contact histories of these non-european colonized 
people. For if the same system which put them down, has also, willingly or 
unwillingly, kept them down, then by definition, their voice would not reach 
beyond the social and political boundries and parameters established by 
their colonial conquerors: nor would such information be volunteered by 
these imperialistic aggressors. 
As a result, scholars began, in the 1960's, to develop various theories 
as to why and how this socioeconomic inequality is created and perpetuated. 
Theories such as core-periphery, metropole-satellite, dependent 
development, and uneven development began to emerge. At first, some of 
6  
the results, however, were rather short sighted. In their first attempts to 
uncover the interrelatedness between development and underdevelopment, 
scholars did not think entirely globally or holistically. They did not initially 
reaUze how the colonialism of the past as well as the present contributes to 
underdevelopment. Moreover, they viewed underdeveloped peoples in the 
same social, cultural, historical, economic and political context as developed 
peoples (Chew 1996). This was, as I have said, short sighted. However, 
while it may have been somewhat less valid, it was no less critical to the 
process of discovery. 
Underdevelopment, or at the very least, non-development, was not 
disputed. Inequality does after all, exist, and is increasing. However, the 
debate at the time, and one whose echoes can still be heard today, was 
between those who believed that post-colonial economic development, 
through the mechanisms of industrial capitalism, was in fact the direct cause 
of underdevelopment, and those who felt that underdevelopment was 
merely a by-product of honest and progressive development efforts. It 
became apparent, though, that arguments for the latter had to be presented 
in culturally evolutionary contexts. In other words, for the argument that 
underdevelopment was simply something which coexisted with 
development, not the direct result of development, to carry any weight, it 
had to be considered given that cultures progress in the same way, and 
7  
according to the same formulas. Therefore, underdeveloped people were not 
there because of developed people, they were simply behind or retarded in 
their progress; and this not only explained but justified the paternahstic role 
in which the colonizers invariably found themselves. 
However, if the process of colonialization not only subsumed the 
politics and economics, but the culture and history of the colonized peoples 
as well, then it would be inaccurate to automatically assume that their past, 
or more accurately, their view of their past, would by necessity have to 
reflect that of their colonizers. Moreover, if the proponants of this view 
were from colonizing nations themselves, and they had not examined the 
past or the present from the perspective of those colonized, then they would 
have no way of determining its validity. This is why it was critical for these 
scholars to make the mistake of assuming that the past histories of the 
colonizers and the colonized were operating according to the same formulas. 
Otherwise we would not know that the process of colonization itself seems to 
promote this by its very nature. 
Scholars had another issue to contend with as well. Einstein was 
famous for positing the notion that one cannot employ or incorporate the 
cause of a problem in any attempt to find a cure for the problem. However, 
the attempts at finding a cure for underdevelopment, were in fact employing 
more and more developmental strategy; yet underdevelopment persisted 
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And those who decided what or who was developed or underdeveloped in 
the first place, also came from the developers. As a result, again, scholars 
were led to the conclusion that so-called development itself just might be the 
cause, and not the cure, of underdevelopment (Hobart 1993). 
One early proponant of this theory, Andre Gunder Frank, was sugesting 
precisely this in the I960 s when he stated; 
Since tiie historical experience of the colonial and underdeveloped 
countries has demonstrably been quite different, available theory therefore fails 
to reflect the past of the underdeveloped part of the world entirely, and reflects 
the past of the world as a whole only in part. More important, our ignorance of 
the underdeveloped countries' history leads us to assume that their past and 
indeed their present resembles earlier stages of the history of the now developed 
countries Consequently, most of our theory fails to explain the structure and 
development of the capitalist system as a whole and to account for its 
simultaneous generation of underdevelopment in some of its parts and of 
economic development in others. 
It is generally held thai economic development occurs in a succession of 
capitalist stages and that today's underdeveloped countries are still in a stage, 
sometimes depicted as an original stage, of history through which the now 
developed countries passed long ago. Yet even a modest aquaintence with history 
shows that underdevelopment is not original or traditional and that neither the 
past nor the present of the underdeveloped countries resembles in any 
important respect the past of the now developed countries. The now developed 
countries were never «fl<^/deve loped, though they may have been 
tfjadeveloped (Frank 1966). 
The modest aquaintence with history' to which Frank was refering, 
also demonstrated to him that, as we have seen, it is the developed countries 
which determine what, and who, is, could, or should be developed or 
underdeveloped. And it was in and through these determinations that 
developed nations thought of themselves as developed; and furthermore, 
that developed nations were, by definition, advanced and progressive 
9  
However, the above passage ought to indicate the logical fallacy, circular 
thinking, or even historical impossibility of such an assertion. Moreover, 
thinking in terms of such self-appointed paternalism creates thought 
patterns, and thereby, cultural contexts, wherein developed countries think 
that underdeveloped countries can only be understood in terms of the 
developed countries charactaristics or structures. Yet history demonstrates 
that underdeveloped countries are as much, if not more so. the products of 
the social, cultural, historical, political, and economic charactaristics and 
structures' of developed countries. Consequently, these underdeveloped 
countries are an integral, if not necessary, part the development of the 
developed, or developing, countries. 
In other words, the efforts, and the methods, of developed countries 
sustain their development for themselves, inasmush as they create 
underdevelopment for others. Those who are underdeveloped, conversely, 
both create the development of the developers, and sustain their own 
underdevelopment by incorporating the histories and customs of their 
imperialist aggressors. The reality that development and underdevelopment 
can. and do create a sort of mutual, self-creating, self-perpetuating, 
feed-back loop between themselves, even though one is benil'itting at the 
expense of the other, caused Frank to make the distinction in his later 
writings between what he called the development of underdevelopment. 
1 0  
and the underdevelopment of development" (Frank 1990 i 
For the purposes of this thesis I will use the term socjoecx>noai/c 
underdeveJopment to describe the reality of. and the process by which, 
developed peoples, willingly or unwillingly, but by definition, create 
underdeveloped peoples, to establish the ways of the developers as 
standard, by, and through, defining the ways of those underdeveloped as 
sub-standard; and I add the prefix socio-" to indicate the mutual 
dependence of economics and politics with culture and cultural identity as a 
necessary condition of this process. 
Socioeconomic Underdevelopment in the Americas 
Most Westerners, especially Americans, through terms like second and 
third world, have come to think of backward or underdeveloped peoples as 
automatically residing in some foreign or exotic land, on the other side of the 
globe. However, the fact has been inescapable that even in the United States, 
the most powerful industrial nation in the world, where 6 percent of the 
worlds people comsume over 40 percent of the world's resources, an 
exponentially increasing number of its own citizins are. and have been 
socioeconomically underdeveloped and underprivileged. Traditionally, these 
people have always been, and continue to be, the American Indians. It is 
through studying the results of development plans that American 
1 1  
anthropologists, with the help of the efforts of thinkers like Frank, and 
through the theoretical tenets of dependancy theory, evolution, and Marxist 
anthropology, "began to argue that capitalism and western development 
initiatives were the cause, and not the cure, of underdevelopment" (Hoben 
1997t. Underdevelopment is therefore seen as the way in which already 
marginalized portions of our indigenous population are systematically kept 
in a state of perpetual colonialism. 
Those who are underdeveloped in the Americas are made subordinate 
in a system not of their chosing by a method not too difficult to trace. 
Usually the seat of power is l(x:ated somewhere else, if not almost completely 
inaccesable and obscured from view, or even contact. Initially, it almost 
invariably involves the imposition of Christianity, in the form of 
missionaries, who require regular church attendance. Thus, ushering in the 
end of nomadic lifestyles and the beginning of sedentary ones, sustainable 
through agriculture and the domestication of animals. Later, through the 
mechanisms of capitalism, those underdeveloped are forced from a relatively 
egalitarian system onto a cash economy, promoting isolated and individual 
success, and subsequently denied the means to earn the necessary cash, or 
even an infrastructure within which to spend it (Cernea 1991; Horowitz & 
Painter 1986). 
At this point in the civilization of the savages' through these Western 
1 2  
development initiatives, it can safely be said that they have been 
underdeveloped. As Hobart states; 
What is singally absent in most public discussion of development are the 
ways in which the knowledges of the peoples being developed are ignored or 
treated as mere obsticals to rational progress. In order for them to be able to 
progress, these peoples have to be constituted as underdeveloped and ignorant 
Conversely, without such underdevelopment and ignorance, the West could not 
represent itself as developed and possessing knowledge. 
. At various times Ihe peoples of much of the world have been portrayed 
as savage, decadent or merely pagan and unenlightened. So they require law 
and order, effective government or Christianity and civili2ation. Whatever the 
rationale, non-western societies have been widely represented as static, passive 
and incapable of the progress based on rational government and economic 
activity which the West alone could provide (Hobart 1993 ) 
Here is illustrated the the method of ethnocentric enculturation 
through the tnechanisms of capitalistic growth and development, which 
result in the inevitable socioeconomic inequality where non-western peoples 
are systematically rendered sobordinate and subservient, while their 
hegemonic historical, political, and economic aggressors remain, through the 
same system, dominant and chiefl^^ Consequently, it becomes necessary in 
scholarly endevors to incorporate the histories, politics, and economics of 
underdeveloped peoples, as independently as possible from the culturally 
conteitualized perspectives of their self-appointed paternalistic gaurdians, 
with the possibility of advocacy and emancipation emerging and being 
discovered. These methods fall generally under the heading of 
"Ethnohistory. 
1 3  
Introduction to Ethnohistory 
Ethnohistory is a twentieth century offspring of American cultural 
anthropology, history, archaeology, and to some extent, British social 
anthropology It was designed to better reconstruct the histories of North 
American aboriginal peoples before European contact using documentary as 
well as oral histories, archaeological data, and the insights born of the 
conceptual frameworks of cultural and social anthropology Past attempts at 
reconstruction privileged, if not consisted exclusively of naive and baised 
written accounts of second and third hand outside observers. 
"Ethnohistorians Ion the other hand! combine their historical' sources with 
ethnographic field work among the presentday members of the societies 
whose past they aim to reconstruct " (Cohn 1980). 
Ethnohistory has seen its theories, methods, and goals evolve over the 
course of the last century, in much the same way that its broader field of 
cultural anthropology has. To summarize the chronology of the theoretical 
and methodological history of American cultural anthropology (refered to 
hence forth as, simply, anthropology), one writer, Stanley R. Barrett, has 
described these stages in the development of anthropology as follows. First, 
there was the initial construction of the scientific foundations of the 
discipline from about the turn of the last century to the early 1950 s, 
marked by the post-war climate and collapse of colonialism. Then, in the 
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i960's. new theories emerged to patch the cracics in the foundation 
stemming from doubts about scientific approaches to human culture. Finally, 
from the 1970 s to today, the academic community has witnessed a 
demolition and reconstruction' of the foundation, with its postmodern 
underpinnings and feminist overtones, which sought to question the very 
cornerstones of the discipline (Barrett 1996:xii). 
The development of ethnohistory has mirrored this overall pattern of 
evolution in anthropology, albeit microcosmically, as anthropology did so by 
reflecting the emerging trends in Western academia, as well as in the social, 
political, and historical Western world in general. In the following section. I 
wish to trace this path as it emerged in the practice of ethnohistory, present 
some of the current trends in ethnohistoric approaches, and illustrate the 
ethnohistorical method I wish to employ in my work. 
The Founding of the Discipline of Ethnohistory 
Clark Wissler may have been the first to use the term ethnohistory. He 
wrote that when reconstructing cultures of prehistoric peoples, all have 
followed the same general method of reconstructing the prehistoric culture 
by welding together the available ethno historical and archaeological data, a 
method justified by the failure to find neither local evidences of great 
antiquity nor indications of successive or contemporaneous culture types 
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(Wissler 1909:3-62). Implicit in this statement is that these data of 
prehistoric noniiterate societies were exclusively documented by 
non-natives. And the notion of native peoples' oral traditions as unecessary 
or unworthy for analytical consideration (as any written tradition was 
simply unavailable!, represented the European mindset, which was. to a 
large extent, the academic order of the day. Alfred JCroeber stated thai, 
pertaining to the study of poor dateless primitives we do not possess 
even one document written before our day" (Kroeber (19011 1952). This 
view might best be illustrated in the words of Robert Lowie. 
The important thing to keep in mind is that the question before us is not a 
metaphysical one. but a question of method We are not concerned with the 
abstra^it possibility of tradition preserving a knowledge of events; we want to 
know what historical conclusions may safely be drawn from given oral 
traditions in ethnological practice. And as regards this purely methodological 
question I can only say, that 1 cannot attach to oral traditions any historical 
value whatsoever under any conditions whatsoever. We cannot know them to be 
true except on the basis of extraneous evidence, and in that case they are 
superfluous since the linguistic, ethnological, or archaeological data suffice to 
establish the conclusion in question (Lowie 1915:598) 
The historical particularism and diffusionism, stemming from the 
cross-diciplinary efforts of Franz Boas, has been argued by scholars to be 
opposed to the distributionism of Wissler, Kroeber, and Lowie. Whether they 
argued for evolutionism and independent invention to defeat diffusionism. to 
incorporate it, or to demonstrate the "phychic unity of mankind" is 
debatable. Nevertheless, their points of view epitomized the overall trend in 
ethnohistory for decades. Emphasis was placed on documentation and 
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ethnohistorians were generally unsympathetic toward oral iradition as a 
reliable source of factual data. And with ethnohistorv being a North 
American practice, the information gathered primarily pertained to the 
mdigeneous peoples thereof, and the data documented' was gathered and 
analyzed by Europeans according to European traditions. Lowie even went 
so far as to utterly denv "that primitive man is endowed with historical 
sense or perspective." Furthermore that the anthropologists "historical 
problems can be solved only by the objective methods of comparative 
ethnology, archaeology, linguistics, and physical anthropology (Lowie (1917) 
1960), 
This theory prevailed even into the 1960's with H. H, Trevor-Roper. He 
argued that "the only history worthwhile was the history of Europeans in 
Africa' (Krech 1991:345). He further argued that "the rest [of history) is 
largely darkness, like the history of pre-European, pre-Columbian America. 
And darkness is not a subject for history. We should not amuse ourselves 
with the unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but 
irrelevant corners of the globe" (Trevor-Roper 1965.304). 
Patchini^ the Cracks in the Practice of Ethnohistorv 
Although the majority of these theoretical and methodological 
approaches in early twentieth century academia reflected this emphasis on 
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comparative, objective, cuUuraily hierarchical, and traditionally scientilic 
tenets, there were, even as far back as 1922, those who attempted to employ 
a direct historical approach in reconstructing the past histories of aboriginal 
peoples. The most notable of which was the work of John R. Swanton on the 
Indians of the American Southeast (Swanton 1922). In it. he used an 
extensive array of documentary materials, and supplemented these with a 
great deal of fieldwork among the tribes themselves. Consequently, in 1940. 
the Smithsonian Institution published an in-depth and systematic 
ethnohistorical work and dedicated it to Swanton (Smithsonian Institution 
1940), This was the first work which "indicated the ethnohistoric approach 
that was to become formalized in the 1950's' (Cohn 1980), 
William Fenton used seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century documents to 
trace location and movement of Iroquois bands (1940): William Duncan Strong 
demonstrated that documentary materials could be used vith archaeological data 
to provide a continuous record from present into the past of particular sites 
(1940); Julian Steward's study of Great ^sin societies combines ecology history, 
archeaology. and ethnography and yeiided insight into structural and cultural 
processes(1940) 
The accumulation of ethnographic data made it clear that early 
assumptions about the stability of cultures and societies before European contact 
were false. Anthropologists began to realize that instead of a precontact 
situation of stagnation in ai)original socieities, [significant] changes had 
occured- . In each case the culture and society that anthropologists assumed 
vere static and stable and from which oa© could measure and describe change 
were in themselves changing because of outside influences (Cohn 1980) 
The realization put fourth by the work of those employed by the 
Smithsonian Institution in 1940, that the benckmarks and plumblines 
tradiiionally used to measure the spread of, the change in, and thereby 
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determine the significance of, cultures and cultural events, (for the purposes 
of describing, delineating, classifying and categorizing cultures and cultural 
identity through comparative analyses of cultural evolution), are rendered 
insubstantial when they themselves are seen to also be changing, was not 
only instrumental in flushing out earlier dogmatic perspectives in academic 
mindsets, it also set the stage for the return of cultural relativism in the 
post-structuralist times yet to come. For if this seemingly separate and 
stable perspective, which traditional positivistic and scientific observation 
requires, and which the academic paradigms of the time were steeped in, is 
realized, instead, to be interconnected and dynamic, then it simply cannot 
arrest or fixate, by observation, that which it is observing. It would, 
however take four more decades to begin to become politically correct to 
admit that this realization does not make an analysis of the present, or a 
reconstruction of the past, any less true. For the notion that conclusions 
must be the result of arrested observations and analyses from a fixed 
perspective in order to be taken seriously, is itself, a social, political, 
historical, and cultural construct; and therefore, is relative, in itself. 
The second event which accelerated the formalization of ethnohistory 
was the passing of the Indian Claims Act by Congress in 1946. The 
provisions of this act allowed tribes to seek restitution from the U.S. 
government by filing law suits in the name of countless treaty violations 
1 9  
which occured nationwide from the close of the Indian Wars of the oiid to 
late nineteenth century, through the early twentieth century Thus the 
Indian Claims Commission was established to attempt to settle these disputes 
which arose as Indian land had continued to be taken away from the tribes 
after the treaties were signed. Ethnographic specialists were therefore 
required as arbitrators, and anthropologists were then called upon to 
substantiate both governmental and tribal claims. In short, the work of the 
Indian Claims Commission forced anthropologists to become historians as 
archival reasearch was needed "to establish location, extent, and nature of 
aboriginal control over various territories and the exact nature of Ifederal] 
treaty obligations (Cohn 19S0i 
The third factor in the formalization of ethnohistory occured when its 
practice became academically institutionalized from 1954 with the 
introduction of the journal of Ethnohistory, through 1966 with the 
establishment of the American Society for Ethnohistory Ethnohistory. 
which was founded partly to provide an outlet for materials and interest 
developed by the Indian claims cases," first defined their approach as one 
which "focused on the documentary history of the culture and movements of 
primitive peoples, with special emphasis on the American Indian (trech 
1997:160). The information generated by such method was subsequently 
employed by The Indian Claims Commission, whose agenda it served in 
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many land claims cases brought before the commission in the 1950 s. who 
privileged documented truth claims over oral ones. 
In 1961. the editors of Ethnohistorv held a symposium "On The Concept 
of Ethnohistory At the symposium a re-examination of the purpose of 
ethnohistory was discussed. One scholar argued that ethnohistory was 
conceived to provide a documented history of the concealed and officially 
inarticulate groups in American history." Because negro history and 
immigration history are still written largely from the point of view, and 
source materials, of the dominant White majority' (Dorson 1961:17). 
Another acknowledged that we certainly owed much to the traditional 
historical accounts, but held that, in practice, ethnohistory ought to be more 
inclusive, for traditional methods for gathering information were begining to 
be called into question. And therefore the prefix ethno-' itself suggests the 
need for "trained, impartial and purposeful observers voiced in the early 
days of the scientific study of culture, [which] reflected dissatisfaction with 
the need to rely on the casual and fortuitous cultural data available in 
accounts of travelers, missionaries, and the like' (Lurie 1961:82). Here we 
see indications of the growing trend to incorporate the anthropological with 
the historical, and to examine more 'eclectic uses of data from a wide range 
of sources, such as archives. museuDis. and especially fieldwork. 
The essence of ethnohistorical approaches could also now be seen as a 
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combination of documentary evidence and broad speculative cultural 
implications provided by, say, archaeological method as well iBaerris 1961). 
Historical as well as anthropological theory and method were said to be 
married in the ethnohistorian, who thus produced a more balanced, and 
rounded" account, and thereby a truer one (Axtell 1981. Ewers 1961) For in 
their origional Greek, history was the study of one's own nation, and 
ethnology was the study of the Other. And thus the ethnohistorical method 
can vary from the traditional ethnological and historical approaches 
(Washburn 1961). It can thus be combined with the methodological 
framework of field anthropology, which had, up until that point, specialized 
in cultural studies of the Other. 
A simple yet enduring definition of this sort was espoused by William 
C. Sturtevant when he stated that ethnohistory is "the study of the history of 
peoples normally studied by anthropologists." Furthermore. Sturtevant 
suggests that in studying, the ethnohistorian ought to be concerned with 
primarily three issues; 
, , concentration on the past or the present; the use of written or nonwritten 
documents : [and] a diachronic or a synchronic emphasis. Among additional 
dimensions are: concern with history as we understand it. or with the 
charactariEation of other, folk' views of history: whether the society studied is a 
Western or Oriental civilization or a more exotic one; the value placed on 
typologizing cultural or social phenomena and their changes, that is. on 
generalizing or abstracting principles or theories from concrete data as opposed 
to emphasis on the uniquness of events, on the study of a specific period or 
sequence for its own sake raiher than as an example of general processes 
(S tune van I 1966:6-7) 
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William Fenton concured and offered that ethnohistory seems to be an 
approach, not a discipline," but one emerging as a "hybrid field, that scholars 
who use this approach are never really both. and that we had best not 
forget our disciplinary origin.' He goes on to state. 
that it is the ethnographer's business to apprehend culture; and 
likewise, it is the ethnologist's business to dilineate patterns, forms, and 
processes of culture history. But such attempts at descriptive integration, to use 
the anthropologist Alfred L. Kroeber's phrase, are also charactaristic of the work 
of the historian. What really divides us is whether we take smAll or large 
segments of time, whether we ignore time altogether, or whether we take the 
whole world as our province, or whether we es^y the history of a [single] tribe 
The ethnohistorian has little use for the concepts of micro-dynamics or 
macro-dynamics, which appear so useful to cultural evolutionists in their 
concern for the whole broad span of human history and prehistory. The latter 
are in the traditions of the comparative method and of the idea of progress, and 
they are not really interested in history at all but in science' in the broadest 
terms (Fenton l%2:2-3) 
Therefore, in redefining their field during the 1960's, ethnohistorians 
strived to combine the skills of the historian with that of the anthropologist 
as they saw them. This mainly involved the use of documentary as well as 
oral sources, and archival research, as well as information from museums, 
and fieldwork. "It was assumed that history contributed a concern for 
accuracy, [and] anthropology an interest in generalization and culture 
theory (Krech 1997). This is not to imply that the borders which define 
disciplines were dissolving and rendering their contents soluable in such a 
precise and definable way as that which traditionally separated them. But 
there was a growing realization that history, social history, cultural history, 
ethnohistory, ethnology, social anthropology, and cultural anthropology, were 
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much less dissimilar in their approaches and purposes than previously 
acknowledged. Furthermore, that these approaches were becoming more 
dissimilar than the traditional, evolutionary, hierarchical, and comparative 
approaches, as they were more interested "in science' in the broadest 
terms,' was becoming quite apparent as well. 
Recoastructigg the Approach of Ethnohistory 
Since the 1980's the traditional definitions of anthropology and history 
have continued to bleed into one another. Historians are now speaking more 
frequently about non-Western beliefs, customs, ideas, and events, as well are 
anthropologists speaking of rather non-exotic Western peoples, right in their 
own back yard. Krech is quick to remind us, though, that while many new 
names have been introduced to describe these scholarly pursuits, most of the 
traditional notions which the new vocabulary is designed to move beyond, 
have remained. This has effected the practice of ethnohistory in two ways, 
presented here as both detrimental and benificial. 
The detrimental aspect of the methodology of the 1960 s carrying over 
to the present, albeit an arguable one. is exemplified in the etymology of the 
word itself. Ethnos, from the Greek word for nation,' was applied 
connotatively in that language mainly to describe the Other, as it is also 
applied today. However, at that time the other' it refered to was primarily 
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seen as tribal, primitive, unrefined, and barbaric. And no matter how much 
combination we have wittnessed in the theory and method of history and 
anthropology, of exotic and non-exotic peoples, Oriental and Occidental, IQ-ech 
points out that the concept of the Other has not lost all of its ancient Greek 
connotations: "Today, it [ethnohistory] has not shaken its tribal or pagan 
referent: tribal groups have ethnohistory, minority' groups may have it, but 
rarely do majority groups. In practice ethnohistory has been exclusionary 
(Krech 1997:161). 
While ethnohistory can be seen as exclusive in their choice of subjects, 
the second way that anthropology and history have co-mingled has been 
rather inclusive. If historians are studying the Other people they are 
normally not accustomed to dealing with, and anthropologists are studying 
those people with whom they traditionally held a Vested interest, then this 
is indicitive of a growing reflexivity between these two fields. Which, if 
ethnohistory is acknowledging that something has been lost by privileging 
data toward literate, academic, and imperialistic entities, and thus, 
attempting to redefine itself to be more inclusive of the Other, be it by the 
use of museum records, archival data, oral traditions, or narrative 
descriptions, would it not be a necessary condition for becoming more 
inclusive of the Other, to be also more inclusive of eachother? tCrech states 
that this is the case, and this is precisely what has been happening. 
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Furthermore if the problem is with the "ethno-" part of the word, then 
maybe scholars ought to be calling it something else. Krech suggests 
"anthropological history. To take a spin off of Sturtevant, ethnohistory 
could now also be described as the study by anthropologists in the 
methodology normally used by historians. This would be in keeping with 
the postmodernity in recent attempts to turn the focus of our lense back 
upon ourselves. There would also be an element of dynamics and 
interconnected ness in ICrech's anthropological history in that it would change 
with current trends in academics. After all, history is not only done, it is also 
being done. 
Krech summarizes the history of ethnohistory from the patchwork 
through its demolition and reconstruction thusly; 
Ethnohistorians once helped bridge anthropology and history at a time 
when anthropology largely ignored history and history paid no attention to 
small-scale, indigeneous societies. Although the label 'ethnohistory' may today 
be suspect, its methodology is not. Renamed 'anthropological iiistory," the 
methodology involves, as it always has, the combination of method and theory 
current in history and anthropology, and the focus on history or historiography 
in or of some ethnic group. The degree to which anthropological historians 
engage theory and structure history as narrative remains a matter of diciplinary 
preference - anthropologists tend to remain comparative, explicit and analytic, 
historians tend to consign theory to endnotes and still privilege narrarive - but 
each year there are new eseptions. There is no reason to think that 
ethnohistory, as anthropological history, will not continue to flourish (Krech 
1997:162). 
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Current Trends in AnthroooAogical History 
Scholars today have been interested more and more about culturally 
specific way of knowing or making history, that is, how the Other sees itself, 
or even, how the Other sees the way it is bejng seen (Clifford 1986a; Geertz 
1973, 1974, 1984, 1988; Rabinow 1986; Tausig 1992). They have also 
attempted to tease out the native voice in colonial texts, which shed light on 
the way Western history has been produced, or even manufactured into an 
"invented tradition." In other words, they are examining the ways in which 
we see the Other as well (Axtell 1988; Bruner 1986; Dening 1988; Hobsbawm 
& Ranger 1983; Sahlins 1985). 
As a result of this unveiling of Eurocentricity in historical and 
anthropological writing, many other styles and approaches are emerging as 
well. Narrative downstream specific histories still rely more heavily on 
documentation, but attempt to "release" chronological descriptions of native 
culture from the archives. Other narratives choose to employ more 
historiography and describe the native perspective. Some give more or less 
inclusion to theory in their narratives. Other non-narrative forms of specific 
history explore ecology, demography, economy, politics, globalism, 
mercantilism, commoditization. modes of production, and world-systems 
using historical method to expose the overall interconnectedness of societies 
over time (Cronon 1983; White 1983; Wolf 1999;). Finally, some are 
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interested in how the power of globalism supercedes that of agency, as well 
as how agency overrides globalism. So indigenous peoples can now be seen 
as willing or unwilling participants in the writing of the colonial histories of 
their Western imperialist aggressors as well (Sahlins 1995). 
Methods 
With all of this in mind, I will present, using the skills of the cultural 
anthropologist and the methods of the ethnohistorian, the history of the 
socioeconomic underdevolpment of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes of the Flathead Indian Reservation in western Montana. Beginning in 
1804 with their first recorded contact with the white man, but concentrating 
on the post-reservation years, after 1855. I will use a variety of sources in a 
diachronic narrative of the ethnocentric enculturation and systematic 
socioeconomic underdevelopment of the Tribes. This phase was ushered in 
with the signing of the Hell Gate Treaty of 1855, then escalated, and peaked 
in the 1930's with the completion of the Kerr dam near Poison, Montana. 
The information was gathered from books, journals, magazines, 
newspapers, films, bulletins, pamphlets, archival documents. Senate reports 
and hearings, House reports and bills, the United States Congressional Record, 
The United States Statutes at Large, other government documents, and 
several brief interviews among local tribal members, tribal government, and 
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power company officials. They will demonstrate how the Indians became 
the unwilling wards of the state; and how the Great White Father, the United 
States government, the self-appointed paternalistic gaurdian to these wards, 
did not live up to its promises or its obligations. 
The Indians supposed protectors forced them onto lands they did not 
want, outlawed their language, religion, and customs, and systematically all 
but destroyed their tribalism by imposing a socioeconomic system which 
rewarded individual success and discouraged, if not punished, collective 
success. The United States government forced the Indians onto a cash 
economy, and took away their ability to earn or spend that cash. They broke 
nearly every promise made in the Hell Gate Treaty designed to promote and 
provide an independent economy for the Indians, while claiming that they 
were doing this for the Indians' own good, and for the purpose of teaching 
them to be farmers. 
Furthermore, it was the governments attempts to make sedentary 
farming citizins out of this free and nomadic interrelated band of 
hunter-gatherers, through the self-proclaimed "trustee" authority the 
government had over all of the resources possessed by its Indian children, 
that justified the illegal confiscation and reassignment, or allotment, of their 
tribal lands, the selling off of the surplus lands, and the opening of the 
reservation to white settlement. Consequently, the government was able to 
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the construct an unwanted, massive irrigation system that was incomplete, 
shody. and disfunctional. and which contributed to the socioeconomic 
underdevelopment of the Confederated Tribes, as it made the irrigation 
project reemburcible by those who built it, the federal government itself. 
Therefore, because the Indians had to pay for the irrigation system, out 
of their own funds, which they could not control or even see, their trees 
were cut and their lands were sold; and when the Indians could not pay for 
the system through inaccessable markets with the crops that the system 
supposedly would provide, but did not, their allotments were forciosed upon, 
and they lost more land. Consequently, all of this laid the political and 
economic ground-work for the construction of the Kerr dam. where the 
Indians protectors and providers would open the gates of the reservation 
even wider to allow big business, in the form of a transnational corporation, 
onto Indian lands to attempt further confiscation of Indian lands to clear the 
debt which the government had amassed and passed on to the Indians. 
Through it all, though, the political sophistication of the Confederated 
Tribes continued to erode the corrupt ways of their imperialistic aggressors 
through to the present day; much like the sacred water they so admired and 
identified with, which was arrested and harnessed by the white man; who 
further used it to subjugate and underdevelop the Indian people. Because, 
for better or worse, all of these socioeconomic and sociopolitical events had 
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become a source of cultural identity for the Confederated Saiish and Kootenai 
Tribes; arguably as much as the events in their pre-contact history. 
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Pre-reservation History, and Underdevelopment In the 
Early Reservation Years: 1855-1926 
The Flatheads, orSalish, were one of the few ladian tribes to welcome the coming 
of the white man, remain his friends, and refrain from Joining from Joining in the 
battle against him. For this, they were dispossessed of their lands by the federal 
government and consigned to oblivion by historians who have treated them only 
episodically and impressionistically (Fahey 1974J. 
It has been said that "the story of Kerr Dam is the story of conflict and 
exchange over deeply opposing ways of life" (Bigcrane 1991). The Salish and 
Kootenai way of life can be described in four stages; 1) the period from time 
immemorial to their first contact with the european horse trade c.1680: 2) 
the period since the Indian's aquisition of the horse and other european 
trade goods to the first contact with whites from the Lewis and Clark 
expedition in 1804; 3) the period of initial white settlement and cultural 
conflict from 1804 to 1855 with the signing of the Hellgate Treaty; and 4) 
the post-reservation years, since 1855. For the purposes of this study I will 
consentrate on the fourth time period. But first I will establish some 
goegraphic, linguistic, political, and historical background information from 
the second and third of these time periods. 
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The Pre-reservation Histories of the Confederated Tribes 
Prior to the Stevens Treaty, or Hell Gate Treaty, of 1855 which 
officially recognized those present at the signing at Council Grove, outside of 
present-day Missoula, which were to be moved to a single reservation under 
the single designation of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, the 
Flathead. Kootenai (pronounced; koo-ten-ey ), and Upper Pend d Oreille 
(pronounced; pond-er-ey ) peoples, primarily occupied a region which 
anthropologists refer to as the Plateau. The Plateau is a semi-arid region of 
mountains and valleys with a comparatively mild climate, high-level 
meadows, rivers, and glacial lakes, located between the Pacific Northwest 
and the eastern Great Plains. More specifically, the Plateau Indians resided 
"in a cultural area approximately bounded on the north by the McKenzie 
Basin Drainage, on the south by the California-Oregon border, on the west by 
the Cascades, and on the east by the Rocky Mountains' (Fahey 1974; xxi). 
The peoples inhabiting the eastern most regions of the Plateau would also 
cross the Rocky Mountians periodically and spill out onto the buffalo ranges 
of the Upper Missouri for annual or semi-annual hunts. 
The word Salish is a linguistic term refering to the general language 
group spoken by most Plateau Indians. Due to their geographical location, 
these tribes served as a gateway through which all trappers, traders, 
settlers, and later government and military officials, had to pass. "The first 
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literate white men among the Flatheads observed that with Salish alone one 
can converse from the United States to the Willamette without the 
necessitiy of an interpreter. [Also] he will find many among the Blackfeet, 
the Crows, and the Crees who speak the Flathead language " (Fahey 1974; 8). 
The Salish, albeit unknowingly, were thus perched in a unique and rather 
precarious geographical and political position. The Flatheads, to whom the 
tribal designation "Salish" now exclusively names, resided in what is now 
known as the Bitterroot Valley south of present day Missoula, Montana. 
The Flatheads, contrary to some popular misnomers of the time, did not 
engage in the practice of flattening the heads of their infants, as did some 
tribes west of the Plateau. Those tribes who did practice such a custom, 
lived near the mouth of the Columbia river and were primarily comprised of 
the Cathlamahs, K.illmucks, Clatsops, Chinooks, and Chilts (Ronan 1890). The 
theory persists that the Salish, or Flathead people of the Bitterroot Valley, 
received the name as, over time, anyone passing across the continient to the 
west, as were all newcommers at the time, (except those representatives of 
the early trading companies riding east from the port cities of the west 
coast), would have to pass through using the universal sign language in the 
region. That language identified this tribe by "pressing both sides of the 
head with the hands. It stands to reason, then, that anyone unfamiliar with 
the inhabitants of this land probably expected to find it occupied by Indians 
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with flattened heads. Another reason for the discrepancy could simply be 
that those with flattened heads, being linguistic, cultural, and geographical 
cousins of the Salish, were at times seen with the Salish by whites (Fahey 
1974; Hungry Wolf 1974). 
This same sign, with an added gesture, signified another group of 
people living to the north around the Flathead Lake area who also spoke 
Salish. French trappers and traders later identified these people as those 
who ornamented themselves with dentalium earrings, and they have since 
been called Pend d'Oreilles, or Kalispells (Partoll 1951). They would later be 
dintinguished from other Pend d'Oreilles living further west and north 
around Lake Pend d Oreille and along the Clark s Fork of the Columbia in 
what is now the Idaho Panhandle (Chalfant 1974). They, like other Interior 
Salish peoples, such as the Spokanes and Coeur d'Alenes {core-da-Iains), of 
which the Flatheads were the most prominant, told stories of earlier 
migrations from lands beyond the Rocky Mountains (Carriker 1973: Chalfant 
1974). 
The Kootenais, are the only tribe in the area not to speak the Salish 
toungue. In fact, they posessed a language unlike any other known tribe, 
according to the manuscripts of the earliest trappers and traders (Curtis 
1911; Fahey 1974). At the time of contact, the Kootenai, which were later to 
be encorporated into the Confederated Tribes, occupied a region known as 
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the Tobacco Plains which lie in an area around what is now the United States 
and Canadian border north of present day Libby, Montana and west of 
Glacier National Park. The entire Kootenai nation, though, ranged from the 
areas just north of Flathead Lake, up through the Tobacco Plains and over a 
hundred miles north into present-day Alberta and British Columbia, in an 
area bordered on the east by the Rocky Mountains, and on the west by 
Arrow Lake and the Columbia river; which is all centered around the 
Kootenai river (Antiste 1987). Different bands of Kooteni were designated 
depending on where they were located in this river drainage system. It was 
those who resided in what would later be called the Dayton creek area of 
Montana, called the Flathead Lake Kootenai, who were present during the 
initial delegations and subsequent treaty councils with territorial governor 
Isaac Stevens between 1853 and 1855. They were, therefore, destined to be 
separated from the rest of the Kootenai people to the north and become 
members of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes. 
The vastness and diversity of the region and its people are significant 
when noting not only how much land and resources were ceeded by the 
Indians when the reservation system was established, but also in terms of 
which tribes were separated from which, culturally and geographically, and 
why. Whites misinterpreted certain cultural differences as similarities, and 
Indians almost invariably misinterpreted the intentions, the meanings, and 
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even the very words of whites; especially during treaty negotiations. 
Consequently, the names given to these tribes are primarily those of the first 
French trappers and traders. The Indians naturally had names for 
themselves in their own languages which ment, like most Indians' names, 
"the people," or ' the human beings." However, as non-literate peoples were 
first contacted by literate peoples, who were new to the country and 
relatively ignorant, and who came from a cultural tradition which renders 
the world intelligible through categorization, post-contact written accounts 
tended to separate people into certain groups delineated by certain 
geographical and cultural parameters, which the Tribes may or may not 
have recognized themselves. In traditional times, through trade and 
intermarriage, peace and communal living, were for the most part, 
predominant in the region; with the exception of those attacks by the 
Blackfeet (and occasionally the Crow or Souix) to the east, and the Snakes to 
the south (Johnson 1969; Fahey 1974; Fuller 1974). 
As a result of these written accounts by different men of different 
backgrounds, languages, and nationalities, and because there was no prior 
precedent in the first days after contact, one may find the following 
variations in spelling when researching into the past of these peoples; Salish, 
Selish, or Saleesh; Kalispell, Kullyspell, Calespelles, Pend Oreille, Pend 
d'Oreille, Upper Pend d"Oreille; and tCootenai, Kootanae, Kootenais, fCootenay, 
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Kutenee, Kutanee, or Kutenai. I will use those spellings which are agreed 
upon by the Tribes today; Flathead or Salish, Kootenai, and Upper Pend 
d Oreille or Kalispel. 
The introduction of the horse into the cultures of the Plains and Plateau 
peoples is significant for several reasons. It greatly increased the efficiency 
of hunting. This would result in the beginning of a period of decline in the 
numbers of available game, and thus, increased competition among 
neighboring tribes. It also changed the local economy between the Plains 
and the Plateau. With few exceptions, the social structures and subsistance 
activities were communal (Fahey 1974). Historically one tribe would let 
another dig camas or bitterroot in exchange for buffalo hunting rights later 
in the year. However, with the coming of the horse, these peoples were now 
connected, albeit indirectly, with British, French, and Spanish settlements all 
around the continent. Therefore as the trade routes brought more horses, it 
also brought more guns. And so, the disappearance of game emphisized the 
concept of individual wealth and prestige, as opposed to communal. It also 
brought epidemics of diseases such as smallpox and tuberculosis, and an 
increase in intertribal warfare, as variations in geographical and political 
positioning allowed some tribes to possess more guns and horses than others. 
So even though the Confederated Tribes may have expanded and 
separated in their pre-historic migrations, as archaeological evidence and 
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oral histories suggest, and thus roamed the vast expanses of the Plateau and 
all its surrounding areas living communally and sharing subsistance 
strategies, it was the combination of horses, guns, epidemics, wars, and 
general overall westward expantion of Indians and settelers in the late 
eighteenth century which pushed both people and buffalo west and confined 
and isolated the tribes into their aforementioned geographical and political 
areas at the time of contact. 
This occured for the Salish when they met the Lewis and Clark 
expedition on September 4. 1805, and later helped them across the 
Bitterroot Mountains: which began the recorded history of the peoples who 
would later become the Confederated Tribes. The areas claimed by the 
Tribes at this time would represent how trappers and traders would 
establish their network of inroads into these cultures, and how the Hell Gate 
Treaty would later separate and categorize them. The location of the Tribes 
also helped to establish Salish as the predominant language of the region, 
and the Flatheads as the most conspicuous of its members. Their lands, the 
Bitterroot Valley, were geographically and politically significant as they 
represented the gateway between resources; mainly, the camas and 
bitterroot of the Plateau, and the buffalo of the Plains. They provided a 
sanctuary from outside influences, like war and disease, but also made it 
easier for their neighboring tribe, The Blackfeet, to conduct their raids and 
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war parties. In the future, though, this would further the Flathead's desire 
for protection from Jesuit missionaries, called the Blackrobes. 
The Salish and Kootenai people appear, according to many of the 
writtings of early trappers and traders, to have maintained their peaceful 
demeanor, in spite of their circumstances. David Thompson, formerly of the 
Hudson s Bay Company and later the North West Company, built tCulyspell 
House on Lake Pend d Oreille, and, at the time, found the Flatheads with only 
a few rude lances, and flint headed arrows' (Fahey 1974:29). This was 
mainly due to the intertribal wars made more frequent and more deadly by 
the unequal distribution of horses and guns. After estabUshing the first 
known semi-permanent structures in what would later become Montana in 
1809 (Ronan 1890), Thompson spoke of the Salish as an intelligent race of 
men, hospitable, proud of their industry and their skill in doing anything, 
and [who] are as neat in their persons as circumstances will allow' (Fahey 
1974;29). Another early fur trapper, a young clerk of Jacob Astor's Pacific 
Fur Company, met the Flatheads in November 1810 stating, "We were quite 
charmed with their frank and hospitable reception, and their superiorty in 
cleanliness over any of the tribes we haad seen hitherto" (Fahey 1974:31). 
T. w. « BtHioti iicmcrtia-nt 'Wftstc csf the Kutcnais, "They arc honest 
and do not beg. qualities which I have never met with yet in any Indians" 
(Fahey 1974:33). 
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The concepts of socioeconomic inequality and the decrease in available 
game which accompanied the coming of the horse, were increased with the 
introduction of a market economy by the fur traders. This furthered the 
destruction of their tradional way of life by altering the natural balance 
between man and nature. Through privatizing the formerly shared 
resources which were used with nature, they began to become something 
separate from nature to be competed for, and used over nature. However, 
while the results of inequality which naturally accompany the introduction 
of supply and demand economics, and colonial-age goods among stone-age 
peoples, the Flatheads, nevertheless, continued to demonstrate the many 
cultural charactaristics which originally made them the most prominent 
peoples in the region, as well as those which many european newcommers 
would consider moral, upstanding, and civilized. This would not, however, 
stop them from later efforts to cheat the Indians out of their traditional 
homelands and subsume their traditional culture, as these inroads laid by 
the traders began to pave the way for religious domination as well (Fahey 
1974). 
Because of their being forced into these more isolated and fixed 
locations, making Blackfoot raids easier and more devastating, the Salish 
sought the protection of the white man first through his missionaries. This 
behavior was quite rare among Indian peoples. However, the Salish had long 
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anticipated requesting the advice of the white man as the prophecy of a 
Pend d'Oreiiie eider, Shining Shirt, had foretold of the coining of white men 
in long black dresses who would tell the Indians of another way to live. 
When several Iroquois setteled among the Bitterroot Salish in the early 
nineteenth century and told them of the Jesuit missionaries, they were 
anxious to fulfill this prophecy (Fahey 1974; Turney-High 1937). 
In an attempt for peaceful and mutual cross-cultural communication, 
previously unheard of in the region, the Flatheads set out on their own to 
make contact with, and seek out the medicine of the Blackrobes. They sent 
out a series of deligations to St. Louis in the 1830's. The first three failed, 
ending in unknown deaths and mysterious disappearances of the Indian 
delegates. This did not stop them, however, and the fourth delegation 
succeeded in bringing Father DeSmet into the Bitterroot Valley to establish 
the St. Mary s mission in 1841. Later, the now famous St. Ignatius mission, 
and its boarding school, was established by Father Hoecken with the aid of 
DeSmet in the Jocko Valley in 1854. where the Pend d'Oreiiie camped for the 
winter. DeSmet described the Flatheads as "a chosen people; . it would be 
easy to make this tribe a model for other tribes. .They are charactarized 
by the greatest simplicity, docility, and uprightness Yet to the simplicity 
of children is joined the courage of heros' (Fahey 1974:75). 
Despite the prophecies, the relatively good relations between the 
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Jesuits and the Indians, and the fulfillment of their necessity of protection, 
some of the Indians converted to Christianity and some did not. Some 
created for themselves a combination of the Christian and Indian 
world-view. What is significant to the missionaries contributions to the 
further disintigration of Indian culture, however, is that for Christians, 
religion must be received through the church, which requires regular 
attendence. Traditionally, the Indian view held by all peoples, regardless of 
local idiomatic idiosynchracies, was that everything is alive. Everything 
under the sun, animal, mineral, plant, or human, was the manifestation of 
spirit, and was therefore sacred. This reverenve for all forms of life, without 
hierarchical rank or designation, not only fostered the lifestyle which created 
their balance with their natural environment, which was disappearing and 
creating a dependence on european economic subsistance, it also fostered a 
lifestyle where awareness, prayer, thanksgiving, and communion with all of 
creation, both physical and metaphysical, was more of a constant and 
continuous unfolding process. This was something which the missionaries 
simply could not accept. Because Christianity requires attanding church, the 
priests simply could not have the Indians out chasing buffalo, so they 
sought to enculturate the Indians into an agrarian lifestyle (Bigcrane 1991). 
This cultural paradigm shift, was in keeping with the pattern 
established in virtually all other historical cases of the eurocentric 
43 
enculturation of the American Indians; namely, the imposition of a market 
economy, and hierarchically structured religion, requiring a sedentary 
life-style sustainable through agriculture (Fahey 1974; Prucha 1984). This 
was instramental in the destruction of Indian culture in many ways. 
Immediately it encouraged them to reject the already diminishing numbers 
of buffalo as the primary means of sustenance. However, the buffalo was, of 
course, more than a means of sustenance. It was absolutely central to their 
culture. To make sure all were attending church, the nomadic cyclical 
hunting, harvesting, and measuring of time would be replaced by the 
sedentary, agricultural, and domesticated ways of the white man. The 
missionary's boarding schools, also used specifically for the purpose of 
enforcing this life-style, were another nail in the Indian s cultural coffin, as 
they would not only require regular attendance also, but they taught only in 
English; and they would physically punish and abuse the Indians for 
practicing their beliefs or speaking their own language. 
The most destructive factor in the missionary equation was that, in 
forcing the Indians to become farmers, they introduced a social structure 
based on an economic system which rewards individual efforts and 
successes, and not collective or communal ones. The Indians simply could 
not understand any of this. The old ways certainly seemed to be capable of 
sustaining the people. After all, they were alive, weren't they? One elder 
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commented: to say that an Indian had to plant a garden and raise cattle 
[in order to eat] would be like somebody telhng you that you had to dig a 
well when there was mountain [spring] water running on both sides of your 
house' (Bigcrane 1991). 
It can now be concluded that, all the social factors and historical events 
in this systematic paradigm shift; culture, language, religion, horses, guns, 
disease, trade goods, wars, raids, climate, geography, topography, 
environmental impact, prophecy. missionaries, boarding schools, 
domestication, agriculture, market economy, and the promotion of individual 
success over collective success, all occuring over a period of approximately 
one hundred and seventy-five years, were not only inextricably interrelated, 
but were the direct causes which positioned the Indian peoples, both 
geographically and politically, where they were about to become the 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, through the establishment of a 
treaty with the United States government. 
The Hell Gate Treaty of 18^5 
Prior to their induction into statehood, portions of Washington, Oregon, 
Idaho and Montana, comprised what was called the Washington Territory 
In 1853 the governor of Washington Territory, Isaac Stevens, who's 
instructions from Washington D. C. were to survey and prepare the territory 
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for railroads, mines, and white settlement, began to send delegations into the 
area to prepare the indigenous peoples. By the summer of 1855. Stevens 
was scheduled to make a series of treaties with other tribes along a route 
from the territorial capital in Olympia to Council Grove, near present day 
Missoula, and one afterward with the Blackfeet as well. His agenda called for 
the removal of the "Indian problem" by the end of that summer (Bigart 
1996). Governor Stevens son, Hazard, later recalled that his father had a 
preconceived desire to place all the tribes in the area (which would have 
included the Spokanes and Couer d'Alenes as well) onto one reservation 
claiming that they were all really just one people to begin with (Stevens 
1900). 
The tribal leaders, Victor, Alexander, and Michelle, of the Salish, Pend 
d'Orellie, and Kootenai Tribes, respectively, were openly jealous of one 
another' (Fahey 1974:94). They were not accustomed to being considered a 
sole hierarchical leader as this was not the Indian way. Consequently, 
leadership, power, and authority were misunderstood on both sides, but in 
this, like all else, the whites would have their way. Father Hoeken observed 
that the governor's translator, Ben Kiser, was performing poorly, and James 
Doty was not properly transcribing the procedings (Burns 1952). 
Nonetheless, these were the only translations and transcriptions which were 
recognized by Congress. 'Born of confusion and disagreement, the treaty was 
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one of the most important legal documents in western Montana history. It 
provided the legal foundation for the relationship between the Confederated 
Salish and Kootenai Tribes and the federal government and established the 
Flathead Indian Reservation' (Bigart 1996). 
To this it should be added that the Hell Gate Treaty also established the 
political gaurdian-ward and financial trustee relationship the federal 
government had over the Tribes. Furthermore, it garanteed that the Indians 
would have a permanent homeland with established land and water rights. 
However, their gaurdians would use the same treaty to circumvent these 
rights in their later attempts to make farmers out of the Indians, build a 
reimbursably funded irrigation project, and reserve so-called surplus lands 
for future power sites. 
In the meantime, and in the midst of a great deal of confusion and 
cross-cultural misunderstandings, Governer Stevens, with his busy schedule, 
attempted to radically alter the traditional lifeways of some two thousand 
Indian people in a matter of days. When this did not somehow automatically 
happen. Stevens grew impatient and on the fourth day called for a break and 
that all should relax and have a great feast. By the fifth day, the governor 
was becoming more impatient when Salish chief. Victor, still did not want to 
leave his people's ancestral home where the dust of [his] people mingles 
with the earth," (Ronan 1890) unless there was a justifiable reason, or if the 
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Great Father in Washington forced him to go (Partoll 1938). After much 
deliberation the governor ended up calling Victor une vielJe fern me une 
chJea an old female dog; essentially, an old bitch (Burns 1952). After Victor 
left the proceedings Pend d Oreille chief Alexander retorted that governor 
Stevens was un homme a doubJes bouches, a man with two mouths, a 
double talker' (Fahey 1974). 
There were several primary sources of controversey concerning the 
misunderstandings and broken promises pertaining to the treaty which 
would emerge throughout the next several decades (Bigart 1996; Saunderson 
1961). The first was that the Kootenai's and Pend d'Orellies were to go to the 
Jocko Reservation, (which was identical to the site of the present day 
Flathead Indian Reservation in western Montana, named for Jeaque Finlay 
an early trapper the Indians called "Jocko"), and the Salish were to remain in 
the Bitterroot Valley until the federal government could perform a proper 
assessment and survey of each of the proposed reservation lands to 
determine which would be best suitable to the Flatheads. To this day, this 
has not been done (Bigart 1996; Fahey 1974; Kappler 1904). 
The Tribes peacefully ceded over 22 million acres of ancestral land for 
the sake of white progress, in exchange for the 1.24 million acres that is now 
the Flathead Indian Reservation. With this there were certain provisions 
which prohibited whites from settling in certain portions of the Bitterroot 
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Valley until further agreements could be reached. The agreements were 
never reached. However, this did not stop the encroaching white community 
from collectively assuming and acting as if it were their land. They settled 
it, bought and sold it, and threatened the Indians who attempted to subsist 
off of it in the old ways (Bigart 1996; Ronan 1890). 
The Early Reservation Years: Broken Promises and Corruption 
The Hell Gate Treaty, signed July 16. 1855 and ratified by Congress 
March 8, 1859 (Burlingame 1961), promised not only a survey and 
protection from encroaching whites, it also promised cash settlements, 
agricultural tools, commodities, medical services, vocational schools and 
training, lumber mills, grist mills, and other forms of the white mans 
economic infrastructure to expedite the Indians' assimilation into the 
dominant culture. However, the vast majority of these the Indians still had 
not seen by 1871, and thus were not interested in signing further 
agreements. Most of the few provisions which the Tribes did receive were 
dishonestly sold out from under them by dozens of corrupt elements in the 
Indian agencies which were directly or indirectly involved with the Tribes 
during this fifteen year period (Fahey 1974). But in 1871, due in no small 
part to the written appeals made by land-hungry white settlers already in 
the Bitterroot Valley, and their numbers steadily growing. President Grant 
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sent James Garfield to sign another treaty with the Bitterroot Salish; 
apparently disregarding the fact that the provisions of the original one were 
never satisfied. 
So after four presidents, a half a dozen regional superintentents and 
governors, and over a dozen Indian agents breaking over fifteen years of 
promises (Fahey 1974), when it came time to sign the Garfield Treaty, which 
essentially was more of an executive order, Salish subchiefs Arlee and 
Joseph, both had made their marks and agreed to leave the Bitterroot Valley 
and reside on the jocko Reservation. The head chief of the Salish, Chariot, 
son of the recently deceased chief Victor, whose mark is recorded on the 
document as well (all marks were simply X's but there were three of them), 
claimed to his death that he never signed the document (Ronan 1890). 
The state of affairs on the reservation became somewhat improved in 
1877 with the arrival of Peter Ronan. Ronan was appointed the newest 
Flathead Indian agent, and held that post for sixteen years. Ronan spoke out 
on behalf of the Indians' plight and even accompanied them to Washington 
for a delegation. During his tenure the amount of cattle and horses, as well as 
the volume of cash crops produced by the inhabitants of the reservation 
increased substantially (Trosper 1974); although, the self-sufficiency 
indicated by early treaty negotiations still seemed a long way off. For the 
majority of food produced was needed to feed the Tribes at home, and thus, 
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could not be sold on the open market. 
Conversely, the Ronan years also marked the establishment of tribal 
police and courts, the outlawing of traditional dances and feasts, hunting and 
gathering off the reservation became grounds for punishment, and a portion 
of the reservation was handed over to the Northern Pacific Railway as well. 
When the United States Assistant Attorney General visited the Tribes 
in 1882, the leaders of the Salish, Kootenai, and Pend d'Oreille peoples were 
concerned about the loss of land the railroad, rights-of-way. terminals, and 
depots would cause, not to mention illegal trespassing, timber cutting, 
livestock loss, and sales of liquor by non-Indians to the Tribes. The Tribes 
were given the right to bring charges up against anyone who would do so. 
They suggested that their ownership and control of the lands on and around 
the north side of Flathead Lake be reinstated in exchange for the railroad. 
The Attorney General said that he could not answer them right then and 
there but that if they would draft a treaty, and sign it, he would promise to 
use [his] influence to get that strip of land [for the Tribes]." The Tribes 
complied, but the lands remained under white control. After the railroad 
was completed in 1883 some elders claimed that they tried to get that part 
of their country back during the railroad negotiations because it was still a 
source of confusion from the Hell Gate Treaty, which drew a line from the 
east due west "halfway in latitude between the northern and southern 
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extremities of the Flathead Lake' (Bigart 1996:10). Apparently some of the 
elders still were not sure exactly just what they had signed away 
Meanwhile Salish chief Carlot, broken hearted and embittered by the 
lies and broken promises made by his peoples' self-appointed protectors, 
was watching his ancestral homelands, still not surveyed by the government, 
fill up more and more with white settlers, who were growing more and more 
impatient with the Salish presence in the valley. Nonetheless, Chariot 
remained the peaceful and venerable leader he is still respected for today 
But, as he and several hundred of his followers continued to disregard the 
Garfield Treaty and the deceit surrounding it, chosing to remain in the 
Bitterroot Valley, the military was called in. 
The Bitterroot Salish were forcably removed to the Flathead Indian 
reservation in 1891, where they endured more eurocentric enculturation, 
diseases, poor diet, and lack of exercise as sedentary life was now the only 
means for survival. Depression and suicide took their toll as the Tribes were 
forced to live in towns on a cash economy for their only source of 
sustenance; while the means for earning any money, the equipment, the 
mills, the schools, etc., either had not been sent, or had quite simply been 
stolen while in route, or sold for the personal profit of the agents in charge. 
The Salish. who's bravery, integrety. and humility was once described as; 
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pre-eminent. . a love of truth they think necessar>' to a varrior's character 
They are assiduous to please, peaceable, unassuming, and much attatched to the 
whites. They are charactari2ed by the greatest simplicity, docility, and 
uprightness. , .They are loo proud to be dishonest, too candid to be cunning a 
nobel race [and] the Spartans of Oregon ,. 
were now simply surviving on the government dole (Fahey 1974:33,75). 
The Flathead Allotment Act of 1904 
The last two decades of the nineteenth centurv witnessed a push for 
increased growth and development in America. There was a sense of 
urgency in the public toward increased civilization, and that the nation s 
strength would be in the measure of its natural resources, and its unlimited 
access to them (Smith 1979). In less than one hundred years, the Indians 
which remained within the borders of what was to become the forty-eight 
contiguous states, saw their lands reduced from "all landls] west of the 
Applachian Mountains to desolate reservations totalling less than 4 percent 
of the continental United States. The once proud hunter-warrior had been 
relegated to a confined beggar s existance of ridicule and abuse' (Russell 
1995). 
With the last of the American Indians rounded up and placed onto 
reservations, and the last in the series of Indian wars culminating at the 
Wounded ICnee masacre, The original inhabitants of this land were not only 
desimated and demoralized, they were socioeconomically underdeveloped, 
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However, the majority of the underdevelopment they would experience was 
vet to come. 
It has been argued that the federal government s pollicies of allotment 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were possibly the single 
most influencial factor in perpetuating poverty and a state of colonialism on 
Indian reservations (Trosper 1974). The attempt to solve the "Indian 
problem by alloting lands to tribal members occured for several reasons. 
Congress was looking to stop the increase of appropriations to Indians. With 
civilization growing all around the reservations there was not only a 
demand from whites for the last of the Indian s lands, there was also a fear 
that a bunch of Indians roaming free on their own lands might represent a 
threat to that civilization. Also, there was a growing sense that the country 
had a legal as well as moral obligation to civilize the Indians in a way they 
considered to be "humanitarian." Plus there was the push to aquire the last 
of the natural resources left to the Indians. This push was rather forceful at 
times as exemplified by Colorado Congressman James Belford, when he 
declared, in 1880, that an idle and thriftless race of savages cannot be 
permitted to gaurd the treasure vaults of the nation' (Smith 1979:131 )• 
Montana is called "the Treasure State." 
Article 6 of the Hell Gate Treaty of 1855 set the precedent for 
allotment on the Flathead reservation. The mechanism, however, was set in 
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motion in 1887 through the work of Senator Henry L. Dawes of 
Massachusetts. As the chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs, Dawes 
sought to legalize the individualization of the Indian people by assigning 
private plots of land in severalty to the inhabitants of the reservations and 
their families. This separation and privatization was, of course, a necessary 
condition for farming and future homesteading by whites (Prucha 1984). 
The Dawes Act further called for each reservation agent to establish a tribal 
roll and for parcels of land, (usually in 20, 40, or 80, acre plots and 
sometimes of the most nonproductive and undisireable land) to be asigned to 
tribal members (Otis 1973). 
The Dawes Act, or General Allotment Act, of 1887, contained two 
important conditions which would effect the state of Montana and its Indians 
forever. It called for the creation of surplus' lands to be sold to whites, and 
it called for a second set of more specific bills to be passed pertaining to each 
individual reservation. Not only was white settlement more on the minds, 
and in the agendas, of this generation of policiy-makers than those who 
drafted the treaties which originally established the reservations, so too 
were the "idealized goals of civilization and assimilation." So the second 
condition of the Dawes Act made these idealized goals rather difficult to 
achieve through the legislative process, as they were "a poor match for 
individual ambition, partisan politics, and the desire to make money' (Smith 
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1979:132). 
That is precisely what occured with the passing of the Flathead 
Allotment Act of 1904 (33 Stat., 302). Refered to as possibly "the most 
important factor leading up to Montana Power s construction of Kerr Dam, 
(Bigcrane 1991) the Flathead Allotment Act not only alloted lands, and 
created and sold the surplus, it also established certain water rights, and 
reserved lands for future irrigation and power use. And the passege of this 
Act can be attributed almost exclusively to the efforts of Montana Senator, 
Joseph M. Dixon. 
Beginning in late 1903. Dixon, a Missoula businessman, who owned 
land on the reservation, introduced a bill into Congress calling for the 
Flathead Indian Reservation to have its lands alloted and the remainder, or 
surplus' lands, sold off for white settlement. Dispite ardent opposition, the 
bill passed. This Act was significant in three ways. In terms of Indian 
culture, this Act hegemonically divided and conquered, ethnocentrically 
separated and subsumed, the Indian people, for assimilation into the 
dominant regime. Moreover, "the most significant [culturally) destructive 
force of the Flathead Allotment Act was that it forever ended the [Indian's] 
communal economy and stewardship of the land" (Bigcrane 1991). 
Secondly, it was an ironic example of representative democracy and 
underdevelopment at work. To claim that Senator Dixon was efficient in the 
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use of his time in passing this bill would be an understatement. In fact, 
"Dixon did more in one term to open Indian reservations than any of his 
predecessors' (Smith 1979:138). This was due in no small part to the 
lobbying efforts of many local business constituents of Senator Dixon. 
Because local and influential merchants, bankers, and land owners coveted 
the resources within the boundries of the resevation, and their ability to 
profit from them, they created an excellent example of representative 
democracy at work, in that they took local political ambitions all the way to 
Washington D. C., and won (Dixon 1904). The irony, however, was that, 
inasmuch as this was hailed as democracy, the Indian voice was 
non-existant. In fact, it was purposefully and systematically supressed 
(Dixon 1904; Smith 1979). 
The lack of Indian voice becomes increasingly important when one 
discovers the way the law is actually worded. Senator Dixon convinced a 
Congress to forcably assign allotments, but misinformed them of the Indian s 
intentions. Without any Indians present anywhere in the proceedings, in 
Montana or in Washington D. C., Senator Dixon convinced Congress that the 
Indians wanted allotments, because it is so indicated in their treaty of 1855 
(Karlin 1974). Article 6 of the Hell Gate Treaty (12 Stats., 975), does provide 
for the possibility of future allotments of land to be assigned to the Indians. 
However, it also says that for the logistical details of such a possibility, one 
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must refer to the allotment provisions laid out in the treaty made with the 
Omahas for the allotment of their lands. And Article 6 of that treaty, 
signed by President Franklin Pierce on March 16, 1854. specifically states 
that the President may, "from time to time, cause the whole or such 
portion of the land hereby reserved. to be surveyed into lots, and to 
assign to such Indian or Indians as are willing to avail of the privilege 
(Kapler 1904; 1044). 
So apparently only those Indians who were willing to avail themselves 
of the privilege of receiving allotments, were to actually receive allotments. 
Congress was not at this time legally permitted to force allotment or surplus 
land sales onto unwilling participants. Both historical documentation and 
oral histories indicates that the Confederated Saiish and Kootenai Tribes 
clearly did not want it (Arnold 2002; Bigcrane 1991). They were not given a 
fair voice or a hearing of any kind. Furthermore, some have argued that 
Senator Dixon over-stepped his boundries as the interpreter of the Omaha 
treaty, as that treaty is unclear, or simply does not mention, its provisions 
which call for the creation and redistribution of so-called "surplus lands" 
(Arnold 2002). 
However, the legal precedent for reinterpreting Indian legislation 
whenever Congress deems it "in the Indian s best interest" to do so. was set 
the previous year in the famous Supreme Court case, Lonewolf v Hitchcock. 
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Furthermore, through rewording the provisions for the surplus lands, Dixon 
would be able to maintain his constituencies with his local bankers, 
merchants, and land owners. For it would be they who would profit from 
the surplus land sales, as they would be sold, at auction, to the highest 
bidders; in other words, those who were able to bid the highest (Fahey 
1974: Karlin 1974; Smith 1979). 
The third significant factor in the passage of the Flathead Allotment 
Act of 1904 was that it established the federal government's right to use its 
self-proclaimed gaurdian-trustee role over the Tribes to lay the ground 
work, literally and figuatively, for the major undertaking of the Flathead 
Irrigation Project. Furthermore, it would be the huge debt amassed from 
federally appropriated but reimbursable funds, which could not be paid back 
due to this largely unfinished and unusable project, which would cause the 
federal government to elicit the services of a transnational corporation to fix 
its financial quandry, at the direct expense of its wards and rightful owners 
of the land, the Indian people. 
The Opening of the Reservation to White Settlemeiit 
From 1905 through 1907 the only significant legislation passed was for 
monies to be appropriated for the continuing of the allotment and 
enrollment process, or for the support and civilization of Indians at [the] 
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Flathead agency, as well as for the surveyal and appraisal of future 
town-sites to be conducted. However, in the first session of the sixtieth 
Congress in 1908, came the first mention of funds to be appropriated for the 
preliminary surveys, plans, and estimates of irrigation systems to irrigate 
the alloted lands of the Indians of the Flathead Reservation in Montana and 
Iforl the unalloted irrigable lands to be disposed of " (34 Stat., 83). These 
plans for irrigation, and those later to reserve lands specifically for power 
and reservoir sites, would be made official the following year on March 3, 
1909 (35 Stats., 795). 
Meanwhile, the first session of the sixtieth Congress also contained the 
amendments to sections nine and fourteen of the original Allotment Act of 
1904, passed May 29, 1908 (35 Stats., 450). These acts called for the 
opening of the land for white settlement, after the President issued such a 
proclamation: even though, some fifty-three years earlier, Article 2 of the 
Hell Gate Treaty explicitly stated that no white man, excepting those in the 
employment of the Indian department, be permitted to reside upon the said 
reservation without permission of the confederated tribes (12 Stats., 
975). These amendments also provided for the payments for water rights, 
and for the reclaimation of portions of irrigable lands; even though Article 3 
of the Hell Gate Treaty states that the exclusive rights of the Confederated 
Tribes to hunt and fish in all the accustomed places, and on open and 
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unclaimed lands, within the reservation, were never to be denied (12 Stats., 
975). With all the new, imaginary lines being drawn on the ground, and all 
the games being played on them, the Indians refered to this time in their 
history as making checkers " (Bigcrane 1991). 
On April 12, 1910, further amendments to the 1904 act were passed 
(36 Stats., 296). These allowed the Secretary of the Interior to cause surplus 
lands on the reservation to be surveyed and subdivided into lots, regardless 
of their status as grazing, agricultural, or timber lands, and sold to the 
highest bidder. They also allowed lands previously alloted to Indians to be 
sold, and the proceeds disposed of for funding irrigation purposes. Half of 
the monies to be paid to the Indian(s), and the other half to be held for them 
in trust. Furthermore, this same act provided for the aquisition of any and 
all lands which had been reserved for power and reservoir sites by the Act 
of 1909. And if any Indian had been alloted lands between 1904 and 1909 
that, by 1909 were to be reserved for power and reservoir sites, he must 
relinquish them immediatly or have them confiscated (36 Stats., 296). 
So the reservation was opened up in 1910 and white homesteaders 
poured in. Now the Indians became visitors, and were told they did not 
belong on their own land; or what little land they still had (Bigcrane 1991). 
They might return from a visit or from a hunt only to find that someone had 
squatted in the path they had traveled for generations. Consequently, they 
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attempted to grab all the land they could and a wave of greed fell over the 
people for the first time. Farmers killed off the wild foods, and considered 
the Indians hostile if they continued to harvest (Bigcrane 1991). The Indian 
people were not only feeling extremely depressed and powerless at this 
time, they were also almost completely ill-equipt to handle the day-to-day 
language, proceedures, and cultural mindsets necessary to compete for and 
secure the remainder of their land. As a result, most of the best land was 
aquired by whites. "The [Flathead] Allotment Act, [with its future 
amendments], combined with the many other pressures we have seen, in 
many ways subverted the promise of cultural coexistance held out by the 
[Hell Gate] treaty" (Bigcrane 1991). 
Culture and tradition changed so fast [in those days] What happens 
when your whole lifeway changes? What happens when you're no longer a 
hunter? When you're no longer a fisherman? When you no longer camp and 
move around and visit with your people . and rely on trade . . and rely on your 
traditional life style? What happens to you when you get lost that way? The 
people. I think, got lost (Wall, as cited in; Bigcrane 1991). 
The Flathead Irrigation Project 
The last example of underdevelopment on the path leading to the 
construction of the tCerr Dam was the Flathead Irrigation Project. Designed to 
serve over 150,000 acres of lands newly deeded from the recent allotments, 
the irrigation project claimed to further Indians endeavors to become 
farmers. However, the irrigation project ended up helping non-Indians 
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considerably more. This is evident in the number of Indian farms which 
were going under in the early years of white settlement: and, thus, the 
project actually forced the Indians to fight to aquire the land and water 
rights guaranteed in 1855. Also, because the project was to be paid for by 
those who benifited from it, in terms of the revenue from sales of livestock 
and crops, many Indians lost their land through forclosure when they could 
not afford to pay for the water delivered (Bigcrane 1991; Flathead Indian 
Agency 1944). 
Even whites fell prey to the conditions necessary for forclosure. As 
more and more money was being appropriated for the irrigation project, 
which was never completed until decades later, the operation and 
maintenance costs, in terms of dollars per acre, increased. However, these 
costs would increase much faster than the annual profits yielded from sales 
of crops and livestock. In fact, many were being charged for water whether 
they used it ot not, whether they had access to it or not, and whether it came 
when ordered in time to save that years crops or not. As a result, only a 
small number, maybe less than a dozen Indians," were successful irrigators 
during the first two decades of the project (Survey 1929). 
Indian protests arose but were never heard outside the reservation. 
Even when the Tribes elected their very own tribal council in 1916, Congress 
still ignored them, and continued their practice of withholding information as 
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to where their money was going. At a series of hearings entitled, A Survey 
of the Conditions of the Indians in the United States, attended in 1929 and 
1930 in St. Ignatius, Montana, by Senators Frazier (chairman), Wheeler, and 
Pine, Assistant Indian Commissioner Scattergood, Montana Representative 
Evans, John Collier of the American Indian Defense Association, and later the 
Peoples Lobby, and others, both Indians and whites got to voice their 
opinions, albeit arguably too late, about the ongoing problems pertaining to 
the Flathead Irrigation Project (Survey 1929). 
At the hearings C. J. Moody, project engineer, testified that the project, 
which officially began through the Act of March 3, 1909 (35 Stat., 795), after 
preliminary surveys were conducted in July of 1907, authorized by the 
Allotment Act of 1904, was barely half completed by 1915. Furthermore, 
the irrigation project still needed to borrow $2.4 million, on top of the $5 
million debt already amassed. He testified that most of the people "under 
the ditch," that is, under the juristiction of the irrigation project, would have 
a great deal of trouble paying off their debt to the project with the forty 
years worth of payments that were set up, if at all. And, that if a landowner 
could not pay and had to sell his land, the profit from the sale must, under 
the provisions of the current legislation, be deposited toward the debt on the 
land. With the debts all being more than the land was worth, no one selling 
their land saw a penny from the sales, regardless of the improvements made 
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on it. Even those who were not in severe financial trouble due to the 
irrigation project could not sell their land at a worthwhile price due to the 
lowering of property values caused by the project (Survey 1929). 
Another illustration of the eurocentric concept of gaurdianship and 
governmental control over Indians, political and financial connections 
between Congressmen, local landowners, and merchants were also 
instrumental in facilitating the legislation and the materials for the irrigation 
project: as well as benifiting those involved politically and economically from 
all of the land forclosures associated with the project cost. What was most 
important to note, the Indian Bureau, through the Commissioners of Indian 
Affairs, was overseeing all of these proceedings, supposedly as protectors of 
Indian interests. However it was instead, going out of its way to serve 
non-Indians, on an Indian reservation (Survey 1929). 
It was well known that the Indians gaurdians and protectors were 
permitting corporate interests to be involved in survey work on the 
reservation, even before the leglation was passed officially designating land 
for power and reservoir sites. However there could be no doubt after 1911, 
as to their prior plans for placing a dam and hydroelectric plant at the Place 
of Falling Waters on the Flathead River just below Flathead Lake. In 1911 
an Act passed stating that any patent issued on lands bordering Flathead 
Lake must contain an easement of one hundred linear feet back from a 
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contour of elevation nine feet above the high-water mark of the year 
nineteen hundred and nine of Flathead Lake, to remain in government 
control for purposes connected with the development of water power' (36 
Stats., 1066). 
Conditions on the reservation continued to worsen throughout the 
nineteen-teens. The Indian Rights Association, the Board of Indian Officials, 
Indian Commissioners, and the Indian Bureau, continued to survey the 
problems and hold hearings, but the standard of living still deteriorated 
(Brosius 1916; Ketcham 1915). This was because the laws which authorized 
the construction of the irrigation project, also held, in trust, monies from the 
sale of surplus lands to be hypothecated to the federal government to be 
held as colateral against repayment for the work undertaken by the 
Reclaimation Service. In other words, if a particular settler benifited from 
the irrigation, he would still have to pay for his own land, in annual 
installments, without interest, against the revenue it generated (if the 
revenue was to actually exceed the debt). But if he did not succeed, in his 
failure, "the Indian tribe pays for the white man s experiment. In addition, 
the United States withholds the funds due to the Indians .without interest 
to the Indian debtor" (Brosius 1916). 
The Indian Rights Association concluded, that 
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The spirited debases in the recent session of Congress disclosed the fact 
that unless the Government is very prompt in protecting the interests of these 
Indians, they will suffer loss in water rights, being almost reduced to 
bankruptcy and suffer hardship as a rusult of these unwarranted conditions. . 
The Indians within these reservations are doomed, under existing laws, to 
suffer gigantic wrongs through legislation enacted within the past ten years 
which provide for the construction of irrigation projects on their tribal iknds. 
The provisions contained in the various laws no doubt were better understood by 
those urging their adoption than by the Indians (Brosius 1929) 
In addition to further underdevoping the Tribes financially, the 
irrigation project delt severe blows to the Tribe's cultural identity as well. It 
significantly altered the water tables, the fish habitat, and the local 
ecosystem in general. Swimming holes dried up and gardens died out. 
Furthermore, it continued the destruction of the Tribes cultural and 
economic independence, forcing the Indian people even further into an 
economy based entirely on cash; and this occured just in time for the Great 
American Depression when most of the country would be poverty stricken 
an^'way. It is no small irony, then, that after seventy years of forced 
enculturation, this proud and noble band, now reduced exclusively to cash 
dollars for survival, with virtually no means for aquiring cash, had no choice 
but to stay on the reservation receiving government rations and near 
starvation, or traveling throughout the land, hitch-hiking, and searching for 
odd jobs. 
Even though the Tribes' control of resources and economic 
independence were provided for in the Hell Gate treaty, now nearly eighty 
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years old, Congress and the Indian Bureau pushed for the allocation of the 
water-power site for the dam. At the same time, no one attempted to 
protect the rights or interests of the Indian people. These days, the Indians 
were so poor, economically and psychologically, that they were forced to 
make decisions which placed their individual and tribal needs aside, in spite 
of their objections to the inevitable destruction of their sacred site. The Place 
of the Falling Waters. 
So, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, who were among the 
very few peoples in history to welcome the coming of the white man, 
remain his friends, and refrain from joining in the battle against him,' 
(Fahey 1974) once again had their land and their culture taken from them, 
this time with a handshake and a written agreement, instead of with a gun 
or sword, as they silently looked on. After all, to survive in a cash economy, 
they needed cash; and the next inevitable step in aquiring that cash, even at 
the expense of their cultural identity, would involve the struggle over the 
licensing of the Flathead River 's Power Site No.l. 
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The Battle for the Federal License to Develop, Operate, and 
Exploit Flathead Power Site No. 1 1926-1930 
Oae of the most scandalous actions that has occured in this century M'-ith regard 
to the affairs of the Indian has been the embittered struggle over the Flathead 
power-sites. Perhaps this case will appear infinitely more scandalous to the American 
public when it learns that its national welfare had suffered twice as much as the 
Indians'. The Flatheads of Montana were cheated out of one-half of their prospective 
income. The result of the battle has been a bare fifty percent victory for the earliest 
settlers, while the public and its regulation of utilities have been a hundred percent 
defeat (Gessner 1931). 
* * * * * *  
By 1926, The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes had been 
systematically forced into a social, cultural, and economic position of 
dependency. They were dependent on a government they did not ask for, 
who created development they did not want, or need. They were dependent 
on an economy they could not even participate in, let alone benifit from. 
During this same time they were being told by their self-appointed 
protectors that all of this was designed to make them independent, 
assimilated, and civilized. This was coming from the same protector that was 
about to commit its biggest sin of all. It was about to solicit the services of 
an outside agent, a transnational corporation connected to a regional power 
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monopoly, to fix the mess that it created by constructing an unwanted, 
unworkable, and incomplete irrigation system. 
The Indians were systematically denied access to the means to benifit 
from the irrigation water, yet they were expected to pay for it, with money 
they could not control or even see. Furthermore, during this entire process, 
the needs and wishes of the Tribes were almost completely ignored or 
supressed. If anyone should ever need to see a textbook case of 
socioeconomic underdevelopment, they need not search any farther than the 
history of the Confederated Tribes of the Flathead Indian Reservation from 
1855 to 1930. The Flathead Irrigation project thus serves as the pivotal 
point in this study. There were those aspects of the project discussed in 
chapter 2 which epitomized the increasing efficiency with which the 
gaurdians of the Indians were able to further enculturate and underdevelop 
them. Moreover, there are also those financial aspects of the project which 
explain the presence of the private corporate interests which would lead to 
the culminating underdevelopmental event since the birth of the reservation 
itself: the battle over the Kerr Dam site. 
The construction of the Kerr Dam was to be a direct cure for the 
massive $5,141,497.53 debt which the irrigation project had amassed by 
1926. Only 1 12.000 acres of the 150,000 plus they had originally intended 
were capable of being irrigated, and less than 30.000 were actually being 
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irrigated, bringing the cost of irrigable lands up to $175 per acre. Of the 
total only 1,882 acres were cultivated by Indians, while 23.312 acres (were] 
white owned and 5.696 [were] white leased" (Knox 1926;28). Furthermore, 
by 1924, the average revenue generated by crops per acre in the district, 
excluding labor, operation, and maintenance costs for the irrigation itself, 
was a mere $19.07 per acre (Knox 1926). Critics were now also noticing that 
not only the annual yield from the agriculture aided by the irrigation was 
becoming exponentially less each year than the debt amassed by the same 
irrigation, causing land values to plummet, they also made note that the 
climate, the marginal quality of the soil, and the distance between this region 
and any market which could bring a fair price, justified the accusations that 
the project largely was a failure. 
In addition to the increasing debt on this failed project, the Indian 
Bureau had also spent over $101,000 on the Newell tunnel, a huge hole 
through a mountain situated in the inside of a large s-curve which the 
Flathead River took through the canyon and over the sacred falls. Work on 
the tunnel began in 1909 which was originally intended, so said the Indian 
Bureau, to generate about 7,500 horsepowers of electricity for the Tribes, to 
be used for irigation purposes (Brosius 1927). However, this was the sacred 
site, the Place of the Falling Waters, which belonged to the Indians from time 
immemorial, which would later become the place of the Kerr Dam: Flathead 
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Power Site No. 1. 
Federal officials claimed that the unfinished tunnel was originally-
intended to be part of a pumping station to gravity-feed water into irrigation 
ditches for the Indians' and settler's farms. However, later evidence 
suggests that the earlier secret presence of the power monopoly might 
indicate that the tunnel, at some point earlier than indicated, was in fact 
intended to aid in the building of the dam, as the river would need to be 
temporarily diverted during construction (Survey 1929). 
By the mid 1920's, even though those who were to pay for the 
irrigation were supposed to be those who benifitted from its uses, and those 
who supposedly benifitted were not capable of paying, Congressman Louis 
Cramtons Interior Committee was investigating ways to continue funding 
the project. Meanwhile, the Montana Power Company and the Anaconda 
Copper Company, who were both owned by John D. Ryan, were witnessing a 
large expansion in their industry, and with that, their influence in the affairs 
of the state. Furthermore, they needed more electricity to power their 
operations. 
Therefore, because the government desperately needed a way to clear 
the debt on the still unfinished irrigation project, and the project engineers 
still needed more horsepower to pump the water to be gravity fed into the 
ditches, to get the people the water they deserved, and to draw attention 
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away from the fact that the people s land was being forclosed upon due to 
the government's broken promises, big government and big business came 
together to formulate a solution to this problem. Before I describe their 
solution, I must first elaborate on just how "big" this big business was. 
The Power Monopoly 
All of this, while obviously rather shady, might at first appear to be the 
typical bitter battles within Washington's power politics, until one becomes 
more familiar with the roll of the Montana Power Company. Mr. John D, 
Ryan headed both the Montana Power Company and the Anaconda Copper 
Company, and with them, an interlocked chemical-fertilizer-metallurgical 
monopoly, the extent of which was refered to as 'incalculable. Furthermore, 
this monopoly was in need of a great deal of cheap power to run its 
operation (Gessner 1931). 
Montana Power originally grew out of a series of mergers between 
smaller companies; among these were the Butte Electric Company, the 
Missouri River Electricity and Power Company, the Great Falls Power 
Company, and the Thompson Falls Power Company (Abbott 1954). The 
Montana Power Company and its subsidiary, the Rocky Mountain Power 
Company, both of which Mr. Frank M. Kerr was the vice-president and 
general manager (Collier 1927e), were under the ownership of the American 
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Power and Light Company And that company was but one of four huge 
branches of the transnational conglomerate called the Electric Bond and 
Share Company, which, with its numerous connecting branches, measured 
its strides in terms of billions of dollars' (Collier 1930b). A considerable sum 
in the era of the Great Depression. 
Along with the American Power and Light Company, the other three 
main branches of the Electric Bond and Share Company were the American 
Gas and Electric Company, the Electric Power and Light Corporation, and the 
National Power and Light Company. "The subsidiaries of these four holding 
companies supply electric power and light and other utility services in 
thirty-one states of the United States. What a monopoly!" (Gessner 
1931:313). "This, then, is the impregnable, iron-clad power trust — a 
veritable wolf in sheep's skin -- into whose clutches wandered the 
unsuspecting Flathead lamb, led by a rope in the hands of the Indian Bureau, 
the supposed shepard of the flock (Gessner 1931:314). 
First Solution: Confiscation Through a Secret Agreement 
Returning to the solution devised by the association of federal and 
corporate interests, the reader should recal that any solution the government 
would come up with, with or without corporate help, would contain a rather 
obvious dilemma; namely, that this was all on Indian lands. The first three 
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Articles of the Hell Gate Treaty reserved all the lands within the borders of 
what is now the Flathead Indian Reservation for the Confederated Tribes, 
including what would later become the Flathead power sites, forever. 
However, the precident set by the Lonewolf v. Hitchcock case of 1903, and 
the Flathead Allotment Act of 1904 changed all of that, forever. 
After the land was divided, alloted, and surplus created, lands could 
then be reserved for power sites, according to the provisions laid out in the 
Act of 1904. However, it was a body of Indian lands, federally dsesignated 
by the same government which held a gaurdian-trustee authority over the 
Indians. Therefore, no government or corporation could legally take the land 
and exploit it, without at least purchasing or renting it from the Tribes. 
Purchasing lands would naturally empower the Tribes with funds which 
could be used toward greater self-determination. However, this was not the 
goal of their gaurdians, nor the rhetoric of the federal government at that 
time. 
In the event that a power site should be developed on Indian lands, 
provisions for properly compensating the Tribes, usually through some 
rental agreement, were laid out in the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 (41 
Stats., 1063). This act stated "that all proceeds from [power developed on] 
any Indian Reservation shall be placed to the credit of the Indians of such 
reservation' (Collier 1927b). This same Act called for the formation of a 
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Federal Power Com mission, a three person committee consisting of the 
Secteraries of War, Agriculture, and the Interior, with the latter as 
chairperson. They would serve as arbitrators in disputes over water-power 
issues on Indian lands, and administer licenses to federal or private interests 
who wished to develop and exploit these Indian properties. Implicit in this 
arangement is, of course, that the Indians were not capable of accomplishing 
this on their own. This would explain why they were never present during 
any of these, or the following deliberations. 
In 1925 and 1926, Senator Cramton, with the weight of his Interior 
Committee, attempted to push through an uninformed" Congress, several 
riders on appropriations bills. They were specifically designed to undermine 
the Confederated Tribes' ownership of Flathead Site No.l and completely 
confiscate it from the Indians, so that permits to develop power could be 
granted to the Montana Power Company This would enable them to turn a 
profit, as well as satisfy the needs of the Interior Depertment and the Indian 
Bureau to clear their debt as Montana Power would agree to sell electricity 
to the government at cost (Survey 1929). 
After this "trickery' slipped through Congress, it opened the door for a 
private contract to be "hurriedly" signed on February 17, 1927 Present at 
this meeting were members of the Montana Power Company, the Indian 
Service, the Interior Department, the Federal Power Commission, and even 
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the Flathead Water Users Association, a local group consisting of white land 
owners on the reservation who were trying to make the irrigation project 
work for them. Those absent at these meetings were, of course, the Indians. 
The agreements reached at these conferences, agreements which would have 
divided the spoils' between everyone but the Indians, were first denied but 
later made public through the diligence of the American Indian Defense 
Association, spearheaded by John Collier, and the Tribes' own attorney, 
Albert A. Grorud. They successfully demonstrated that this secret contract 
attempted to confiscate the ownership and subvert the control of the power 
site away from the Indians, its rightful heir and owner. Collier confirmed 
this when he later stated that 
[t]he Flatheads were not invited to the conferences. They were not 
admitted to them. They were not informed of them They were not parties to the 
bargain, the agreement, the undertaking, which were, in simplest English: that 
with their official gaurdian's [the federal government's] consent their property 
should be confiscated" (Collier 1927b). 
Their motives, those of the government and the Montana Power 
Company, for subverting the Hell Gate Treaty of 1855 and the Federal Water 
Power Act of 1920, which the American Indian Defense Association exposed, 
will become clear, and proven, as this chapter proceeds. The Montana Power 
Company, whose owner and executive director, John D. Ryan, also owned and 
operated the Anaconda Copper Company, had rather clear intentions; to 
maintain and better secure the power monopoly, which already stood in 
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place, under their s and their parent company s control in the northwest 
portion of the country, by securing the necessary legal permits, early on, to 
further monopolize the power industry and illiminate the possibility of any 
competition. 
The Power Company s ability to profit from the site was undisputed. 
The minimum or constant projected horsepower output from Flathead Power 
Site No.l was 214,000 with a projected maximum of 280,000 (Collier 1930b). 
The quest for complete confiscation of the power site by the private and 
public interests involved, the ground work for which was laid out in the Acts 
of 1904, 1908, and 1909, had come at the Indians with full force by 1927 
with this confidential initial agreement, previously ' unrevealed but now 
absolutely proved" (Collier 1927c). 
The Interior Department, through the Indian Bureau, had amassed, by 
this time, over a $5 million debt on the Flathead Irrigation Project, 74 
percent of which was, by then, owned exclusively by whites, and a total of 
85 percent was to some degree being farmed by whites. As for the Indian 
Bureau, they had been accused by groups such as the American Indian 
Defense Association of corruption for decades at this point. Investigative 
committees were exploring, at the opposition of the Bureau, why for years 
the national total of Indian lands had been shrinking at the rate of 4 percent 
per year, while the Indian death rate had been twice that of the rest of the 
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American population (Collier 1927e). In this particular case, the Bureau was 
looJcing to save face in light of these and other accusations, and achieve some 
re-compensation for all the wasted (or missing) money on the 
Congressionally approved but still incomplete irrigation system, and 
especially on the $101,000 spent on the defunked Newell tunnel project. 
So the investigations were stepped up when the Indian Bureau 
embarked on their quest to seize the land necessary for the Flathead power 
sites, which exceed[ed] in its primary horsepower capacity the entire 
developed horsepower of England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland" (Collier 
1927d). Later, sworn testimony from the Montana Power Company and the 
Federal Power Commission would confirm that the attempted despoliation 
[of the Indians! originated with the Indian Bureau' (Gessner 1931). 
To summarize thus far, the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 was 
designed to oversee the activities surrounding "licensed or rented power 
sites under government control" (Collier 1930b). However, clauses 
smuggled" into appropriation acts in 1925 and 1926 provided for 
governmental developement of the site where the dam now stands, with 
earnings from the site to be made payable to the federal government and 
the white owners of the irrigation district. In this way the Indian Bureau 
attempted to subvert the provisions of the Power Act of 1920 and illiminate 
the possibility of the Indians gaining control of the site, or benifitting in any 
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way. This should not. however, have changed the fact that the Indians still 
exclusively owned the site as of the Treaty of 1855. a fact that would later 
emerge time and time again in witness testimony during Senate hearings 
(Survey 1929; Survey 1933). The slight amount of attention drawn to the 
exposure of these earliest attempts at complete confiscation, caused the 
Montana Power Company to pursue its interests at ever increasing rates. 
Second Solution: Partial Confiscation 
So the Montana Power Company later proposed, that if it were to be 
granted the license to develop and operate the No.l power site, which 
controlled the remainder of the proposed sites, it would pay $1 per 
horsepower per year to the government, to the whites of the irrigation 
district, and to the Indians, respectively. The first part of the payment was 
to cover the cost of the Newell tunnel project, immediately skimming money 
off the top, rightfully belonging to the Indians and appropriating it to a debt 
to which they had no fault or responsibility. Another part was to be 
distributed to the irrigation district in the form of power-at-cost, which was 
only 15 percent Indian. And the balance, in the form of cash, to be split up 
again between the whites and the Indians. 
Because the power monopoly was partially exposed, and could no 
longer attempt complete confiscation, a voracious white-settler and 
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power-company lobby decended upon Washington' and attempted what 
John Collier called "a seventy percent confiscation.' For, of the proposed $ 1 
per horsepower year rent, the government, the whites, and the Indians were 
to recieve 10c, 60(1;, and 30^, respectively. The Indian annual payment 
proposed in this agreement, then, amounted to $20,400 as the Montana 
Power Company predicted a mere total annual output of 68,000 horsepower 
(Collier 1927e). Furthermore, the Indian share was to decrease while the 
white share was to increase with each year hence forward (Collier 1927b). 
There was another example of paternalistic intervention occuring, 
designed to stifle the Indian voice throughout this entire battle. Even though 
there was overwhelming opposition from the Tribes, the Indian Bureau, and 
the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Burke. Meritt. and Rhoads, all refused 
to allow the Tribes to pay Albert A. Grorud, the tribal attorney which, the 
tribal council elected themselves, out of their own tribal funds, which at the 
time, exceeded $158,000. The Tribes' attorney continued to work in 
Washington, as he would do throughout this entire battle, by himself, and 
without payment for fees and expendatures from tribal funds. In addition to 
Grorud, and Collier s American Indian Defense Association, some support was 
also received from the National Council of American Indians, and the General 
Federation of Women s Clubs (Collier 1930b). 
Those party to this second agreement did not inform Congress before 
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the congressional session held in May of 1927 However, six days before the 
session adjourned, there arrived a recotnendation through President Calvin 
Coolige from the Buget Director and the Secretary of the Interior calling for 
an amendment to the Second Urgent Deficiency Bill, which contained within 
it two "jokers' (Collier 1927a). One sought to distribute the earnings 
between whites and the Indians similarly to the distribution proposed in the 
Power Company's initial agreement. The other transfered discretion over 
power site lease granting from the Federal Power Commission, created by 
the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, exclusively to the Sectetary of the 
Interior. The bill passed in the House without question. After pro-Indian 
lobbies fiercely battled in Washington, the bill was killed in the Senate. 
This amendment to the Second Urgent Deficiency Bill, recomended by 
the Budget Director and the Interior Department, and sponsored by the 
Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Interior Department matters in the House 
Appropriations Committee, Louis Cramton, contained language, albeit 
disguised, which authorized the Interior Secretary to make official the 
conditions of the original secret lease agreement of February, 1927. This 
was later confirmed in a letter from 0. C. Merrill, executive secretary of the 
Federal Power Commission, to Senator Borah. May 26, 1927; 
The Department of the Interior sought to secure in the Urgent 
Deficiency Bill of the last Congress, amendment in a form corresponding to the 
tentative arrangements made betveen the Interior Department and the Rocky 
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Mountain Power Company [a subsidiary of the Montana Power Company formed 
for the sole purpose of aquiring and exploiting the Flathead powers] 
In order that it might have protection against other possible 
applicants, the Rocky Mountain Power Company has requested a preliminary 
permit under which it proposes to make the investegation and prepare the plans 
for the proposed power development If the Commission grants a preliminary 
permit for this site, the permit will contain provisions that all rights and 
priorities under it will expire on a given date unless Congress meantime has 
amended existing legislation so as to permit the issuance of a licence on 
substantially the lines laid out in the tentative agreement between the Interior 
Department and the power company (Merrill, as cited in: Collier 1927b). 
It was later proven that, at a prior date, Montana Power agreed to 
furnish 25,000 kilowatts to its sister corporation, the Anaconda Copper 
Company, from a hydroelectric power facility, which at that time it did not 
have, had not started, and had not even secured the rights to construct. 
Montana Power had to see that legislation would pass enabling them to 
aquire the rights to operate the site, which comes in the form of a license 
from the Federal Power Commission, which the power company could not 
have until Congressional authorization of governmental control over the 
Newell tunnel site was lifted (Collier 1927b). 
This first round of battles in 1927, surrounding these agreements made 
behind the scenes, determined that Montana Power could not pass the 
necessary legislation until it at least acknowledge that it must divide the 
spoils, which in reality, belonged exclusively to the Indians. Collier 
considered the victory only temporary, though, noting that being 
"[clonfronted with what can only be described as a hold-up, the Power 
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Company has yielded. It yielded without any groans, because the Indian 
pockets were being emptied not its own. (Collier 1927b). The power 
company did not, however, yield in its quest to generate more power for the 
Anaconda Company, iiliminate competition, increase its profits, and better 
secure the established power monopoly. 
So if the exposure of the plot by the Indian Bureau, through the Rocky 
Mountain Power Company, alias the Montana Power Company, (the 
relationship between these two comany's will be explained later), in the 
form of the initial contractual agreement of February 17, 1927 was not 
enough to convince an observer that all these parties, including the Power 
Commission, Congress and state legislators, and the Flathead Water Users 
Association, were in colaboration against the Tribes, who had no voice in 
these deliberations, then the work accomplished by John Collier's American 
Indian Defense Association should be completely convincing. 
In addition to the Merrill letter. Collier obtained the summary of the 
initial agreement addressed to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and 
signed by Frank M. Kerr. They had a published statement by the 
representative of the irrigation project's local interests. Mr. B. F. Johnson, 
wherein he revealed the contents of the contract and boasted of his 
contribution. They had a statement by the Hon. Louis C. Cramton in a letter 
to the secretary of the Flathead Water Users Association, Mr. F. M. Hillman, 
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in which he mentions the contract, the parties involved, that the terms will 
favor the irrigation district which the Indians will not be entitled to, and 
also, that the Federal Power Commission will grant a preliminary permit 
using the Federal Water Power Act, which created the Power Commission 
and was supposed to garantee Indian revenues for rental of power sites. 
They also had speeches and corespondences from Frank Kerr reiterating this 
information (Collier 1927e). With this evidence, and with the help of Senator 
Borah and others, the American Indian Defense Association stopped the 
earlier attempt at complete confiscation, and exposed some of the dirty 
dealings of the Indian Bureau prompting formal appologies. The Cramton 
bills of 1925 and 1926, undermining Indian ownership of their land, still had 
not been lifted, but for now, the business of the preliminary permit" 
demanded their immediate attention. 
With Congress ready to convene session in December of 1927. the 
American Indian Defense Association tried to ensure that the Tribes would 
somehow have their voices heard and their concent obtained before any 
preliminary permits were issued; and, from thereafter, have their arguments 
presented with the help of legal counsel. Moreover, the Defense Association 
attempted to ensure that all of their evidence become public, and requested 
that no significant action be taken until Congress met in December. Even 
with their political weight, and with the support of Senators Wheeler and 
85  
Frazier, the power monopoly remained silent, and continued to work behind 
the scenes on their agenda to preserve the provisions of the 1927 contract. 
In fact, all parties involved were silent except for the Indian Bureau 
who wrote responses to accusations saying, "Trust the Indian Bureau -- the 
Bureau will protect the Indians!" Even the Assistant Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, E. B. Meritt, wrote the chairman of Indian Welfare for the General 
Federation of Women s Clubs ' that any preliminary permit that may be 
issued will not grant any right in and to such company or corporation to 
receive a license for development purposes. This is a complete falsification 
of the truth, for Section 5 of the Federal Water Power Act states ' that 
each preliminary permit issued under this act shall be for the sole purpose 
of maintaining priority of application for a licence under the terms of this act 
Each such permit shall set forth the conditions under which priority shall 
be maintained and a license issued.' (Collier 1927b; 41 Stats., 1063). 
First Attempt at Complete Confiscatioa Thwarted 
While the Indians were still attempting to be heard for the first time 
on the license, the engineers of the Montana Power Company began to work 
on the power site without a permit. They claimed they were just finishing 
some survey work they were entitled to over a year before. The Indian 
Bureau and the Federal Power Commission both denied any knowledge of 
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the engineer's presence. The local residents, however, did not need any 
confirmation of this. Apparently the Indian Bureau had no problem with 
upholding federal legislation, or simply ignoring it, whenever it suited them 
to do so. Nonetheless, the engineers completed their work furnishing 
Congressional Committees with suficient data to support their request for a 
preliminary permit, while the Bureau looked the other way. 
If this would succeed, the Montana Power Company, under the guise of 
the Rocky Mountain Power Company, would circumvent the Federal Water 
Power Act of 1920 and the Hell Gate Treatv of 1855, and would thwart all 
potential competitive threats which an open market would naturally 
produce. The Bureau even went so far as to organize a group of tribal 
members claiming to represent the Tribes' interests, to be brought to 
Washington, at the expense of the Tribes, to be given a hearing before the 
Power Commission and the Indian Bureau. These Indians, who would claim 
to favor the granting of the preliminary permit to Rocky Mountain Power, 
who were appointed by the Bureau, and who had no training in the law, the 
courts, parliamentary procedure, or in business, would be hailed by the 
Bureau as proof that ' the Flathead tribe has been fully taken into our 
confidence' (Collier 1927b). Mr. Grorud, tribal attorney, was still prohibited 
by the Indian Bureau from being compensated for any of his fees or 
expenses. 
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Between late 1927 and early 1928, a fierce debate raged in 
Washington. The Power Commission attempted to issue the license to 
operate the power site, without competition, to the Rocky Mountain Power 
Company at a 'fantastically low rental." Grorud and Collier worked the legal 
end of things while the Indian people remained confident, vigelent, and 
hopeful. Meanwhile, Montana Power embarked on a campaign throughout 
Montana of "lavish spending" attempting to win' support for their cause. A 
Senate Investigating Committee would later unearth many questionable 
activities related to Montana Power's political tactics. Nonetheless. Indian 
morale was holding steadfast. 
In March of 1928, after an eleven month contest, the Senate voted to 
uphold the Tribes ownership of the reservation power sites, repealing the 
Cramton "confiscation rider* of 1926. Spearheaded by a few Indian 
representatives, Grorud, Collier, Senators Wheeler, La Follete, Fraizer, and 
others, their efforts indicated, as Collier said, that "'lt]he day when Indian 
community spirit can be killed by purchase or by violence has gone by 
(Collier 1930b). Despite overv/helming financial and political opposition, the 
Confederated Tribes of the Flathead reservation, had, in two short years, 
progressed from a situation of total confiscation, to approximately one third 
compensation, to a re-establishment of tribal ownership of the power sites. 
The story of the battle over the power site license, however, was far from 
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over. 
Competition to the Power Monopoloy is Introduced 
The Indians, while not too familiar with the procedures of big business 
or of big government, did come from a cultural tradition which empowered 
them with skills in the politics of trade. They wasted no time after the 
March 1928 victory to take^ the next step in attempting to impeed the 
progress of the power monopoly. They solicited the services of an 
independent engineer from Minneapolis, named Walter H. Wheeler, to make 
his own bid on the development of the power sites. He too applied for a 
preliminary permit which required that he aquire the endorsements of his 
bankers and other customers, and if not, would be forced to withdraw from 
the licensing battle. After conducting his studies, Wheeler offered long term 
contracts which promised to produce large amounts of affordable electricity 
to companies in the chemical, metalurgical, and fertilizer industries. He 
claimed he could guarantee an annual output of 214,000 horsepower, and at 
a wholesale price of $15 per horse power-year (Gessner 1931). 
This was an important and appealing proposal to the Indians for 
several reasons. First, the proposal for business and industry to boost the 
local economy, if it were to happen, would be the first time since the dawn of 
the reservation, that the Indians could now have the potential to earn cash 
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dollars close to home, and be on the road to self-sufficiency promised them 
so long ago. Second, Indian land values would significantly increase, since 
the people still had to travel far from home to find even adequate work. On 
the other hand, the Montana Power Company, proposed no local 
develpment, but a transportation of power 140 miles to Anaconda, for 
industrial uses at Anaconda, and beyond, and for general utility uses' (Collier 
1930b). The third reason the Indians were eagar to sign a contract with Mr. 
Wheeler was the numbers he was offering. 
Wheeler guaranteed 214,000 horsepower, compared to Montana 
Power s 68,000. He proposed to develop all five of the Flathead power sites, 
whereas Montana Power offered to develop only the principle one (which 
would control the other four regardless of who may or may not operate them 
in the future). His sale price of $15 per horse power-year was "one-half the 
average switch board rate of the Montana Power Company and 58 percent 
below that company's wholesale rate to customers other than the Anaconda 
Copper Company " (Collier 1930b). Finally, he offered to the Indians an 
annual rental fee of $240,000, again, of more than 280 percent over Montana 
Power s $68,000. Wheeler's work gave the Tribes good cause to be 
optomistic. "For once, in the history of the State of Montana, the power 
monopoly was threatened " (Gessner 1931). 
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The Power Monopoly is Threatened 
The Montana Power Company had long been accused of "taking money 
from one pocket and depositing it in another, but keeping the vaiuable pants 
on all the time' (Gessner 1931). In other words, it took anually a 4.7 percent 
excess profit over the legal limit, by providing reduced rates for companies 
which it owned or was directly affiliated with. Not a bad idea, until one 
discovers that they were passing the cost along to the consumer public. 
Montana consumers alone were said to be squeezed out of $2.1 million of 
Montana Powers annual profits over and above its legal return. 
Approximately half of the power generated by Montana Power at the time 
was being sent to the Anaconda Copper Company, who payed only 3.82 mills 
($0,001) per kilowatt-hour, while other industrial customers paid between 
10 and 20 mills per kilowatt-hour (Gessner 1931). Colliers reaserch 
revealed that, at the time, all industrial and domestic consumers in Montana 
[were] required to subsidize the Anaconda Copper Company through rates 
(Collier 1930b). To beat this monopoly. Wheeler even offered to change his 
bid to match, or exceed, any bid, or future amendment to a bid, proposed by 
the Montana Power Company Needless to say, these business practices, 
heretofore unchallanged. were indeed quite threatened. 
Both whites and Indians saw the obvious advantages Mr. Wheeler was 
offering and overwhelmingly supported him. However, Wheeler was, 
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naturally, refused the preliminary permit by the Federal Power G^mmission 
with the argument that he would not be capable of soliciting the customers 
necessary to satisfy his offer. Wheeler countered that the very nature of the 
preliminary permit was to grant a certain amount of time for the bidder to 
secure the business, and he purported to have that very business secured at 
that time. At future Senate Committee hearings, dozens of letters from 
prospective clients substantiating Wheeler s claims would be read into the 
record (Survey 1929). For now, though, it was to no avail. He was denied. 
After a chance to attend a hearing before Secretary Bonner of the 
Power Commission, which the Interior Secretary would not permit Wheeler 
to attend because he planned to continue to insist on rebutting the power 
monopoly's claim of 68,000 manimum horsepower, he delivered a lengthy 
and convincing pn'me fade case in the large Senate hearings of 1929 and 
1930. Wheeler delivered his case before the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs, instead of just the Interior Secretary or the Federal Power 
Commission, in spite of Senate protest. In it he even tried to expose a plot 
by the Indian agent and superintendent to get the Senate to approve another 
attorney from Missoula to represent the Tribes' interest (when he clearly did 
not) instead of the attorney which the Indians themselves had selected. The 
preliminary permit, which he personally applied for, and paid over $10,000 
in court for, was still denied to him. For not only was Montana Power s 
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monopoloy threatened, so too was the rating structure of the whole 
northwestern region of the country, due to the far-reaching financial and 
political arms of the intercontinental Electric Bond and Share Company 
(Gessner 1931; Survey 1929). 
The Indian Voice is Finally Heard 
Beginning October 28, 1929, and lasting eleven days, the first in a 
series of Senate hearings on the power site development, and the granting of 
such licenses and permits to do the work and reap the spoils, were held. The 
records of the meetings cover 2,295 pages. In them, every one from the 
Indian Commissioners, Senators, Congressmen, the members of the Federal 
Power Commission, Albert Grorud, John Collier, Walter Wheeler, Frank Kerr, 
and others, can all be heard. All in all, though, less than 10 percent of the 
text has recorded the actual words of tribal members, even though the 
hearings were held in the reservation town of St. Ignatius, Montana. One 
Indian, tribal council president Caville Dupuis, had quite a bit to say on 
behalf of the issues (Survey 1929). 
Mr. Dupuis began by stating that the Tribes wanted a proper appraisal 
of what the power site was worth so they could be paid a fair market value 
for their land. He also urged that the Tribes' rental payment should not be 
shared with irrigation district customers, or to clear any Indian Bureau debts 
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which the Tribes had nothing to do with, such as the repayment demand for 
the Newell Tunnel debacle, which he called "blackmail. He stated clearly 
that the Tribes wanted their attorney to be paid, and that, at that point, he 
had been working, mostly in Washington, for six years without any pay 
There had been confusion concerning the true Indian opinion due to 
what some were calling falsified petitions which were circulating around at 
the time. Furthermore, there had been tribal hearings and meetings, with 
hundeds of tribal members and superintendent Coe present, where all of 
these arguments were made public and were overwhelmingly supported by 
the Indian people. Nevertheless, Dupuis argued, the general consensus of the 
Tribes were never conveyed outside of the boundries of the reservation. 
The tribal council president, therefore, requested that the Indian voice be 
made public. Dupuis further stated that the Tribes' intention was to accept a 
bidder who did not plan to sell their power at cost to the government, but 
would be in the position to clear its own debts at its own expense (Survey 
1929). 
These were all worthy claims supported by worthy arguments, and 
similar if not identical to those of Grorud, Collier, and others. However there 
was clearly a different tone to Dupuis testimony It was apparent that he 
represented the voice of the tribal people, who, by all principle and law. 
ought to be in control of their own destiny, but quite obviously were not. 
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Dupuis spoke for himself, and for the Confederated Tribes of the 
Flathead as the president of their tribal council, but he also spoke for Indians 
everywhere. He told the Committee that he did not trust the Indian Bureau 
or the Montana Power Company, but that he would take the Committee s 
word that the Senators and the new Indian Commissioners were 
trustworthy. Dupuis would trust them until they gave him a reason not to. 
Dupuis summarized the Indian attitude when he said; "I wish to state that 
we are not so much concerned with the loss of money to the Tribe[s] through 
the proposed blackmailing and bribery as we are concerned with the fact 
that this action is defended on the grounds that the Flathead Tribe does not 
in fact own its power site. The whole scheme is dishonest and illegal" 
(Survey 1929:3288). 
Dupuis indicated that the Tribes were somewhat used to being taken 
advantage of financially, and this should not be surprising given their 
twenty-year history of power site licensing. They were more interested in 
receiving what they considered to be honorable behavior on the part of their 
supposed protectors. He admitted that the Indians needed money, and cited 
examples of how they were given opportunities to earn cash and try to be 
self-sufficient. Then these opportunities were taken away from them, such 
as the livestock industry which the Indian Bureau pushed on them, which 
was later rendered obsolete after allotment and white settlement (Live Stock 
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1936). Dupuis further argued that the Indians were continually uninformed 
as to what was in the tribal trust accounts, how much was coming and going, 
and where. It was also discussed that all but a small handfull of tribal 
members up to that point had even been educated as to how to farm and 
how^ to use the irrigation systems that ail tribal members were expected to 
pay for (Survey 1929). 
In addition to hearing the Indian voice, and making a matter of public 
record the Indian's concurence with those who were arguing on their behalf, 
this lengthy hearing was significant in terms of the behavior of an Indian 
Bureau official. Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Scattergood, 
questioned the power monopoly to such an extent as to expose their 
intentions, and ability to earn huge excess profits from the power site, and 
that the Indians were not going to be able to participate. [Hie forced into 
the record a mass of extrordinary evidence, bearing on the immediate 
question of the Flathead site, and on the wider question of rates, 
capitalization, pyramiding of controil and, generally, the hydro-electric 
operations of Montana (Collier 1930a). This shocking and unprecidented" 
proposal, revealing Montana Power's expectation of a 20 percent net revenue 
from the No.l power site alone, was very instrumental in increasing the 
rental amount to be paid to the Indians, but not so in illiminating the 
monopoly entirely from the scene. 
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Later, rather mysteriously, Scattergood made a hasty exit [from the 
focus of the proceedings] and from then on remained hidden somewhere 
backstage' (Gessner 1931). This, however, does not appear so mysterious 
after reexamining the Assistant Commissioner's track record throughout 
these proceedings. He, and his boss. Commissioner Rhoads, were 
instrumental in the official proposals to illiminate the possibility of 
compensation to be paid to the tribal attorney. They were quick to give 
creedence to the fake group of Indian delegates, lead by paid chiefs of the 
power monopoly and implemented by superintendant Coe, who claimed that 
the Tribes wished to accept the power company s offers. They considered 
the actual elected tribal council no longer official" Furthermore, they even 
drafted memorandums suggesting the establishment of the dummy 
company. Rocky Mountain Power. Later, Scattergood even went so far as to 
urge Walter Wheeler to withdraw from the competition for the license bid, 
and to join forces with the power monopoly as an engineer or stockholder 
(Gessner 1931). 
The Pover Monopoly Increases Its Offers: The Indians Settle 
After the Senate Hearings on Indian Affairs in 1929, the Montana 
Power Company greatly increased its efforts to secure its bid for the license. 
Twice before the Senate, the Indians pleas for fairness in the proceedings 
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were squelched by arguments drafted by the army engineers working at the 
site, the same engineers employed by the Power Commission. Each time the 
American Indian Defense Association, subpoenaed witnesses, and other 
friends of the Indians fought before the Senate of behalf of the Tribes. The 
Defense Association claimed the engineer's proposals drew impossible 
conclusions from ficticious data, all weighted heavily against the Indian 
claims and in favor of the Montana Power Company' (Collier 1930b). Then 
another proposal came in. This time it came directly from the Secretary of 
the Interior to the Montana Power Company, completely disregarding Walter 
Wheeler, and offering $104,400 in annual rental fees to the Indians, to be 
attained only "after a term of years.' 
Even with friends in Washington, Montana Power was not going to take 
any chances. They also embarked on a campaign at home, superseeding 
their aforementioned scandalous activities, through what were called post 
Civil War tactics in a Herculean effort to drown out Wheeler, by 
"launchling] itself on a spending orgy' (Gessner 1931)- Ever since its bid of 
$68,000. the Montana Power Company, through its own paid agents, and 
even with bought Indians, bribed local officials and prominent peoples. "It 
paid out thousands of dollars to rabbis, and priests, to Deaconesses' homes 
and Y.M.C.A. s, to comercial clubs and wool-grower's associations, and to 
individual Indians, Indian fixers, Indian picnics, and Indian pow^^ows." The 
98  
power company s fake petitions and monies all were circulating for one 
reason, and with a clear message: "the instant [and] unconditional grant of 
the power sites to the [Montana Power] Company' (Gessner 1931). Later, 
Montana Power even went so far as to claim, for reimbursement, the one 
hundred odd items of bribe money' when the Power Commission required 
that they list their preliminary costs leading up to the license. These costs, 
listed as necessary investments, were to be eventually charged to 
consumers (Gessner 1931). 
Again the Indian Defense Association mounted a defense on behalf of 
the Indians forcing the power company to rethink its offers. Montana 
Power, claimed they simply decided to renegotiate, but in the end, they were 
finally forced to accept another offer. This was due partly to the efforts of 
Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs Scattergood at the 1929 hearings, 
but mostly to the efforts of Indian Defense Association s executive Secretary 
John Collier, tribal attorney Grorud, and other popular lobbys and 
government leagues, not to mention the competition offered by Walter 
Wheeler, which would not have been heard so loudly had it not been for the 
Indian Defense Association. On May 23. 1930, Montana Power accepted a 
license from the Federal Power Commission requiring them to pay a 
maximum of $175,000 per year to the Tribes, w^ith an average per year of 
$140,000 over the next twenty years. For now the battle was over, and the 
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material and financial gains for the Indians, which are not really gains 
considering it was theirs to begin with, can be summarized thusly. 
In 1926 a House sub-committee lead by Louis Cramton issued a 
proposal calling for complete confiscation of the power site from the Tribes 
to the power monopoly headed by the Montana Power Company, with 
annual rentals and revenues for the Indians to be exactly $0.00. In 1927, 
Montana Power, after stating that they intend to produce only 68,000 
horsepower per year, offered a $1.00 per horsepower-year rental to be 
divided among the whites of the Water User's Association ($0.60). the 
federal government ($0.10), and the Tribes ($0.30). amounting to $20,400 
per year. Then, in 1928, an offer that all of the $1.00 per horesepower-year 
rental be paid to the Indians, in the amount of $68,000 per year, was 
proposed and the earlier attempt at confiscation of the ownership of the land 
at the power site was repealed (Collier 1930b). 
In late 1929 and early 1930, a series of offers began appearing more 
rapidly First, the Power Commissions' army engineers proposed an offer 
which attempted to further subvert the Indian's rights, and benifit the 
federal government, until the Indian Defense Association exposed and 
illiminated it. Next was the plan of Interior Secretary Wilbur given 
personally to the Montana Power Company This was the one ignoring 
engineer Wheeler's competitive bids, and which Montana Power supposedly 
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rejected" themselves. It offered the Indians $104,400 anualh', derived 
from the profits of Rocky Mountain Power, the dummy company, and was 
defeated by Collier, the People's Lobby. Senator Lynn Frazier, and the 
National Popular Government League. Finally, the proposal in April of 1930 
by Montana Power to pay the Tribes $140,000 annually, was maximized to 
$175,000 annually on May 23, 1930 by Collier's Association. That 
Association, through the discovery of letters written to Interior Secretary-
Wilbur, exposed the scheme that Montana Power was attempting to employ 
to have retail consumers shoulder the burden of the reduced wholsale power 
costs to her sister organizations, such as the Anaconda Copper Company 
(Collier 1930b). 
Collier's last letter, dated April 26, 1930, cited evidence from the 
Power Commission hearings, stating that 'it would seem that the domestic 
users suffer even worse than the competing industrial users as a result of 
the discriminating rates enjoyed by the Anaconda Copper Company The 
power house rate of the Montana Power Company to the Anaconda Copper 
Company is $17.50 per horse power-year. The rate to other industries for 
24-hour power is $36.25 per horsepower-year" (Gessner 1931)-
Considering that the land for the power site was garanteed to the 
Indians by the Hell Gate Treatv. and the revenues generated from power 
developnient were guaranteed to them by the Federal Water Power Act of 
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1920, the Indians, nonetheless, considered themselves fortunate that they 
received what material compensation they did, given the weight and 
magnitude of the monopoly they were up against, even though the figures 
fell short by measure of 50 percent of that of Walter Wheeler s. The whites 
on the reservation in the end, however, recieved next to nothing; and the 
violations of the Indians rights, which began at Council Grove in July of 
1855. were still far from over. 
The Rocky Mouoiaip Power Comany: A Domniv Corporation 
The final proposals which granted the license were made with 
reference to the Rocky Mountain Power Company, a dummy company, 
completely owned and operated by the Montana Power Company The 
stipulations of the license required that it sell all of its power and 
subsequent profits from the Flathead power site No. 1 exclusively to the 
Montana Power Company. Also, no federal regulations on profit making or 
price fixing would, by the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, extend beyond 
the licensee, even though it is apparent to all that the licensee, in actuality, is 
only the Montana Power Company in disguise. Even in the 1930's in 
America, big business was so "big" that its power, authority, and influence 
over the affairs of the common people, who made ail of their tremendous 
profits possible, were so extensive that it made federal regulation of its 
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actions and dealings impossible; unofficially ushering m an age of 
deregulation in the power industry. This occured long before Americans 
would be told, by their leaders, that deregulation, and the invisible hand of 
competition in open markets, were the only sensible solution to rising power 
costs. Collier wrote: 
The Federal Power Commission and Interior Department, by the particular 
terms of the license as issued in May [1930], have destroyed irrevocably a mass of 
vital public rights which had been, it was assumed, garanteed by the Federal 
Water Power Act. As follows: 
The Federal Power Act requires of a licensee that he stipulate to the 
Government a control over all of his operations which are not controlled under 
the Law of the State wherein the isuance of securities, in kind and amount of 
utillities in that State. Hence, if the Montana Power Company had been required 
to take the Flathead License in its own name that company's accounting, its 
capitalization, its securities in kind and amount, would have been brought under 
the regulation of the Federal Power Commission — of the reorgani2ed Federal 
Power Commission, altered from being, what it now is. essentially a political 
agency, to being (it is hoped) a technical agency equipped to enforce public 
regulation. . (Tjhe Rocky Mountain Power Company [was] created to become 
the Flathead licensee, andfinanced, officered and controlled by the Montana 
Power Company, and bound by contract amir&quired by the licensee to sell the 
Flathead power only to its monopolistic owner The dummy, according to the 
Montana Power Company s scheme, was to become the licensee The Government 
would regulate the licensee — the dummy Government regulation could not 
reach beyond the licensee. The Montana Power Company would be made 
immune. Regulation would be nullified (Collier 1930b ) 
Here it is evident that the Montana Power Company had not only 
cheated the Indians and the public," but had even usurped the federal 
power to regulate their dealings and practices. For now that the Rocky 
Mountain Power Company was established, legally and openly, as the sole 
licensee to the Flathead power site No.l, and that that company was 
exclusi^'ely owned, operated, and now regulated by none other than its 
parent compaiiy. the Montana Power Cooipany who was in turn regulated 
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and parented by still other companies, unofficial deregulation was secured. 
With this dummy company as the licensee, and not the parent company 
the federal government, through the Federal Power Commission, would only 
regulate the affairs of the dummy, according to the Federal Water Power Act 
of 1920. 
After four years of heated debate and political battle, it was the 
scheme of the dummy company which underdeveloped whites and Indians 
alike. It prevented further benifits from being bestowed upon the power 
site s rightful owners. Also, by subverting the regulatory intentions of the 
Act, Montana Power was then able to "run up, by 100 percent or more the 
capitalization of the project -- capitalization on which power consumers will 
pay inflated rates for all time to come' (Collier 1930b,). 
Furthermore, the reader should not take lightly the federal 
government's role in these final proceedings. These protectors of Indians not 
only surrendered to the power monopoly, but set up fake Indian delegations 
who claimed to support these endeavors, discouraged Wheeler from 
competing and encouraged him to join forces with the monopoloy. In 
addition, they disallowed their white American citizins their own voice, 
voluntarily participated in the dissolution of their own regulatory authority, 
and moreover, did so in writting, signing it all away for the period of the 
license granted to operate the power site, namely, fifty years. No Act of 
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Congress could now prohibit the sale of profits from the power site, 
undisputediy lying on Indian land, from the dummy company to the parent 
company, as of May 23, 1930. Robert Gessner concludes the four years of 
the battling for the rights to profit from the power site as follows; 
By this singular action the Federal Power Commission and the Interior 
Departm^ent, promted by the Indian Bureau, have destroyed the accumlative 
public rights, which have been previously guaranteed by the Federal Water 
Power Act, Those officials have chosen to surrender to the Montana Power 
Company's scheme of a dummy licensee Regulation has been nullified. The 
Indians, who have witnessed this confiscation of their rentals to the estimated 
amount of at least $5,000,000 can only appeal to the justice that dons a black robe 
It would be useless Uj seek any further protection from their betrayer, the 
Indian Bureau. (Gessner 1931) 
Additionally, there was another way that this singular action by an 
outside force with self-appointed authority had underdeveloped local 
socioeconooiic interests. The power company openly retracted its prior 
promise to bring local jobs and affordable power to the area. Rather the 
Montana Power Company decided to transmit its electricity 140 miles away 
to Anaconda, unlike Wheeler who promised to create local industry and 
employment. Furthermore, 
Secretary Wilbur and Commissioner Rhoads have been preaching 
eloquently for the need of jobs for the Indians near their homes, and yet by 
their action, not their empty words, they have destroyed the one possibility for 
industrializing and Americanizing the Flatheads. , The Flathead Indians are in 
desperate need of employment. Their farm life has been stifled under a 
tremendous reclamation failure, which has placed on their backs a debt of man^' 
millions. The Indian Bureau, not satisfied with this lien, has already started to 
accumulate one still greater. The revenue from the power-site rental will go 
toward paying for this failure and toward the construction of another. In the 
meanwhile, the Indians, paper-rich, are compelled to leave their reservation and 
seek employment elsewhere. (Gessner 1931) 
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Nevertheless, the Tribes could be pleased with their victorv, albeit a 
rather bitter-sweet one; for no other reason than the magnitude of the odds 
and the corporate and political power thrust against them. 
106  
(erhFTiinftftif? a1 
The Construction of Kerr Dam: 1 930-1 939 
A Monument to Underdevelopment 
The Federal Power Commission required the power company to give /ob 
preference to tribal members, and hundreds of Indian men did help biuid the dam. in 
spite of the sacred nature of the place 
By the independent triha! economy had been largely broken as a direct 
result of federal policies Native people had become poor and dependent on the cash 
economy for their survix^al So the sudden chan ce to earn good wages loomed larger for 
most than their cultural and spiritual ob/ections to the dam. 
For many of the Indian workers, it was their first experience in industrial labor 
So the company assigned them to the toughest manual jobs the most dangerous work 
at the dam site . and there were few safty pi-ecautions (Bigcrane 1991) 
4c 4c 4: # 
Now thai the license to construct the dam had been granted, another 
phase of socioeconomic underdevelopment, as well as further threats to the 
extinction of the Indians cultural identity, were ushered in. The 
Confederated Salish and K^ootenai Tribes, the descendants of those who had 
always done their best to welcome the changes brought by their white 
breiheren with compassion and understanding, be they invited or not. were 
now faced with the ultimate test of that faith. They knew that this immense 
concrete structure would change the sacred river and their lives as Indians, 
forever. They knew that it w^ould exist for countless generations as a 
monument to underdevelopment. It would represent how their so\ ereignty 
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inciependence, and identity were overrun by anotiier, more dommani 
culture. However, given their state of underdevelopment and the 
dependency which accompanies it, as well as the harsh realities of the Great 
American Depression, the Indians were forced to place their traditional wavs 
and tribal goals aside in favor of their immediate economic needs, even 
though they knew they did not ask for them, nor did they want them, or 
deserve them. 
They were even forced to appear as if they wanted this dam, in formal 
ceremonies as well as by doing the work itself. Even when they would lose 
their lives in the construction of this monstrous monument to 
underdevelopment, they would neither fight their oppressors, nor would 
thev forget. Rather, like the flowing water they so related to, which was 
about to be bent to serve the needs of the white man as they had been, they 
would gather their strengh behind the obsticles in their path, instead of 
hastily attempting to crash through them. Without rash expediency, and 
with calculated efficiency, the people would attempt to follow the ways of 
the .waters in the rivers, around the obstacles, in a path of least resistance. 
Even though that path included resisting, as well as participating, in 
promoting the needs of their conquerors, and benifitting outside industrv s 
hunger for electrical energy. 
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The Nevspapcrs Tell a Different Story 
Following the announcement in May of 1930 that the Rockv Mountain 
Power Company, the subsidiary dummy company of the Montana Power 
Company would be granted permission to develop hydroelectric power at 
the Place of the Falling Waters, the local and regional newspapers began a 
trend which would last for decades. They would present the conditions of 
the lease agreement as an advance over the previous practice of the Power 
Commission' iFlathead Water-Power Lease 1930j. Some editors and writers 
would present the scheme of the dummy corporation as safe, legal, in the 
public's best interest, and even that it ought to be used as a model for 
similar situations in the future (Flathead A Power Yardstick 1930 i. 
The Montana Power Company was portrayed as wise benevolent 
leaders doing what everyone knew to be best for the Indians, who could not 
possibly know for themselves. Furthermore, the newspapers would assert 
that everyone from all cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds were 
rejoicing at the decision. In short, the local reports would all sav how much 
Montana Power was giving and how much the Indians were getting: rarely 
would they even care to suggest what Montana Power might be gaining, or 
what the Indians were losing. Even though the circumstances surrounding 
the battle for the power site were unique, they were virtuallv unknown 
outside of the relatively isolated circles of those directly involved or 
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At the same time, the press did not help to dispell this collective 
Ignorance, in fact, they perpetuated it. This was the second or third most 
valuable economic natural resource remaining within the boundries of a 
federally recognized body of Indian lands anwhere in the country The site 
was the most ideally suited for a hydroelectric power generating facility- of 
any site anywhere in the country The geography and topography were such 
that a natural reservoir, the largest fresh water lake in the country after the 
Great Lakes, with an endless supply of millions of acre-feet of water, was 
already in place. Also, a natural channelling effect at the lower end of this 
reservoir-lake in the form of a narrow^ canyon of water falls, caused not onl'>' 
the build up of water behind it, but also the force necessary to drive it over 
and to make it fall, ready to turn turbines in generators from potential 
energv to kenetic energy Add to these the facts that it was one of the 
largest of the hundreds of proposed hydroelectric projects going on in the 
country in the early part of the twentieth century Moreover, it was one of 
the most cost-effective and profit-generating, in terms of potential 
horsepow^er versus the cost of construction, production, transmission, 
distribution, and maintenance of that horsepower. 
Despite these possitive aspects, the site was on lands undisputedly 
owned bv a sovereign nation. It involved local white interests on Indian 
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lands in the form of the Flathead Irrigaiion Project and the Flathead Water 
Users Association. The struggle for the site s control invoh'ed illegal 
corporate activities and corrupt high ranking government officials ^^hose 
actions and intentions were publicly exposed and recorded, all of whom 
retained their positions. Finally, the players involved included a huge 
transnational power monopoly, and for the first time, a threat to that 
monopoly in the form of competition (Collier 1930a, 1930b; Gessner 1931 ' 
These factors, and their combination, made the entire drama 
surrounding the Flathead Power Site No.l, one of the most unique and 
significant of its kind. Yet the Indian voices were still barely being heard by 
anyone outside the boundries of the reservation (Survey 1933'. 
When the Federal Power Commission announced that the lease would 
be granted to the Rocky Mountain Power Companv, the newspapers 
indicated two things. They explained both, the ellimination of Walter 
Wheeler as a compeditor. and the estabUshment of the annual rentals to the 
Indians as fair, and justified this simply because Interior Secretary Wilbur 
deemed Wheeler s promises to be unreUable. Therefore, the newspapers 
claimed, the Indians would be better off with a steady income which they 
could count on (Montana Power 19301 Furthermore, it stated that 
construction would begin immediatey (Development of 1930 •, and take only 
three and a half v'ears to complete (Construction Will 1930i. The future. 
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however, would not bare these out. 
The local white opinion of the dam, the conditions of the license 
agreement, and the impending construction work, was presented with joy 
and exuberance. The entire town of Poison, Montana, just six miles from the 
power site, was said to be in a state of grand jubilee celebration. "Everv 
man, woman and child in town joined in the merrymaking. Bonfires glowed 
into the night and every kind of noise-making instrument that was available 
was brought into use in the hilarity that followed the announcement that the 
residents of the town had been waiting 20 years to hear' I Poison Thrills 
1930). The Missoulian. from Missoula, Montana, some seventy miles to the 
south, also proclaimed that people from aJJ social classes were pleased at the 
decision. Naming as those classes businessmen, public officials, professional 
men, and working men, no one else (All Classes 1930). The WTiters spoke of 
praise for the further development of the Flathead district in the form of 
railroads and power lines which would need to be built to facilitate further 
construction (Railway Line 1930). 
The editors promoted Frank Kerr as a benevolent visionary w^ho had 
the insight to see what was best for the development of the economy, and 
the social evolution of the Indians, and the wherewithal and the tenacity to 
accomplish the task. The traditional chiefs Charlo and Koostatah participated 
in a ceremony wherein the Confederated Tribes adopted Kerr as a member 
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of the Tribes (White Man 1930j. At the ceremony, hundreds, including John 
D. Rvan, CEO of Montana Power and Anaconda Copper, and a film crew, 
recorded the Indians in traditional dress presenting Kerr with a tanned hide 
of buckskin encripted with their new Indian name for their new conqueror, 
' A-fvalt-Muc-Quait,' meaning "Light" (Red Man 1930). 
Construction io Begin Immediately 
The terms of the lease were rather lengthy, containing over forty 
Articles iTerms of 1930). Among these terms were stipulations that 
construction must begin within one year from the date the license was 
issued, and must be completed within three years after it has begun; 
meaning that the maximum allowable time from the issuance of the licen.se 
to the completion of construction would be four years, or until May 23, 1934. 
It also indicated, against the Indians requests and those of the local whites, 
that Rocky Mountain Power would ow^e the United States Treasury 
$101,685.11, within nine months, for the use and completion of the partially 
contructed Newell tunnel. The engineering crew w^ould need this tunnel to 
divert the river during construction. It further promised the users of the 
Flathead irrigation svstem, those who were hanging on after twentv years of 
drought, depression, forclosure, and false promises, thai the powder company 
would make 15.000 horsepower available for the local water users. This 
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would come in the form of 5,000 horsepower for free, 5.000 horsepower to 
be set up for retail resale, and another 5,000 horsepower to be made 
available for the locals to purchase, at 2,5 mills per kilowatt hour, if they so 
desired. Naturally, the terms of the lease also contained within them the 
provisions which guaranteed that the power monopoly would not be 
threatened or questioned, by stating that Rocky Mountain Power owes all of 
its power and profits to Montana Power (Terms of 1930). 
The under develop mental details of the rentals to be paid to the Indians 
would be a source of controversy throughout the 1930's. The newspapers 
always presented the Indians as making good on the deal, by stating the 
total amount they were to receive over the course of the license, excluding 
the details as to how the annual rental money was to be distributed. Dollar 
figures in the millions seemed to be rather exorbitant in 1930's terms. 
However, $2,845,000, over a twenty year period does not amount to much, 
even in 1930 s standards; especially when compared to the profits Montana 
Power would be making by operating the power site. Nor did the reports of 
the time remind the reader that the Indians would onlv receive pavmenis on 
paper, not in actuality For all rental payments would not go into a separate 
account exclusively in the name of the Confederated Tribes, but would 
become incorporated into the the whole of the United States Treasurv to be 
spent on behalf of the Tribes as Congress saw fit. This is the familiar 
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paternaiislic and underdevelopmental gaurdian-trusiee relationship 
perpetuating itself. 
The license also provided that Rocky Mountain Power pay the Tribes 
S 1.000 per calander month from the time the license was issued to the time 
when the plant was suitable for commercial operation. Whereupon a 
charge of $5,000 per calander month would be charged to the power 
company from then until the start of the next calander year. When the 
annual rental charge for the first five years thereafter would be 60, 60, 75. 
100, and 125 thousand dollars respectively. Then annual charges of 
$150,000 for the next five years, $160,000 for the following five years, and 
$175,000 for the final five years, were to be collected by the Tribes 'Terms 
of 1930). None of this would happen, though, as a year and a half later, all 
construction would come to a hault. 
Even with all of the controversey and dissent surrounding the power 
site license, there were a significant number of local townspeople who were 
anxious for the work to begin. In these hard economic times, they 
celebrated at the prospect of more prosperous times with carnivals and 
festivals of all kinds, featuring baseball games, boxing matches, water sports, 
boat races, swimming races, ferris wheels, parachute jumps, and dance 
parties (Ver\' Interesting 1930), They were even trying to get the President 
to come and join in the festivities (Speakers Say 1930 
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Regardless of what side of the issue a person was on, Indian resident or 
local water user, there was no arguing that this was a big deal. Yet it would 
not be until July that the engineers from the Phoenix Utihty Company would 
arrive from their other projects in Great Falls, Montana 'Construction Men 
1930), It would not be until October that people would be put to work on 
the preliminary projects, such as constructing the camp, building a railroad 
from Pablo, Montana to haul supplies and equipment, and bringing in power 
from Thompson Falls, Montana to facilitate the dam construction iWork On 
19301. 
Therefore, the economic prosperity that the people hoped for now 
appeared to be much farther off. Winter was coming and there were only 
200 people at work. Yet locals were honoring Montana Senator Walsh and 
Montana Congressman Evans, not only with parties and parades for securing 
more money for irrigation, thereby increasing its enomous debt i Walsh and 
Evens 1930); but also for agreeing to extend the repayment terms for the 
irrigation district (Repayment 1930). The bitter-sweet combination of the 
prospect of economic prosperity, and the realization that one needed the 
work from a power monopoly, which placed that prosperity perpertually just 
out of reach, forced the local people to make those sorts of compromises. 
Nonetheless, hope for better times seemed to flourish. 
However, this was the Great Depression. On Christmas da\', 1930, the 
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Mission Stale Bank, one owned by the Beckwith Mercantile Compan\', who 
had been supplying a great deal of the materials for the irrigation project, 
and contributing to the vast amount of debtors who lost their lands to the 
mercantile through forclosure. closed its doors and filed for bankruptcy 
(Mission State 1930). Over 500 workers were employed on the dam by then. 
However, in the cold hard Montana month of January, 1931, 125 men were 
laid off, while the papers claimed everything was going according to 
schedule (Dam Work 1931). In February. 1931, the construction of the dam 
claimed its first life when a worker pouring concrete onto the smaller coffer 
dam used to divert the raging waters into the tunnel and around the main 
construction area, fell into the chilly waters of the Flathead River and was 
never seen again (Dam Construction 1931i. Bv March, 1931. the number of 
those employed fell to 200 (200 Men 1931.), and continued to fall thereafter. 
The press would continue to claim that the work was on schedule. On June 
24, 1931, all construction was suspended indefinately 
The local workers were forced to trust their parental gaurdins. the 
keepers of their economic means of survival, when thev said that this great 
dam. one which would rise higher than the great fails of Niagra themselves, 
would be completed in eleven months, and would then contain three "^5,000 
horsepower generators instead of two 50,000 horsepower ones iKerr of 
1931;Work on 1931'. These promises, like the others, would prove to be 
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siaiply more in a seemmgiy endless stream of insubstantial ones. The power 
monopoly would blame the Great Depression for its failure to meet its goals, 
in breaking its promises, and in suspending the dam construction which laid 
off hundreds of workers. The monopoly even suspended their $1,000 
monthly payments to the Tribes, as agreed upon in the lease. So much for 
the econoDiic prosperity anticipated for years, and celebrated nine short 
months before. 
Another Survey of the Conditions of the Indians is Called For 
Dispite the obvious local complaints, from Indians and whites alike, it 
would be two years before any attention from the world outside was given 
to the issue. In May 1933. a Senate Sub Committee scheduled hearings. It 
was then put off until July, and later to September. Finally in October, 1933, 
the Sub Committee held a hearing at St. Ignatius, Montana. Senators 
Wheeler and Frazier were overseers, and William Zimmerman, Assistant 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Charles E. Coe superintendent of the 
Flathead Indian Resevation and Albert Grorud, now serving as a special 
assistant to the committee, were also present (Survey I933i. 
Among the many issues discussed w^as a scandal exposing the affairs of 
the timber industry on the reservation. It seems, that since the dam was no 
longer being built, and the local residents were still required, although 
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mostly unable, to make their payments for the unwanted and unworkable 
irrigation project. Trees were continuously being cut down on Indian lands 
to supplement funds used to reimburse the federal government for the 
proiect. Whites from off the reservation were given the v/ork even though 
there were countless numbers of qualified Indians v. ho desired the work. 
The Polleys Lumber Company and the Herron Lumber Company who had 
been cutting timber on the reservation since 1916, claimed that they had to 
cut more and more due to the lower market value of the local timber. These 
companies argued that the trees were of lesser quality, and that they had to 
be shipped farther to market, even though there were plenty of mills in the 
region and on the reservation; as well as Indian men capable, willing, and in 
need of the work (Survey 1933 '-
The Tribes timber was supposedly only bringing S3-25 per thousand 
board feet, when other operations, equallv far from the markets were 
bringing much more. The timber companies could not explain why they 
seemed to require college educated whites from forestry schools who passed 
Civil Service examinations when similar operations throughout the countrv 
used scores of men who could not read or write. None of them were able to 
explain why they practiced clearcutting without properly leaving or planting 
seedlings when thev where supposedlv educated in forestrv schools. 
(Surve\^ 1933''. It would appear that socioeconomic underdevelopment is 
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facilitated more efficiently, the more secluded the operation, and the less 
outside attention that is drawn to it. 
Senator Wheeler, chairman of the Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Indian Affairs, stated at the outset that this hearing would also address 
problems with irrigation, reclaimation, and the power project near Poison. 
Compared to prior hearings there was, at this time, considerably more of an 
Indian voice read into the over-all record. However, after over one hundred 
pages of evidence and testimony concerning the condition of the Indian s 
health, intoxication, housing, education, mining, livestock, rations, allotments, 
heirship, surveys, roads, bridges, and dozens of personal complaints, the only 
issues concerning the power project which were discussed were the rates at 
which the locals were being charged for power, and that comprised less then 
5 percent of the total deliberations iSurvey 1933). 
The rates were not in proportion to the standard of living at the time 
The power company was reaping large profits even in the Great Depression. 
Those affected by this testified that it was obvious that there was simply a 
monopoly which would not lower its prices to an affordable rate for fear of 
having their rating structure threatened. The power trust was charging fiat 
rates whether power was being used or not. Meanwhile, the local residents 
were still paying for all of the power, irrigation, and reclamation project?, a? 
the agreement they signed stated that Rocky Moutain Power would 
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compensate the construction costs with revenue generated from the sale of 
power However, it was three and a half vears since the license agreement 
had been reached, and the power site had barely been developed. The 
com.Diittee said simply thai they would look into the matter (Survey 1933 ). 
Tfee Lease Goes into Default 
By May of 1934, Rocky Mountain Power s several previous requests for 
exteniions on their lease agreement to May of 1935, were denied. So too 
were later requests for three-year extentions and indefinate extentions, and 
they were officially found in default of their lease. Not only was the 
promised power still not available, neither were the socioeconomic benefits 
of all of the local construction work; not to mention the further delays in 
annual rentals owed to the Tribes. Secretary Ickes of the Interior 
Department WTOte a letter to the Federal Power Commission on August 16. 
1934, stating that "any postponement of the time set by the license for the 
completion of construction would be prejudicial to the Flathead Tribe of 
Indians' (The Flathead Power Site 1934'. 
John Collier s American Indian Defense Association became more 
directly involved again. They took this opportunity to ask that Article 36 of 
the lease be reworded to elliminate the deregulation achieved b^^ the legally 
permitted 'dummy' scheme, and thereby permit any Indian tribe, anv 
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State, or any municipality, irrigation, or other political subdivision of a state, 
outside of the Flathead Reservation, to purchase power at the switchboard 
for the same rate' They likewise suggested that the Indians begin receiving 
their increased rentals at once (The Flathead Power Site 1934). 
A hearing was held on August 20. 1934. The Chairman of the Federal 
Power Commission denied the Indian Defense Association s requests, but also 
chose not to grant the power company s request for an extention. However, 
even though the original lease granted by the Power Commission had the 
power company clearly in default as of May 23, 1934. Power Commission 
Chairman, McNinch, stated that the Commission would not proceed with any 
action toward a suit to officially declare the license in default for at least six 
months. Rocky Mountain Power, or Montana Power, conveniently took that 
opportunity to not only ignore the lease agreement in terms of its increased 
annual rental payments to the Tribes, but went so far as to suspend all 
pre-construction payments as well, claiming later that they did not know 
that they were supposed to continue paying the Tribes anything because the 
lease expired and the government never instructed them to do otherwise. 
The Tribes Renew the Lease Agreement on Their Terms 
By 1936, a change seemed to be occuring in the players in this drama. 
As new public and government officials were replacing the former, the 
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Indian voice was heard a little louder. The Power Commission was asking 
the United States Attorney General for court action in the matter of the lease 
still defaulted and the construction still suspended. They further asked the 
Justice Department to sue Montana Power for $7,355,000; although it never 
happened. The Indian Bureau even spoke out on behalf of the Tribes, asking 
that $50,000 be paid to the Tribes for retroactive fines since May of 193'^. 
Edwin Dupuis, tribal council president, was sent to Washiong D. C. for a 
conference with the Federal Power Commission and Interior Department 
officials (Outlook 1936). 
On May 23, 1936, the tribal council voted yes to a new lease proposal 
(Indian Council 1936; Okay 1936). This agreement called for $168,000 in 
penalties to be paid to the Tribes by the power company, plus the royalties 
originally agreed upon. $27,000 of the $168,000 was to be given to resume 
construction immediately, and the remaining $141,000 was to be paid when 
the project was completed. This date was now to be May, 23, 1939. If that 
date would come and the project was not yet considered suitable for 
commercial use, a fine of $500 per day, up to $1,000,000 total, was to be 
applied for all days until completion. The Tribes also were awarded changes 
in the annual rentals from the original lease, now to begin at $180,000 per 
year, and increase to $205,000 per year. Also, they were to be given 
preference for employment (Early Approval 1936; Indian Council 1936). 
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Further provisions called for payments to the government, and providing 
power for local irrigation purposes (Federal Power 1936 ). 
On July 16, 1936, on the 81-year anniversarv of the signing of the Hell 
Gate Treaty, the headlines in the Lake County Vista read in bright orange 
letters, "Poison Dam Work Starts' (Flathead Indian Council 1936'. The only 
other time in the papers history that such celebrated lettering was 
employed, was in May of 1930. Four days later the licensee began work. 
Two weeks after that seventy out of seventy-nine employees working on the 
project were tribal members (Flathead Power Site 1936 ), 
The pressure for Rocky Mountain Power to come to some kind of 
agreement came not only from the threats of law suits and the like from 
government officials, but also from the Tribes themselves. After Congress 
passed the Indian ReorRanization Act in June of 1934, The Confederated 
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Indian Reservation applied for, 
and had approved, their first tribal constitution in October, 1935- On April 
22, 1936, their charter was voted on and adopted, and they became the very 
first Indian nation in the country to become incorporated under Section 17 
of the Indian Reorganization Act. At that point, the Tribes first corporate 
business was to send Mr. Edwin Dupuis, tribal council chairman, to 
Washington and complete the negotiations for the new lease on the power 
site (Flathead Power Site 1936). Apparently, in their quiet and watchful, but 
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steady and perceptive way. the Indians were much busier since 1934 then 
the public realized, or the press seemed to indicate. The possitive aspects of 
the Indian s growing strength and awareness in their attempts to fight the 
white man on his own turf, and his own terms, would, unfortunately be 
overshadowed by the events to come. 
Construction Efforts are Acceierated 
Bv August, 1936, Rocky Mountain Power was already building power 
lines and transmitting power to Anaconda iDirector Now 1936t. By early 
1937 over 600 employees were working steadily around the clock (Poison 
Dam). Meanwhile, Senator Burton Wheeler, previously out-spoken against 
the controversy associated with the power site license, was becoming a 
central figure of controversy in Washington. He was openly ratteling chains 
in Washington over the New Deal and its administration s failure to force the 
Justice Department to act promptly and forcefully in the matter of the law 
suit against the Rocky Mountain Power Company (Senater Wheeler 1937i. 
He also denounced some of President Roosevelt's proposals which seemed 
rather favorable to the Indians (More Trouble 1937). 
Back at the construction site, in February. 1937. two more men lost 
their lives when a locomotive left its tracks (Two Men 1937i Nevertheless, 
the power company, and the contractors, the Phoenix Engineering Company 
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were accelerating the work load. They were not about to default on the 
lease another time. Nearly eight months had passed since they were 
awarded this one, and they still had not begun to pour concrete. When the 
total number of workers was approaching 800 in a push' to get enough 
concrete poured on the north bank to be ahead of the spring runoff, more 
laborers were needed to move much more material. 
Those doing the jobs involving the heaviest burdens were, of course. 
Indian people, as every skilled labor position was occupied by whites. At 
the same time, there was little regard for the safety of the laborers. Some 
were working double shifts throughout the night. In the dry river bed after 
the river had been successfully diverted into the tunnel, and at the base of 
the towering canyon walls, the river bottom was being excavated faster then 
the earth above it. Some claimed to have been ignored when they 
complained that the earth was becoming unstable overhead (Bigcrane 1991 J.  
Shortly after midnight on March 1. 1937, as the night shift came on 
duty, a hugh mass of earth and rock, over 1,000 cubic yards, broke free of its 
hold on the canyon wall and roared down, in the form of a rock sUde into the 
dry river bottom, with a thunderous crash. The seven Indian men who had 
been picking, shoveling, and wheel-barrowing underneath the overhang, 
died instantly The superintendent of the Phoenix Engineering Company, C. 
H. Tornquist, blamed the rock shde on frost (Seven Men 1957; Seven 
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Workers 1937; Workers Crushed 1937j. 
Two out of the three men, forman and bosses, working at the opening 
of the man made tunnel suffered serious injury, and the third ended up m 
critical condition after being rushed to the hospital in Poison. Crews at the 
construction site began excavating the rock slide by removing the still 
overhanging dirt and rocks above the bodies of the Indians who died in the 
rock slide, some 60 hours later, on Wednesday afternoon. The last of the 
bodies was recovered on March 8 (Bodies 1937), 
The man in critical condition would die a few davs later. The two 
injured men would recover. On March 1 1, 1937 three more workers were 
injured and another man killed when a seven-ton steel beam in the tunnel 
approach to the power house broke free of the support of its girders. That 
made for a total of eleven killed and five injured in the previous month. In 
hindsight, an ethnohistorian could not help but notice another trend in the 
newspaper writing at that time. The stories of the dead and injured always 
contained background information of the victim s occupations, their parents 
names, place of birth, where they live, names of surviving kin, memorial 
services, etc., if they were of European decent. If they were Indian, the^" 
were lucky to have their names printed (James Emerson 1937). 
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Construction is Completed 
In July. 1937, sixty to eighty workers finally got the go ahead to begin 
work on a pumping plant which would pump water up from the river and 
over and into the reservoir at Pablo, increasing the pumping capacitv of the 
irrigation project by 60,000 acre-feet, fulfilling part of the promises granted 
the local water users (Pumping Plant 1937 t. By August there were 973 men 
employed by the project working around the clock in three shifts. They 
were now predicting that 175.000 horsepower would be produced from the 
site. A significant increase from the figure of 68,000 horsepower which was 
always used in conjunction with predicting what the tribal rental payment 
would be. This now appeared probable, as more power was being diverted 
to the project on its way from Thompson Falls to Anaconda (Nearly 1937). 
By September, the job was being called 60 percent complete and 
Indians were still being given job preference. The river roared through the 
large tunnel at 10,000 cubic feet per second as hundreds of men worked to 
complete the smaller tunnels which w^ould bring the water through the 
mountain and into the plant, to turn the generators after the dam was in 
place (Huge Poison Dam 1937). By November. 1937, the project was over 
three quarters complete. The dam itself was nearly in place in slightly more 
than one year s time, and the remainder of the work consisted of 
completeing the smaller 20' by 700' penstock tunnel, and the power house 
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itself (Poison Dam 1937; Rapid Progress 1937j. 
By March, 1938, Phoenix Engineering confidently predicted that the 
project would be completed one year ahead of time, and would generate 
56,000 kilowatts, or around 75,000 horsepower (the kilowatts to horsepower 
ratio is about three to four), increasing Montana Powers total generating 
capacity by about 20 percent, or from 294,000 to 350,000 kilowatts. The 
additional waters of the natural power reservoir called Flathead Lake would 
further increase the company s water storage capacity from 578,000 
acre-feet to over 1,650,000, a nearly 200 percent increase (Huge Poison 
Power 1938). 
On Monday April 16, 1938, a concrete plug twenty feet thick was 
lowered into place at the mouth of the Newell tunnel; and, for the first time 
in the river s history, for several hours, the rushing water ceased. The 
ellimination of the perpetual numbing effect of the thundering water made 
the silence deafening. The exponentially increasing crecendo of men. hea\y 
equipment, and anticipation, nearly two years running, was now. in one 
abrupt instance, as capped-off as the river had been working on i Straight 
jacket 1938). 
For the first time since time was known by men. the Flathead River did 
not flow beyond the Place of the Falling Waters. For the remainder of that 
day. the waters down stream would slowly dry up into smaller and smaller 
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poois and trickling streams. At 9:53 ptn on Tuesday evening, after building 
up 100,000 tons of pressure on the back wall of the dam. all the waters of 
Glacier National Park, the Northern and Southern Forks of the Upper and 
Lower Flathead Rivers and all of their tributaries, and the whole of Flathead 
Lake, began to run through the gates at the top of the dam, cascading in an 
ever increasing volume to the dr\' river bed some 240 feet below, 30 feet 
higher than the falls of Niagara (Cascade Flows 1938). 
By mid May. 1938, the thirty-foot diameter generator was properlv 
installed, ready to rotate 112 times per minute to produce 75,000 
horsepower of electricity (Generator 1938 '. By August it w^as suitable for 
commercial operation, and began to manufacture minimal electrical power 
for local uses. 
Hundreds turned out for the dedication ceremonv on August 6, 1938, 
including power industry officials, Senators, Congressman, and Indian chiefs 
(Brower 1938). The newspapers promised prosperity, and attributed 
everything necessary to create and complete the project, to Mr. Frank M. 
cCerr. He was referd to as a visionary, industrious, tireless, forthright, a great 
arbitrator,  diplomat, and businessman (Kelly Delivers 1938; Kerr Dam 1938 '.  
The white mans economy was presented as superior, and praise was granted 
to this way of life where private citizens, through the mechanisms of 
capitaUsm, can legally become more powerful than big government. The 
Kerr dam was presented as a monument to free enterprise, celebrating 
power in the hands of the people. They neglected to mention, however, that 
the all the rate payers in the region were now completely- powerless o\'er 
their choice of utilites companies, as well as the price they would be charged 
for retail electricity for the next sixty years. 
The powder monopoly had their eye on this site of Indian lands since at 
least as far back as 1921 when they placed their first bids, but more likely 
1907 when the studies first began. Even with the entire battle over the 
rights to exploit the site, the suspended construction, and the defaulted lease, 
the power trust, in the end, still managed to complete construction, in terms 
of commercial operation capabilities, in twenty-three short months. The 
Poison Dam, officially called the Kerr Dam after the dedication ceremony of 
August 6th, now stood 204 feet higher than the river below, and 800 feet 
long along the top. 89,148 cubic yards of concrete and 1.645,448 pounds of 
steel made this monument to Man 42 feet thick at the bottom and 17 feet 
thick at the top. The 14 gates at the top, weighing 32 tons each, regulated 
the water level and storage capacity of Flathead lake, while the 800 foot long 
by 28 foot diameter concrete-lined penstock tunnel carried ail the river 
water that it could to the power house (Frank Kerr 1939). The 1800 foot 
long diversion tunnel, named for one of Theodore Roosevelt's cabinet 
members influential in passing the Reclamation Act soDie 30 years prior, was 
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closed forever. 
This collosal endeavor employed thousands of men, the most at one 
time being 1,231 in November of 1937 The total payroll to these men 
reached over $2.4 million (Frank Kerr 1939). In the end, thirteen men died 
during the excavation of the 180,000 cubic yards of grey quartzite necessary 
to construct the dam and the powerhouse. Flathead Lake, now 28 miles long 
and 16 miles wide, boasted over 150 miles of shoreline. Fed by the Flathead 
River which draines over 7,000 square miles of land in northwestern 
Montana and southern Alberta and British Columbia, the lake now stored 
1,100,000 acre-feet of water, and permitted over 7,000,000 acre-feet to pass 
over the dam annually 50,000 acre-feet could now be used for irrigation, 
up to 12,000 per month, increasing the 124,000 total irrigable acres in the 
Flathead Irrigation Project by more than 30,000. 
There was also talk of contractors bidding for the construction of the 
pumphouse, along with the propellers, motors, and transformers, and it 
looked as if the local water users might benifit as well. The irrigation project 
still contained its many flaws and limitations of the past, due to geology, 
topography, climate, and the usual pohtics. However, the local water users 
were projected to save over $6 million over the course of the fifty-year lease 
in bonuses made possible by the recent construction. The Indian people 
were projected to recieve over $7.5 million during the same period, for the 
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use of their sacred lands (Competition 1938; Glance 1937). 
The Independence and Sovereignty of a People is Overshadowed 
During the eighty-four years from the Hell Gate Treaty of 1855 until 
the construction, dedication, and successful commercial operation of the Kerr 
Dam in 1939, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead 
Indian Reservation had endured an unfathomable and unconscionable 
degree of enculturation. They had survived trappers, traders, sickness, 
disease, governors, armies, raiding, trespassing and warring Indian parties, 
hundreds of illegal settlers, dozens of corrupt Indian agents, broken and 
unfulfilled promises from treaties, missionaries and boarding schools, the 
outlawing of their language and rehgion, the forced removal from their 
ancestral homelands, the allotment of their tribal reservation lands, the 
selling off of their surplus lands, the coming of the homesteaders, and 
further confiscation of timber, mining, and irrigation lands, for no more than 
possession and exploitation by their conquerors. 
The enculturation thrust upon them by their aggressive and 
technologically superior brothers forced the Indians to stop roaming 
nomadically. and to stop hunting and gathering. It forced them away from 
their tribal economy, and onto one which instead promoted individual 
success and collective competition. In the Indian tradition, one was 
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considered rich by what he gave away, not by what he owned. Now not 
only was that principle removed, so too was its practice, as Indian peoples 
were not even able to be rich by owning things. They were forced onto a 
cash economy and had their abilities to earn and spend that cash 
systematically removed by people who, from a seat of power on the other 
side of the continent, promoted a plan of socioeconomic underdevopment, 
keeping the Indians in a perpetual state of coloniahsm and paternahstic 
dependency 
There are cultural rifts which occur naturally during times such as 
these between young and old. Or, more accurately, they occur between what 
a tribe collectively feels is ment by the traditional and the progressive, in 
terms of what is necessary for survival. Some will feel that the only way to 
ensure that their collective cultural identity, who they are as a people, is 
maintained, is to keep the old wavs alive. In this way, a traditional 
indigenous cultural awareness will always be there to be tapped as is 
needed, like the central fire of a camp, which is maintained so individual tipi 
fires may always have plenty of coals from which to light their smaller fires. 
Others feel that it is precisely the old ways which make the Indian 
unable to function in the new world established by their conquerers — that 
the old and the new cannot mutuallv co-exist -- and therefore, the only way 
for the collective identity to survive is to change, and to assimilaie; or have 
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its central flame be extinguished forever. The question remains; if cultural 
identity, the collective subjective experience of what it means to be in and of 
such culture, must change, to what degree can, or should there be 
maintenance of traditional cultural identity? In otiier words, if the central 
flame is to be lost to ensure cultural survival, is it essentially the culture 
which is surviving? 
The argument is one experienced thousands of times throughout the 
era of colonialism. It is essentially one of principle versus practice. Within a 
conquered poeple there will be those who feel that in principle they have 
been wronged and therefore in practice they must not forget the past, so as 
not to lose their traditional ways; and further, that this will carry them 
through these difficult times. On the other hand, there will be those who will 
feel that such a philosophy in practice is simply unworkable if the tw^o 
cultures are mutually exclusive; and therefore, in principle, one must change. 
For if one acts in such a way which does not wT^rk, he will not be around to 
wonder about it, and neither w41i his children. 
The evidence for these rifts among the Saiish and Kootenai are that 
they had a tribally elected president and council as far back as 1916, and 
also had the bought" tribal officials set up by the power trust. Also, it was 
their aging traditional leaders, who would be asked to present themselves, 
"in full regalia at the dedication cerimonies, to demonstrate for the white 
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man how much the Indian approves of his oppression, and hov^' far he has 
come along in his growth toward that which the parent culture has deemed 
as advanced, enlightened, and proper. 
In the future, however, these sociocultural rifts would prove to be 
relatively minimal, at least for the Confederated Tribes. In fact, one might 
argue that they were ultimately a catalyst for more positive change. 
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Further Dam Construction and the Latest Battle for the 
Control of the Power Site: 1939-1985 
The Flathead Feserva t̂ioii is one of these odd third world pockets thai suddenly 
found itself in a colonial situation. Some leaders of the tribes respond with learned 
reflexes; worshipping' the machinery, the means and the ends of their exploiters 
Others see the situation for what it really is a life-and-death confrontation between 
their culture and the forces that would engulf them (Eggart 1^  ̂
During the four decades which followed the compietetion Ox^ the Kerr 
dam in 1939, incidents of governmentai paternalism and socioeconomic 
underdevelopment iconcerning the dam) on the Flathead Indian Reservation 
continued. These events, while they became relatively less frequent, did, 
however, play out according to the all too familiar formulas. In the end. 
while they were were occuring less often, they were no less intense, as the 
damage had already been done. Those outsiders, such as federal authorities 
and power company officials, had already successfully set in motion their 
developmental efforts, and the underdevelopment of the Indians, from 1855 
10 1939. that ail they needed to do now was to maintain its course. 
From 1940 to 1973, The Montana Pow-er Company continued to control 
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tribal resources according to previous patterns. Montana Power continued to 
do everything in their power to exempt themselves from coming through on 
any of their promises, even after they had successfully estabUshed their 
ability to profit from controlling the power site; and the blow delt to the 
collective psyche and cultural Identity of the Tribes experienced as a result 
of that control, continued as well. However, their traditional ways did not 
die, they merely reidentified themselves. So during the 1980 s, another 
familiar pattern reemerged as well, as the tribal leaders were ready to break 
the previous patterns of underdevelopment. 
In the 1980 s, the Indians were somewhat divided between those who 
wished to be compliant and not make waves, and those of another 
generation who wished to use their political sophistication, and reestabUsh 
their rightful place in the modern pohtical arena as the sovereign nation 
ihey were guaranteed to be in 1855- The power companv once again used 
petitions and propaganda to divide and conquer the collective will of the 
people. However, this time, the weight and support that the powerful Indian 
lobbies provided in the past, came from the Tribes themselves. A surprising 
twist in the plot occured when the previous patterns of governmental 
constituency with big business and industry, coupled with apath^" and 
indifference tovv-ard Indian affairs, to some degree, reversed themselves and 
began to actuallv act in the Indians interest. However, this would take over 
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forty years. 
Even though the Tribes would be awarded the option of taking over the 
dam in the future, by the year 2015, through the political battles of the 
1980's, their legal rights to do so were established in the provisions of the 
lease agreements of the i930's. Nevertheless, Congressmen, Indian officials, 
and the Interior Department began, as early as 1941, to debate publicallv 
the pros and cons of a future Indian take over, or reclamation, of the power 
Site, Some of these men were arguing, all the way froai Washington D. C.. 
some forty years in advance of the expiration of the fifty-year lease 
agreenent, claiming that it would still be in the Indian s best interest to have 
Montana Power own and operate the power structures at the place where 
the failing waters now^ fell at the behest of the white man (Official favors 
1941). This paternalistic gaurdian-ward relationship and self-proclaimed 
trustee responsibility on the part of the federal government, pervaded the 
political arena for four decades, until the next battle for the federal hcense to 
control the dam occured. However, before this debate was to begin, the 
power company continued to expand the hydroelectric facility at terr dam, 
increase its profits, and neglect its legal responsibilities to properly 
compensate the Tribes. 
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Further Construction of Kerr Dam 
After the plant became fully operational in 1939 with its single 56.000 
kilowwatt generator, construction slowed. Then, in the mid 1940 s, the 
company began to talk of the second generator, provided for in the lease. 
The power company s delay in installing the second generator was mainly 
due to World War II, and the time and energy it took Montana Power to 
support the war effort by sending its electricity out of state, while taking 
care of its company and consumer demands at home. After the war, 
however, the company could concentrate its effort? on its original plans for 
the second 56,000 kilowatt generator at Kerr dam 'Montana power 1946). 
By May, 1949, the project was completed and the engineers were 
ready to throw the switch, making the second generator operational, sending 
more power off the reservation. When connected, it increased Montana 
Power's generating capacity to more than a half a million horsepower. It 
was constructed so as to be connected to the remainder of the power grid in 
the northwestern United States (Second Kerr 1949'. In another series of 
public ceremonies and celebrations the project was once again, hailed as a 
monument to free enterprise' (Mammoth Generator 1949 ). 
However, free enterprise, if it is to be free, must not be bound or 
restricted, even if that restriction is a publicly recognized and legallv binding 
agreement. On the other hand, there are ways of getting around that. 
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According to tiie original lease agreement, the Kerr dam and power plant 
was to house two 56,000 kilowatt generators only. But in April of 1953, the 
Montana Power Company filed applications with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, as well as the Federal Power Commission, requesting permission 
to issue $12 million in new securities; half in the form of mortgage bonds, 
and half as preferred stocks, to fund its new construction inititive laid out 
during the previous year. The power company s proposed expansion 
program involved, among other things, the construction of a 161.000 volt 
transmission line from Billings to Anaconda, the aquisition of northern 
Montana gas properties from Montana-Dakota Utihties, and the construction 
of a third generator at Kerr dam (Montana Power Plans 1955). 
Plans were made in 1958, and the third generator was completed in 
1959. By 1960, Montana Power, the company who wrote the book on long 
distance transmission of electricity for homes and industrv as far back as 
1910, was producing two-thirds of Montana's electricity, and wheeling it into 
more than a half a million Montana homes. Montana Power had nearly 
doubled its capacity to produce, transmit, and distribute electricity since 
World War II. Their production costs were still among the cheapest in the 
nation. They boasted fourteen power generating plants on two major 
watersheds, the Missouri and the Clark Fork, on both sides of the continental 
divide. They had more than 12,000 miles of transmission lines distributing 
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to a 90,000-square-mile area, equivalent to all of New England and half of 
New York state (Plentiful Natural 1960i. 
In addition, they had recently aquired vast coal deposits from the 
Northern Pacific Railway at Colstrip, Montana, 100 miles east of Billings. 
They began supplying power to National Parks, like Yellowstone. They still 
had direct connections with other companies like the Anaconda Copper 
Company and the Milwaukee Railroad, and countless other residential and 
industrial ties, and were now expanding into the natural gas industry. And 
this was the Montana Power Company alone, which was still only one branch 
of a corporate tree whose roots were still embedded transnationally 
(Plentiful Natural 1960). 
Imagine the surprise of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes 
then, given the immense wealth amassed by such a corporate giant, when 
the same power company would demonstrate, time and time again 
throughout the remainder of the fifty-year term of the original lease, their 
ineiplicable inabiiity to make the proper and timely increases to the Tribes 
annual rental payments; while the power company was, all the while, 
reaping hugh profits from their exploitation of Indian properties (Kerr Dam 
Rental Fees 1965 '• 
1 4 2  
Montana Power Fails to Pay Rent on Time 
The Montana Power Company did not honor any of its agreements to 
make fair and timely rental increases to the Tribes. From 1940 to 1975 the 
Tribes received payments late, if at all, and these payments did not 
adequately reflect the power company s profits. Not only did this cost the 
Tribes aditional money by forcing them to fight the power company in the 
courts; also, Montana Power, by continuously delaying the process, was able 
to extend their profit-making capabilities to coyer the cost of the rental 
increase once it did go into effect. 
Even after the increases Yvould be applied, the Tribes would never be 
given rental payments reflecting the actual commercial value of the site. 
Montana Power s cost for the legal battles would be passed along to its 
consumers, while the Indians had to pay for their battles out of their own 
funds, which the government still controlled and held in trust for them. 
Therefore, with the federal government still operating under its 
self-appointed role as gaurdian over its ward, for whom it claimed to know^ 
what was best, there would be no one to stop big business from further 
exploitation of the Indians, their property, and their payments. Montana 
Power would alwavs benifit from the delays in annual rental payments at 
the expense of the Indians, and even the rate payers iKerr Dam Facts 1977), 
However each time around, the Tribes w"ere getting wiser in the ways of 
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their conquerors. 
The Tribes already went through the lengthy battles ^ith the 
government and the power company between 1926 and 1930. They made 
amendments to the original lease agreement when work was discontinued in 
1931, and when the license defaulted in 1934. The provisions were changed 
a third time in 1939 when the plant became commercially operational, and 
the Tribes began to deal with Montana Power directly again, not Rocky 
Mountain Power, the dummy company. All of these events effected the 
dates of the ten-year incremental rental increases, but did not effect the 
date of the establishment of the lease itself. The initial license to operate the 
site was issued May 23, 1930 and by law could not be changed. Therefore, 
the license would expire on the same date in 1980, regardless of the 
continuous court battles the Indians would be forced to fight each time the 
power company changed its mind, and its word. 
By the mid 1950 s the Tribes were earning their $175,000 per year as 
originally agreed upon. With Montana Power s violation of the agreement in 
the form of the third generator, and the Montana Power s abilitv to earn 
more profits, the Tribes wanted their compensation to increase. Through the 
familiar patterns of socioeconomic underdevelopment, though, this did not 
happen. Nor did the increase agreed upon in the amendments of the mid 
and late 1930's that called for a reevaluation and increase of the $175,000 
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payment, twenty years after commercial operation was established, and 
every ten years thereafter. 
It would not be until 1962 that the Tribes would see an increase from 
1175.000 to $235,000, retroactive back to 1954, for the construction of the 
third generator. However, during this battle, 1959 came and went, and with 
it, the time for the federally mandated twenty-year rental increase (Kerr 
Dam Negotiations 1978). 
It would not be until 1972, thirteen years later, until the annual 
$235,000 rental would be increased to $950,000, retroactive back to 1959. 
This paid the Tribes over $11.2 million. However, once again, Montana 
Power would continue its trend of always playing a game of catch up, as 
1969 also came and went without its increase. It would not be until 1978 
that the rental payments for the dam would be increased from $950,000 per 
vear, to $2.6 million. This time however, the retroactivitv of the payments 
would only go back to 1975 (Kerr Dam Negotiations 1978), 
From 1969 through 1974 the Tribes agreed to be paid $950,000 for 
each year, On the other hand, from 1975 through 1977 they recieved $2.6 
million for each year, They further agreed to have the $2.6 million remain 
through 1979 The reasons for their backing off on this particular legal 
battle, of their fifty-\"ear war over the dam and their one hundred 
twenty-year war over underdevelopment, was because, at this point they 
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were fighting the war on multiple fronts (Tribal Council 1978j. 
Other Legal Battles Qccuring Simultaneously During the 1970's 
In addittion to the perpetual fights with the federal government and 
the power company, over rental increases, other problems emerged. 
Bedsides the Right-of-way issues concerning power lines and natural gas 
lines through tribal property, mitigation for the destruction of further 
traditional lifew^ays and cultural identity through the radical alteration of 
fish and wildlife habitiats, and compensation for other loss of wildlife due to 
accidental chemical spills, and purposeful and improper waste disposal, the 
1970's also saw the Tribes fighting for the control of the dam in 1980 when 
the license would expire, as far back as 1975 .when they filed a request with 
the Federal Powder Commission to take over the dam in 1980. This was 
substantiated further the following year when the Tribes voted unanimously 
among themselves to attempt a takeover of the control and ownership of the 
dam and the power plant (Tribes Bid 1975). 
In addition to these smaller overlapping legal battles occuring during 
the last decade before the hcense to control Kerr dam was to be renewed, 
there were also three other larger ones occuring during this time. These 
other case? more directly related to the issues surrounding the relicensing of 
Kerr dam. Fulhermore, they represented the changing times, in terms of the 
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attitude of the federal government toward the Tribes, as well as the Tribes 
resurgence of tribalism and cultural identity that would be necessar\' to win 
the forthcoming battles. Films and news reels in the 1940's and 1950 s, 
made by whites, and watclied by whites, proclaimed that the building of the 
dams and other forms of so-called development, marked the end of Indian 
culture. "The Red man bows before white progress, they said. This would 
prove to be another myth, as spiritual strength, tribal awareness, and a new 
sense of what it ment to be sovereign, independent, and self-determined was 
growing in the Indian community (Bigcrane 1991). 
The first of these larger battles to be discussed occured in 1977 when 
the Army Corps of Engineers, through legislation enacted by Congress back in 
1964, were given authorization to perform dam feasibihty studies. In these 
studies, which the Tribes approved, the U. S. Army Corps looked at the 
possibility of developing some or ail of the five other sites on the Flathead 
River recognized by governmentally authorized surveys seventy years prior, 
and still not developed. The studies concentrated on the Buffalo Rapids sites, 
and the Knowles site which would have required a 265-foot-tall dam, 
flooding the entire town of Diion, Montana. Public outcry was, of course, 
very notable and sparked more public forums and Senate hearings 
(Proposed Daais 1978). Even though a rebirth of tribalism and political 
awareness were being experienced on the reservation, the Tribes were still 
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not in control of their own lives, or their own lands. Big government and big 
business had socially and economically underdeveloped the Tribes many 
times in the past. So the proposals of five more dams, vvhen issues 
concerning the existing dam were perpetually pending, caused an anxiety 
and heightened tension among the Indian people. However, it also spawned 
a resurgence of political prowess and sophistication (Eggert 1977; Lindler 
1977). 
The Tribes would fight these proposals, and time and lime again, 
throughout the 1980's, would vote them down. The Tribes later claimed 
they did not necessarilv intend to develop anv or all of the sites. But thev 
did authorize the studies in order to possess knoY>dedge and information that 
the government was so adamant about aquiring, and was willing to pay for, 
to use in their own fight (Dam Studies 1977). It also provided a great 
opportunity to express the Indian views that had always existed but were 
not always voiced. For instance, that "[t]he self-perpetuating poverty of 
reservation society has kept tribes from developing and marketing their own 
resources' (Eggart 1977). Furthermore, it provided an opportunity to 
express the need for poise, patience, conservation of nature, and of future 
generations, all sources of Indian cultural identity, as well as for 
communities to come together. Tribal councilman joe McDonald stated: 
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We have to draw a line someplace between progress and the preservation of our 
sacred trust to our anscestors and our grand children, . These places are sacred 
and our generation has no right to destroy them for all time The only chance 
of survival Indian tribes have is to stick together, (Eggart 19^"^) 
Secondly, in 1977, an issue arose, in light of the Tribes public decision 
to attempt control of Kerr Dam, to attack previous legislation concerning 
irrigation. In 1948, Congress passed legislation whicli stated that private 
land owners were to be relieved of the responsibility of paying for the 
construction costs of the irrigation. The money would, on the other hand, 
come from tribal funds created by the same law, called "Net Power Revenue' 
funds. 
This was yet another example of socioeconomic underdevelopment as 
Congress, through the Interior Department, decided to allow the Flathead 
Water Users Association to put those funds to use, whether the Indians liked 
It or not, providing cheap power for irrigation and passing a portion of the 
costs onto the Tribes. This was also important in 1977 because the Tribes 
were not receiving any compensation under the annual rentals for the 
15.000 horsepower of electricity being used for irrigation on the reservation. 
The Flathead Irrigation Prpject did not pay the Tribes a separate rental for 
the power generated, the water used for power generation, or the water 
used for irrigation. This was being made public as it would be necessary to 
include these issues in the up and coming negotiations concerning the 
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takerrver of terr clam (Tribe Was 1977) .  
Finally, the most significant legal issue which occured in the years 
before and during and battle for the Kerr dam license, from 1973 to 1982, 
other than the battles over the rental increases, was what came to be known 
as the Namen case. This case, between a local land owner and merchant, and 
the Tribes, would be appealed all the way to the Supreme Court, and would 
have local, state, and federal governments involved. It would also mark the 
beginning of federal support in favor of the Indians from their long-time 
paternalistic gardians, who, traditionally, had not exactly operated in the 
Indian s best interest, as the designation of their self-appointed role had 
implied. 
James Namen owned a marina in Poison on the south shore of Flathead 
Lake. The Tribes owned the entire south half of the lake according to the 
treaty of 1855. Mr. Namen had decided to use his authority as a landowner 
on the reservation to construct his property, his docks, and the lake shore as 
he saw fit. In 1973. the Tribes sued Mr. Namen. The case had escalated and 
begun to involve larger contingencies of organizations. In 1975. the city of 
Poison and the State of Montana filed a suit against the Tribes which sought 
not only to remove tribal riparian rights on their own lake shore, but also to 
terminate the verv existance of the reservation, forever. They attempted to 
prove their case by claiming that the Flathead Allotment Act of 1904 
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contained clauses which implied the termination of the reser\'ation ever 
since. As these two cases continued through higher courts, they became 
lumped into one case. In 1977 the United States government counter-sued 
both the city of Poison and the State of Montana against their claims that 
they ought to be given carte blanche to do as they pleased on Indian lands, 
undermining the city and state claims that the reservation did not really 
exist m the first place. 
In April of 1980, one month before the license on Kerr dam was to 
expire, the courts ruled on the Namen case, and determined three outcomes: 
tiiai the United States owns title to the bed and the banks of the south shore 
of Flathead Lake in trust for the Indians: the reservation, in fact, did not, and 
would not. disolve due to the Act of 1904 or any other, and finally that the 
Tribes had no authority themselves over riparian rights and issues 
concerning their own portion of the Lake. 
Predictably neither side was completely satisfied with the outcome. 
But after the appeals court ruled finally on the matter in 1982, the first two 
decisions were upheld, and the third was reversed iTribes Authority 1982 '. 
Ii was a great victory for the Indians, except for the financial burden of 
paying the court costs, and the psychological deterioration experienced 
everytime the\' ha^'e to fight threats to their sovereigntv and cultural identv. 
Nevertheless, this tiaie a federal court ruled that the Tribes had the 
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authority over ail riparian rights on their portion of the lake. These rights 
were, of course, guaranteed by the Treaty of 1855, but were called into 
question many times, publicly and privately until the Namen case i Arnold 
2002; Haddon 1965). 
To continue the storv of the relicensing of Kerr dam, though, it will be 
necessary to digress chronologically. However, the Namen case, as well as 
the future dam proposals from the Army Corps, and the continuation of 
conflict over loss of Indian funds through the irrigation project, were 
significant to mention. These cases marked not only a shift of political 
trends in Washington, they also represented the pinnacle of an escalation of 
differing local attitudes, on and off the reservation, that had been brewing 
for decades. Moreover, they were mdicitive of the emergence and presence 
of the new generation of Indians, those who had the desire to out-white the 
whites' through their ow^n legal system, wiiich had not been traditionally 
benificial to Indian interests, to say the least. The Tribes were letting the 
wairld know that they had the skills, the backing, the money, and the 
tenacitv to accomplish their goals (Arnold 2002). 
The Battle Over the Relicensing of Kerr Dam 
The late 1970's saw the Montana Powder Companv continuing their 
practice of delaying their payments to the Tribes until after the generated 
1 5 2  
power was consumed and ai] the profits made. Even when they did finally 
show up, the rental payments, from the dam which produced one se\'enth of 
the power company's generating capabilities, were merely a slight fraction of 
the profits generated from the dam. Nonetheless, the Tribes did recieve $2.6 
million each year from 1978-1980: but they had to be cautious at this time. 
Even though they deserved more money, this was certainly more than they 
\vere used to, and they needed it to provide their own funds in the fight. 
They had filed requests to aquire the dam themselves five years in advance, 
but they still had to contend with the all too familiar gaurdian-ward. 
trust-responsibility relationship they had with those who would have 
authority over their interests and affairs. 
In other words, the federal government still had it set up so that the 
Indians would not be in control of the outcome of the litigation process. 
Granted, the Tribes were now able to speak for themselves, somewhat, and 
their claims were gaining influence, respect, and credibility in the eyes of the 
public as well as the go'\'ernment. Their tenacity had finally brought them, 
better late than never, funding to support their fight. However, the federal 
government still had the final say-so over tribal spending, and the license to 
operate the dam. The government could legally grant the license to Montana 
Power, to themselves, or even to an interested outside third party 
organization in the region, such as the Bonneville Power Administration. 
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To summarize the Tribes precarious political position, then, the\ had to 
fight loud enough to not lose what was rightfully theirs, but also, quiet 
enough to not lose what was rightfully theirs. After all, the federal 
government, who was supposed to act in the Indian s best interest, 
historicallv had sided w4th big business. The Indians knew^ they might be 
told, simply, no. And local irrigation interests were still being heard along 
with tribal ones. As one informant and I noted, it seemed that "they ^^•ere 
dammed if they did, and damned if they didn't" (Arnold 2002). 
Another problem which rrose during this time, and a rather ironic one 
at that, was the politics the tribal council had to play on their own turf. As 
1980 approached, and with the recent rental increase to $2.6 million, a 
significant number of tribal members were protesting the fact that their 
annual per capita checks were not increasing proportionately w*ith the 
amount of the Kerr dam rental increases. The Tribes learned very quickly 
that the more vou have, the more you have to manage. Even if the rental 
fees were paid entirelv in the form of per capita checks, the 6.001 enrolled 
members, as of March of 1980, would have received only $433 each (Pablo 
1 980 !. The irony was that the tribal council had to play the role of gaurdian 
and trustee to their own people, while attempting to usurp the the same role 
being perpetrated on them by the United States. "Out-whiting the ^*hiies 
has always been a dehcate matter, if not a painful one. But these were the 
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Saiish, Pend d'Orielle, and Kootenai, a politically sophisticated people. 
Nevenheless, the negotiating parties on either side of the Kerr dam 
relicensing issue could not seem to come to any kind of agreement. No one 
could seem to get the overseers, the former Federal Power Commission, now 
known as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), to expedite the 
proceedings. Consequently. Montana Power would once again be afforded an 
opportunity to delay rental increases, as the former lease agreements would 
simply be carried on indefinately after May of 1980 when the license 
expired, if FERC deemed it acceptable. 
Frooi 1980 to 1984, that is precisely what happened. These years saw 
bureaucratic underdevelopment in the form of a series of meetings, hearings, 
proposals, and resolutions between the Montana Power Companv, the Tribes, 
the local water users, and FERC. The local water users were making it known 
that to grant the Tribes permission to operate the dam would hurt their 
chances of recieving power for irrigation at reasonable rates. They cited the 
act of 1948 which they claimed had intended for the local irrigation users to 
take over the project in the future, and that the project should be permitted 
to operate at a level such that its profits would meet their needs to make the 
pavments on it. However, the Tribes voted it down in 1960 to maintain their 
own water rights, so the Indian Bureau \\'as, therefore, still adm.inistering the 
project. The irrigation users did not want to lose their rights to profit from 
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the power received from the dam. The Tribes were tired of ha^•lng lo pa\' 
for something that they did not ask for. did not need, and were noi profitting 
from themselves; with, money that they supposedly had, but could not 
control (Power Outlook 1980). 
During this time, the Namen Case was still pending, and the Arm\^ 
Corps of Engineers was still doing its feasibilitv studies begun in 1977 In 
1981, The Army Corps determined there were 51 "high potential" sites out of 
the 2.037 which they inventoried, in Montana alone. These studies 
proclaimed that, of the 51 sites, 24 existing and 27 undeveloped, a potential 
9.945 billion kilowatts could be generated (Corps 1981). As attention was 
being drawn toward more development in the area, which most likely ment 
underdevelopment for the Indians, the Tribes appealed to FERC to speed up 
the pending situation surrounding the license on Kerr dam. Yet, the Tribes 
offers continued to be met with further delays, if not even evasion or denial. 
By early 1984, the Montana Power Company resorted to their age old 
standard tactics of finding power-friendly Indians to speak on their behalf 
and circulate petitions. These petitions, presented as the collective will of 
the Indian people, offered a one time pav-off to the tribes of $30 million. 
Maybe the power company was counting on such a large figure to appear 
like a better offer than it really was. Appealing to someone's short term 
desires at the expense of their long term needs is a profit-making tactic used 
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in the business world as old as the business world itself. Did the power 
company really think the people would go for it? After all, the company had 
only paid a little more than $40 million total on the dam since 1930. 
Furthermore, this one time payment would be instead of, not in addittion to, 
the annual rental. Yes, the annual rental would be suspended for the first 
twenty years of the fifty-year license, subsequently sending the Tribes back 
to the negotiating table once more in 2000, to begin all over again; with 
Montana Power making enormous profits for another twenty years, at the 
expense of the Indian people (Don't be Fooled 1984). 
Montana Power believed that if they could get some of the Indians, 
even tribal council members, to agree with them, and that the $30 million 
would be split among the 6,001 tribal members in the form of a per capita 
check I even for those who were living off the reservation any^^here in the 
country), that the thought of receiving a check for $5,000 for doing nothing 
more than signing a piece of paper would be incentive enough to have large 
numbers of Indians sign the petitions, and thus appear to FERC as if the 
Tribes were in favor of allowing Montana Power another fifty-vear lease 
(Don't be Fooled 1984). That is what they were thinking, and that is almost 
what happened. 
In March 1984, another significant event took place, this tim.e in terms 
of local politics on the reservation. Tribal council member E. \v "Bill" 
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Morigeau, who had served as the Poison representative for thirty-four 
uninterupted years lsince 1950), was asked by the rest of the council to 
resign (Morigeau Removed 1984j Morigeau, who had long represented the 
Indians of prior generations who believed in maintaining cultural identity 
through accomidation with the white man, was apparently caught in 
fraudulent activities when reimbursing personal expenses from tribal 
coffers. Morgieau reluctantly stepped down and the council appointed 
Teresa Wall to replace him in April (Poison s New 1984). This shift of power, 
the public acknowledgement and acceptance of it by the council, and the 
symbolic nature of it. a sort of out-with-the-old and in-with-the-new. 
marked the beginning of accelerated times in the relicensing proceedings. 
The Tribes had spent years and hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
their fight to gain control of their own resource, and thereby took a giant 
step toward self-sufficiency and self-determination. Judging by Montana 
Power s acceleration of its own campain efforts, occuring in relatively the 
same pattern as they did m the spring of 1930. the Tribes were getting close 
to achieving their goals. 
Meanwhile, Morgieau and three other tribal members formed what 
they called the Kerr Dam Relicensing Team, which again claimed to represent 
the collective voice of the people. However, the relicensing team ended up 
being the voice of Indian support that the power company needed. The Kerr 
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Dam Relicensing Team whole heartedly supported Montana Power's one-time 
$30 million offer, in spite of its obvious drawbacks. They claimed that even 
though the figure was less then what the Tribes would receive through 
annual rental payments at the current S2.6 million, the Tribes would save 
money in the long run by not having to pay for Montana Power s original 
investment, subsequent repairs, or the attorney and consultant fees for 
constant renegotiations. They repeated Montana Power s rhetoric about 
everyone s power bills going up. The debate was the same as before; short 
term wants versus long term needs. The relicensing team knew that there 
were many tribal members who were complaining for vears that they had 
not personally seen any immediate increases in their per capita checks to the 
extent that they felt should correlate with the recent rental increases 
'Petitioners 1984). 
However, the tribal council, looking toward the future strength of its 
people, knew that they had to win now^ or risk repeating the whole scenario 
twenty years down the line. Plus, the $30 million offer was not only less 
than the current rental, $2.6 million, but that figure was due to go up again 
and again in the provisions of the renewed license, as it had in the original 
one. In fact, the council was planning to use the last fifty-five years of 
discrepencies betw^een tribal rental payments and power company profits to 
argue for the substantial increase of the annual payment. Montana Power 
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claimed, in written testimony to FERC, that they believed that $11.9 milhon 
would be fair based on the dams established profit-making abihties. Yet 
Montana Power offered the Tribes $3.0 million in negotiation?. While the 
Tribes were claiming $30 to $40 million was fair (Petitioner? 1984). 
When the self-appointed Morigeau-led relicensing team was failing to 
get more support for their cause, they tried to make an appeal to the tribal 
constitution, in order to advocate the power company s $30 million offer. 
Article 9 of the constitution of the Confederated Salish and K^ootenai Tribes 
states, that if either one third of the eligible v^oters petition, or one half of 
the council decides, then "any enacted or proposed ordinance or resolution of 
the itribal] council shall be submitted to a popular referendum (Relicensing 
Team 1984). Then, a majority of voters could use such a referendum to 
overturn the ordinance, provided that 30 percent of all eligible voters vote. 
While the relicensing team was claiming that they were not being 
given a chance to have their voice heard, and were being treated 
unconstitutionally by being denied their referendum, the tribal council was 
continuing its negotiations with FERC. The council claimed that Morigeau did 
not have enough signatures, and that there were questions as to the validity 
of some of them. Even if he had enough, the council claimed that this 
particular issue was unique and was not covered by x\rticle 9, and was 
constitutionally not applicable. Besides, there were more parties involved in 
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this case than Tribes. Therefore, the federal government, be it the Indian 
Bureau, FERC, or the Interior Department, simply would not recognize 
proposals from a self-appointed, non-elected, unrecognized group of tribal 
officials. This tiaie, they were correct (Tribal Information 1984). 
Nevertheless, the tribal council was continuously forced to fight further 
battles on its own turf. The relicensing team kept up its efforts in spite of 
opposition. Other groups, such as Montanans Opposed to Discrimination 
(MOD, or the mod squad), were becoming more vocal. Groups such as these 
were throw-backs to those who would try to put fourth the argument that 
the reservation system was antiquated and obsolete, and that non-Indians 
had rights that were being violated on the reservation, and thus, were being 
discriminated against (Tribal Information 1984). 
By June, Montana Power was mailing out fact sheets to its customers. 
The company claimed in their mailers that, should the Tribes be permitted to 
operate the dam and the power plant, that they would be engaging in 
profiteering,' exploiting the power and the site. This is a strange rhetorical 
device as that w^ould be exactly what the power company itself had done 
since 1939 The Tribes argued that the rental payments never reflected the 
true profit-making potential of the site. i\,s for rate increases to consumers, 
the Tribes, as a private owner, would still be bound by the established 
federal regulations as a corporate owner, plus they Y-,"ould be forced to use 
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hardware already in place to transmit and distribute their power. In 
addition to the Kerr Dam Relicensing Team, the mod squad, and FERC, the 
Tribes were still fighting with the Flathead Water Users Association, now 
calling it self the Joint Board of Control. Counting its own people and the 
Indian Bureau, the Tribes were fighting a war on at least six fronts. 
The Final Arguments are Presented 
The more 1984 was progressing, the more it began to be reminiscent of 
1930, in terms of Montana Power s rhetorical and political tactics, and its 
attempts to benefit at the Indian s expense. This time, though, the Tribes 
had the benifit of past history to educate them, as well as greater political 
awareness, and what seemed to be a surprise supporter in their corner, the 
federal government; but the power company, naturally, would continue to 
prove to be a worthy adversary. 
The arguments proceeded as follows. The power company claimed that 
if the Tribes were awarded the license, the power company would have to 
replace the plant, costing cornsumers more money. The Tribes proved that 
since the power company sent slightly more power outside the local area 
than it produced for local residents, that consumers were being asked to pay 
extra already. Therefore, giving the site to the Tribes would cause the costs 
and benifits to cancel each other out (Tribal Information 1984). 
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The Tribes said they wanted a significant rental increase if Montana 
Power was to be awarded the license. Again, the Montana Power Company 
claimed that would hurt the consumers. Again, the Tribes proved this was 
untrue. First of all, the Interior Department had to agree with both Montana 
Power and the Tribes, determining a payment that was both reasonable" 
and one based on commercial value." Secondly. Montana Power should have 
had plenty of money through not paying the Tribes for the site's true 
commercial value since 1930. Therefore, the consumers should not have to 
be penalized. Furthermore, from 1950 to 1975 the Tribes' annual payment 
increased by only 0.1 mills per kilowatt-hour, that is, by one one-hundredth 
of a penny each year, or by one mill every ten years. While the power 
company s Colstrip plant, for instance, during the same time, increased its 
pay-offs by 64.5 mills per kilowatt-hour (Tribal Information 1984). 
The Tribes reminded everyone that even the original lease of 1930, 
signed by the Montana Power Company, as Rocky Mountain Power Company, 
contained provisions for the future Indian ownership of the dam. The Tribes 
also reminded the public that their control of the site would boost the local 
economy, through huge taxes the Tribes agreed to pay Lake County, and 
through not having to pay corporate stockholders, most of whom lived out of 
state. 
To counter. Montana Power began to use another of their 
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litU-four-vear-oicl arguments, claiming that the Tribes would have no way 
to secure a market to sell their power. To this the Tribes said that the\'. in 
fact, did have some preliminary energy contracts. However, it should not be 
held against them if they had not completely secured a market. The Indians 
were attempting something for which they had no prior precedent, and they 
were becoming victims of a proverbial Catch Twenty-two. The Tribes argued 
that they could not secure the license without the contracts, and could not 
secure the contracts without the license. The Tribes further argued that 
Montana Power had never been concerned with the well-being of the Tribes 
before, so their recent claims to that fact were insincere. On the contrary, 
the power company had been delaying payments and trying to pass 
legislation for right-of-way issues concerning power lines and pipe lines. 
Instead of fixing the problems, they lied, denied, and fought for the right to 
pay less. The Tribes argued, therefore, that the consumers certainly would 
not suffer under Indian control of the power site, and the Tribes could only 
stand to gain a great deal of profits; only Montana Power's stockholders, with 
whom the power company s true loyalty lies, stood to lose on the deal i Tribal 
Information 1984). 
Furthermore, the south half of the lake, as well as its bed and banks, is 
nov^'. and has always been, tribally owned. Ownership of the dam and power 
plant, the most valuable resource on the reservation, would increase the 
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Indian s potential for self-suffiency and decrease their dependency The>' 
could create jobs, programs, awards, increase per capita payments, eliiminate 
the need to pay for legal battles, and pay the taxes to Lake County, all at the 
same time. June and July, 1984, saw rallies, dinners, and vigils held at the 
dam site, honoring those killed during construction, and promoting Indian 
control of the Dam (Come Support 1984j. Some tribal meaibers decided to 
camp there permanently until the negotiations were complete. At the same 
time, hearings were conducted in Poison. Pablo, and Missoula addressing the 
issue. The Char-Koosta. the newspaper for the Tribes, covered all the details 
i.Dam Hearings 1984; 1984 Kerr History 1984). 
By September, 1984, the Tribes tenacity and legal prowess were 
finally paying off. Montana Power was now throwing offers like $5 million 
per year for twenty years, in addition to their original $30 million per capita 
payment, but with the current $2,6 million added on each year. The first 
offer would mean $100 million for the Tribes over a twenty-year period, and 
the second, $82.7 million for the same period. Morigeau was still vocal in his 
support of the power company, but realistically no longer influential or 
acknowledged by the authorities involved (Council Offers 1984 ). 
The councils reasearch expert. Teresa Wall, with the support of the 
council, called both Montana Power offers grosslv inadequate. As the 
Tribes kept pushing for more money, FERC judge Bruce Birchman was 
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reluctant to grant their request. Citing as his reason, a throw-back to one 
heard some fifty-four years before. Birchman said the Tribes would not be 
able to secure a market for the power. He said that he would deny the 
Tribes' offer unless they could demonstrate why he should not. After an 
arduous up-hill battle, still caught in their Catch Twenty-two of which 
Bi rchman was  undoubted ly  aware ,  the  Tr ibes  looked  as  i f  they  were  about  t o  
witness history repeating itself. 
At the last minute, an "eleventh hour' letter of support came from, 
none other than, the only party that w^as in any position to help the Tribes, 
the Department of the Interior. Wall said that their subordinates, the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, were even there standing along beside them. The United 
States government, the gaurdian, the protector, the parent, and the trustee, 
to the Indians, who had been uncharactaristically silent so far, came to the 
aide of its wards with an offer to purchase 24 percent of the power produced 
at lierr dam, if the Indians were awarded the license (judge 1984). 
Birchmen immediately ordered delays in the proceedings, while 
Interior Department officials agreed to visit the reservation. Meanwhile, the 
Tribes and their attorney. Foster DeReitz, regrouped and reemerged with 
new demands at a meeting on September 10, 1984. The Tribes asked that 
the Interior Department be present from now on. to support the Tribes in 
their negotiations with FERC and the power companv. They requested a 
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federally financed inspection of the k'err facility to establish its current 
condition to determine its true value and future depretiation. Interior 
Department officials were to arrange meetings with Interior Secretarv, 
William Clark, where he would formally express support for the Tribes 
position. The Tribes further asked that the Interior Department give firm 
written details concerning the September 5th agreement for purchasing 24 
percent of the power generated, and the Tribes asked that Montana Power 
be forced to pay them $29 million per year until the company was to be 
completely unaffiliated with the dam (Judge 1984). 
Other tribes around the nation were voicing their support bv this time. 
The thunderstorms were not discouraging those who still participated in the 
continuous vigil at the dam. Letters continued to pour into tribal 
headquarters, both pro and con, as writers expressed their opinions during 
this time of temporary stalemate. As for Mr. Morigeau, he still claimed to 
have enough supporters to take the power company s offer (Judge 1984). 
The Kerr Dam Reticensing Dispute is Settled 
On October 4. 1984, the power company and the tribal leaders, at last 
came to an agreement over the rehcensing of the dam. They settled on a 
fifty-year joint license. Montana Power would operate the dam for the first 
thirty vears and the Tribes would have the option of taking complete control 
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of the operation for the final twenty years. The Tribes forced Montana 
Power to agree to a $9 million annual rental fee for the first thirty years, to 
be paid quarterly; and this time, the payments were to be in advance. This 
time the rental increases would occur, as needed, not at the whim of the 
power company or its lawyers, but according to the federally regulated 
Consumer Price Index. 
If the Tribes decided to take over after thirty years, they would have 
to buy the power company out. This would involve paying for initial 
construction costs, plus improvements, minus depreciation. Montana Power 
further agreed to spend their thirty years training selected members of the 
Tribes to train them for the possible take over. The Tribes agreed to drop a 
court case pending since 1980 concerning the lack of rental increases from 
the S2.6 million figure (Kerr Settled 1984). 
In all, it was a great victory for the Tribes. They had to perservere 
among the various different groups who did not have tribal interests at 
heart. To make matters worse, some of the dissention even came from 
within the Indian people themselves. They had endured and they had much 
lo be proud of. However, the deal would not be made final without FERC 
approval. Some of the Indians wondered if it was not somewhat of a hollow 
victory, given the buy-back clause. After all, it was their propertv all along, 
why should they buy it back? 
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There were other issues to iron out as well. Questions mcluded what 
the Tribes would do for the irrigation project and the local water users. Also, 
how would the Tribes maintain the water level m the lake given their 
cultural tendency toward ecological matters; that is. more for the farmers, or 
more for the fish, the river, and the whole ecosystem which had been 
disrupted since 1930. As it was, 8 percent of Kerr dam's output went to the 
Flathead Irrigation Project, equaling only 30 percent of the projects needs. 
The remainder of the power came from the Bonneville Power 
Administration. There were also issues concerning the right-of-way of 
certain transmission lines, and an environmental impact statement might 
have to be completed before FERC would sign anything. All parlies agreed 
that the tierr Dam Rehcensing Team was not, and never was, legally in a 
position to negotiate anything (k'err Dam, Polluted 1984 i. 
With all of these specific issues to iron out, FERC postponed its final 
approval for quite some time. In late March, 1985, one week before the end 
of FERC's six month grace period to finalize the license, tribal leaders were 
still experiencing delays. Dispite these delays, Montana Power and the 
Confederated Tribes were ready to close the deal. However, others such as 
the Interior Department, the Indian Bureau, the recently involved Montana 
Consumers Council, who represented the rate-payers interests, and the Joint 
Board of Control representing the local water users' interests, all had 
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something to say about this fundamentally Indian issue. Of course, even 
though the Tribes had fought a great battle and were considered by many to 
be victorious, they still had many outside organizations to answer to, who 
were not concerned with Indian cultural identity (Kerr Dam Lease 1985j. 
The United States still had their position of gaurdians over the Tribes. 
Would they stand up for their wards as they did they previous year? 
A decision could not be made immediately, and FERC approved an 
extention beyond the allowable six month grace period. Each dav the 
negotiations were delayed, the Tribes lost another $17,534 that they would 
never see (FERC Action 1985). On July 17, 1985. after more than five years 
of battling, FERC approved the fifty-year joint license settlement (FERC Says 
1985 '. The agreement would not become effective, though, for another fifty 
days, to allow time for appeals. So the Tribes would have to wait still longer 
for their money In spite of the victories, socioeconomic underdevelopment 
continued to remind the Indians who was boss. 
In keeping with the Indian way, the Tribes did not gloat or boast. 
Thev did not publicly denounce their rivals. They simply waited for their 
rightful appropriations, and began immediately to spend them wisely; for 
their future generations, not for the short term. They outlined a spending 
plan involving significant increases in per capita pavments, assistance for the 
eiderlv, land aquisition, grants for Indian students, and estabUshing savings 
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plans for future economic development. They even began to save 
immediately for the possibility of the thirty-year buy back option on the 
dam (Council 1985i. 
In this ^'a.y. it seems that the Kierr dam was just beginning, to assist the 
Indians cultural identity, self-determination, sovereigntv, and 
independence, by finally contributing to them. Granted, it was certainly 
considered a bitter-sweet victory by the likes of some, but a victory 
nonetheless. However, the questions put forth by Roy Bigcrane would also 
begin to haunt even the minds of those enjoying the spoils of victory. Will 
the dam bring empowerment or disaster?" In other words, [ils the dam 
inherently destructive of traditional native cultures, or can the Tribes use it 
to regenerate the wa\' of life it helped to destroy, thus bringing further 
underdevelopment and dependency? (Bigcrane 1991). 
Final mitigation on the Environmental Impacts of 
Kerr dam. Summary, and Conclusion: 1 985~2002 
Since /be beginning of time the cuIturaJ fabric oftJie SaJisb, Pend d'OreiJIe and 
Kootenai people has been linked to water the earthly Nood of life It provided the 
lifesast̂ iaing gifts of food, shelter and water, and it served as a water path " to 
neighboring tribes and relatives to the west. It ts for these reasims among others 
that the river has earned the spiritual reverence of the Tribes And it must be saved 
today so future generations of people and animals - can partake in its life-giving 
nutrients (Azure 1997K 
For the Confederated Saiish and f^ootenai Tribes of the Flathead Indian 
Reservation, water served as not only a means of transportation and a 
sustainer of life, but a vital source of cultural identity Water served, both 
iiteraliy and symbolically as the link between the earth and her people. 
Water, the universal element for life, was inextricably interwoven into the 
fabric and fiber, the body and the blood of the living planet, and the living 
people. Thus, it may serve as a metaphorical representation of the source of 
the Tribe s social and political identy as well. 
Water is simple and humble. It lives close to the earth. It even hugs 
the earth, always chosing the low road over the high road. It is patient and 
gental, always circumventing the obstacles in its path: never trynig to force 
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its way tiirougii tlieni. Water is respectful and non-coni'rontaiional, 
naturally seeking, and by nature always finding, the path of least resistance. 
It is adaptive and accomodating, always taking on the shape of whatever 
vessel it is placed in, and it will always make room for whatever is placed in 
it. It is content to yield to others, assuming for itself only the lowest level, 
it IS the life-blood of the Earth. 
Water is also tireless in its pursuit of balance. It is tenatious in its 
quest for equality It makes the sharp dull, the hard soft, and the square 
round. It \^ iil nurture and heal, but its relentiessness will carve a canyon 
out of bedrock. Water is accepting and tolerant, as it is the universal solvent 
of both solid and gas. Thus, it will make the crystaline etheric. Likewise, it 
will transpose these qualities onto the nature, and merge with the identity of 
anyone who would be as receptive, and willing to listen. The Indians were 
willing to listen. 
It is no irony then, that the Confederated Tribes of the Flathead Indian 
Reservation, while being unfortunate as the victims of systematic eurocentric 
enculturation and the socioeconomic underdevopment which almost 
invariablv accompanies it, were, nevertheless, fortunate in that the 
reservation they had reserved to themselves was, and still is, rich with 
water resources. Within the boundries of the reservation there are 89 lakes, 
including the south half of the largest fresh-v^ater lake west of the 
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Mississippi River. There are 60,000 surface acres on Fiatiiead Lake that fall 
within the reservation. At the same time, there are the jocko, Little 
Bitterroot, and Lower Flathead rivers; ail fed by 460 miles of streams. Plus 
there are hot springs, water falls, wetlands, marshes, and glaciers. All are 
fed throughout the entire vear by the snow-capped mountain peaks, rising 
at times more than a mile above the vallies below, which catch the rain 
clouds coming from the west iBruggers 1987 '. 
Therefore, given the necessitv, as well as their abihty, to be as adaptive 
and accommodating to dominant outside fources as the ^"ater they so dearly 
love, the Confederated Tribes have been tireless in their patient pursuit to 
turn their source of cultural identity into a source of self-determination as 
well. They are now succeeding in their fight against outside 
under develop mental forces who have wished to exploit and control their 
resources, as well as their identity. 
The Perpetual Battle with Montana Power Over Money 
The Federal Water Power Act of 1920 required that Indian lands, 
which were utilizing water power, be protected from negative environmental 
impact. Likewise, the new license on the Kerr Dam, issued in 1985, called for 
the Montana Power Companv to come to terms with the Tribes, through 
FERC. on a Mitigation and Management Plan iMMPi to offset past, and to 
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reduce future, environmental impacts, on the land, the fish, and the \s«"ildlife, 
caused bv the the Kerr Dam (Kerr Dam Mitigation 1994'i, 
It was not until 1990, though, that Montana Power presented iheir first 
MMP to the Tribes. In keeping with their recent pohcy of actually acting as 
gaurdian to their wards, the Interior Department also got involved. Officials 
from the Interior Department developed their own MMP standards that they 
would request FERC to monitor on behalf of the Tribes. These came to be 
known as the 4(e) conditions and would play a pivotal role in the 
negotiations over the provisions of the MMP However, the years following 
1990 did not see much progression in the proceedings, outside of the 
publication of the 4(e ) conditions. Because of loopholes dragging time in the 
appeals process, and the complexity of the issue, it w^as not until 1994 that 
any significant progress in the MMP. and subsequently any monetary 
compensation for the Tribes, w^ould be seen. 
The Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt claimed in March, 1994, 
that by June of that year he would take prompt action on the mitigation 
proposals. Tribal chairman Mickey Pablo and tribal attorney Ronald 
McDonald considered filing a "breach of trust" suit against the Interior 
Department if Babbitt did not come through (Kerr Dam Mitigation 199'4'. 
Tue Tribes were pusliing for the MMP approval. Thev were ansious, even 
with tlieir relatively recent victories, to continue their pursuit ol justice for 
the damages done to their lakeshoes, fisheries and wildlife habuat. 
When FERC began moving faster on the issue, there office was 
developing a Draft Environmental Asessment to fulfill part of the stipulations 
put forth in the Federal Water Power Act, and the new dam-operatmg 
license of 1985. In the Environmental Asessment, FERC modified Montana 
Power s offer, and forced further delays until the results of additional 
scientific studies could be analyzed and publicized. These studies and the 
controversy which surrounded them epitomized the mitigation issue at the 
local level, because it pertained directly to the lake level. Inasmuch as this 
issue was complex, though, it was essentially not verv complicated. 
Coatroversv at the Local Level Delays Mitigation Proceedings 
For the Tribes to begin to be compensated for the loss of their 
resources and their cultural identity, in terms of the loss of water quality, 
fish and wildlife, and the tribally-owned lands they once inhabited, the dam 
would have to be used to monitor and control the level of the elevation of 
the lake to approximate the natural rising and falling, ebbing and flowing, of 
the surface of the lake, as it was before the existance of the dam. This was, 
of course, quite possible as dams are equiped with large gates at the top of 
their mass of concrete for just such quality control. In this case, the 
reservoir, or pool, Flathead Lake itsell\ was also being artificiallv controlled 
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on the intake side to the north, through the H u n g r v  Horse Dam, adding 
additional control over the lake level. 
However, as is normally the case when climatic conditions and natural 
rhythms are viewed against the backdrop of mankind's ever-vigilant 
attempts to maximize his profit-making through their exploitation, the two 
do not always coincide. Using the MMP to periodically lower the lake level 
and restore the natural environmental cycles, and thereby, properly 
compensate the Tribes, w^ould not always synchronistically overlap with the 
rising and falling of the demand for electricity, or of irrigation. So Montana 
Power, and the joint Board of Control, arguing for the local water users, were 
after different ends than the Tribes, as they had been in the past. Now there 
were also others to consider: the white landowners residing on the federally 
recognized tribally owned south shore of the lake. 
These landowners were interested in the commercial value of their 
property value as landowners on a beautiful mountain lakeshore. They were 
also interested in the recreation opportunities that such a location provides 
for themselves, as well as their ability to profit from the sale of such 
recreation to tourists, and other local residents. 
So in addition to the usual arguments from the Montana Power 
Companv and the local water users, in terms of profit-making from the 
w^ater and the electricity, the Tribes had to deal with similar arguments from 
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local landowners in terms of tourism and recreation, who had Montana 
Senators and Congressman speaking on their behalf ' Tribes 1994). Since this 
was a federally recognized Indian reser\^ation, Indians had federally 
recognized rights on their own lands, including the lakeshore. Even though 
the white landowners resided within the boundries of an Indian reservation, 
their claims to land ownership were also recognized bv the same 
government which established the reservation. The only entity they were 
not always recognized bv w^as, of course, the traditional culture of the 
Indians, who were at the mercy of their government. This time, however, 
the recent events indicated the Tribes had the Interior Department on their 
side, and FERC appeared to be interested in making the best decision for all 
involved. 
FERC hstened to the concerns of the scientists at the Yellow Bay 
Biological Station, even though they were denounced by Montana s Senators 
and local landowners. Dr. Jack Stanford of Yellow Bay explained, at public 
debates and hearings, that their findings were not intended to be 
instructions, or even suggesstions, but only studies with corresponding 
results. The Biological Station provided a study w^hich showed a possible 
annual cycle of rise and fail in the lake level, called the Lorang Model after 
the student who developed it, which sparked much controversv and delayed 
the mitigation proceedings beyond the date promised bv Interior Secretary 
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Babbitt (Lake Erosion 1994), 
The Lorang model demonstrated that the natural rising and falling of a 
lake level creates a cycle in which the shoreline becomes alternately dried 
and soaked. This occurs during periods of increased water volume in the 
spring and fall and, as a result, constructs a shoreline made of well armored 
soil. Dams on the other hand, maintain an unaturally high water level. 
Consequently, like stagnant water in a bath tub, they leave deposits of dirt 
and scum around the edge, in this case, along the shoreline. Therefore, the 
erosion everyone is worried about is the eroded land that has been recently 
deposited on the shoreline by the unnaturally high and relatively slow 
moving waters behind the dam. Fluctuating the annual water levels again 
would loosen these deposits hindering water quality Therefore, it may be 
necessary to mimic the flushing activity that ebbing and flowing in pre-dam 
years performed naturally. In the case of this particular dam. keeping the 
water level lower than the "unarmored soils, which were mostly above the 
high-water mark, might even eliminate most of the so-called erosion (Lake 
Erosion 1994). 
This study had opponants. Whites did not want their current situation 
regarding recreation, tourism, property values, and revenue, to change. 
They persued FERC and had that agency dismiss the scientist s findings. 
Politians denounced the studies as well. 
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The Interior Department's 4(e) Conditions Acceleratcs Mitigation 
FERC was still hearing testimony from various sources. However, its 
efforts were consentrated on completing mitigation on only one of the six 
articles of the 1985 license agreement pertaining to mitigation. This was the 
article that concentrated on the north shore of the lake, off of the reservation 
entirely. FERC officials also determined that Montana Power s proposals still 
had significant impact.' The Interior Department finally compiled their 
conditions for tribal mitigation, which were as established in the Federal 
Water Power Act. FERC was forced to seriously consider them. Surprisingly, 
the 4ie i conditions were almost identicle to those of the Tribes iKerr Dam to 
1994). 
The Interior Department's conditions included restrictions of water 
flow and fluctuations, a fish and wildlife implementation strategy, riparian 
habitat aquisition on the south shore of the lake, redevelopment of wildlife 
habitat, drought management plans, protection and utilization of cultural and 
recreational resources, north shore erosion control projects, a waterfoul 
protection area, and last but not least, a policy which would make Kerr Dam 
a base-load operating plant only. For its entire history, the dam was being 
run as a 'peak operating" facility, meaning maximizing profit from the sale of 
electricity was the primar^' concern which caused the lake level to rise and 
fall with the demands for generated power. Now it was to be a back-up, low 
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energy producing plant fPERC Summarized 1993). 
These conditions laid out by the Tribes gaurdian and protector, the 
Interior Department, hightened the environmental nature of the debate, 
forcing other groups to oppose these plans, Montana Power was concerned 
with its bottom line, and the joint Board of Control wanted FERC to delav the 
proceedings until their requests for the increasing their already low-cost 
block of power from the dam was approved. The Tribes still did not receive 
a penny for this power, on which they lose an estimated $1 million annually 
Also, the Technical Review Board who first presented the Draft 
Environmental Assessment, a local organization called the Flathead Lakers, 
and something called the National Organization to Save Flathead Lake, were 
voicing their concerns against the Indian people. However m addition to the 
Interior Department, the Flathead Fishing Association. Montana s Department 
of Fish Wildlife and Parks, and even the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers supported stronger mitigation then that which was laid out in the 
original Environmental Impact Statement 'FERC Denies 1996; FERC 
Summarized 1995; JBC Defends 1996). 
On July 11, 1996, FERC issued a Final Environmental Impact Statement 
advocating for the adopting of the Interior Department s 4ie) conditions in 
their entiretv This decision, coupled with the recent federally mandated 
deregulation of the power utilities industry, and the possibilitv from the 
Final Environmental Impact Statement of a retroactive pa\'ment to the 
Tribes of nearly $48 million, the Montana Power Compam" attempted to cut 
their losses by selling out to the Tribes right away iKerr History 1996 K 
Montatia Power s Profits Falling With the Lake Level 
The ongoing environmental mitigation dispute, the ever increasing 
payments to the Tribes, and deregulation prompted the corporate decision 
for Montana Power to move more in the direction of the 
Telecoaimunication s industry. So it was that nineteen years ahead of 
schedule, Montana Power offered to sell Kerr Dam to the Tribes. Montana 
Power s president. Bob Gannon, said it would be economically benificial for 
both sides. However, if Montana Power could not turn a profit how could the 
Tribes? 
The power company claimed that the recent deregulation of the power 
utilities industry was causing more competition, and as a result, lower prices. 
But wouldn't the same deregulation effect the Tribes as well? Montana 
Power further claimed that the mitigation called for in FERC's Final 
Environmental Impact Statement was unaffordable. The Statement provided 
for a one-time payment of $47 4 million, and an annual payment of $1.3 
million be paid to the Tribes, in addition to the annual rental payments, 
which by this time were up from $9 million to $12.8 million in 1996, and 
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projected to be $13-1 million by 1997 'Kerr Dam: MPC 1996). Howev^er, all of 
these figures would fall well below the profit that Montana Power ^^'as 
earning, according to testimony read into the records of several Senate 
Hearings, over sixty years before (Survey 1929 i. So why were the\- claiming 
that these large checks would break their bank? 
Montana Power Company chairman, and Chief Executive Officer, Daniel 
T. Berube, claimed; 
It looks as if the economic line will be crossed for us, but we think the 
Tribes,with a different cost structure, may find Eerr an attractive opportunity 
The Tribes would not have the same cost structures, nor the same Montana Power 
overheads, such a5 the state's centrally assessed property taxes, if they assumed 
the license, This could be a very valuable plant for the Tribes; it has been 
maintained and upgraded: and it is in escellent working order (MPC Considering 
19%). 
Montana Power officials further called the 4(e) conditions of the mitigation 
plan "too much too late, unreasonable, and untimely, complaining that the 
figures were too high, and that FERC took too long to reach their decision. 
Yet, it w^as the power company who drug its feet and took its time, for the 
past sixty-six years, each and every time they were scheduled to give the 
Tribe? any amount of compensation for the use of their land. Nevertheless, 
Montana Pow^er claimed that it would literally cost more to produce the 
electricity then they could possibly sell it for. "The two lines, Gannon 
asserted, "cost and income, have crossed" iKerr Mitigation 19961. 
The Tribes had much to consider. They had not even received final 
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mitigation according to the lease agreement that v^-as set m motion ele^*en 
vear? prior, and now they would not ever receive this compensation, if they 
accepted the power company s offer. The Tribes were also concerned about 
the agreement to train tribal members for the possible tribal take-over of 
the dam in 2015- Deregulation would certainly effect their ability to sell 
their power in a market that all the other players had nearly a century 
head-start on them.. At the same time, deregulation might just drive market 
prices so low as to minimize mitigation monies still pending, indicating that 
the Tribes should consider the early buy-out. However, federal 
restructuring, which became the deregulation of the power utilities industry 
in 1992, and its effects were just beginning to reach the western Montana 
area (2001; A Power 1996). 
For the tribal council, and tribal economist Ron Trosper, it seemed once 
again that, like the water itself, the smart thing to do was to be patient and 
humble, but persistant. The Tribes chose, for the time being, to do nothing. 
The\^ reminded themselves that they have the 'option' to purchase the dam. 
With the dust of deregulation still not settled, and mitigation not yet 
reached, the Tribes believed they could do better with their rentals then 
with full o's^'nership of the dam. In January. 1997 the Tribes officially 
declined Montana Power s offer to sell them the dam, and decided instead to 
concentrate their effort? on closing the mitigation issues 'Tribal Council 
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1 997; Tribe Turns 1997j. 
After much deliberation, FERC announced on June 6, 1997, that it had 
issued its final order on the Kerr Dam mitigation for environmental impacts. 
Effective immediately, the Montana Power Company owed the Tribes $12.5 
million retroactive from 1985. and a $1.27 million annual mitigatory rental 
payment, also subject to increases through the Consumer Pricing Index, until 
2015, in addition to the license rental. FERC's final order also determined 
that Kerr Dam was to operate as a base-ioad operation only. The power 
company naturallv challenged FERC on all counts. For now. Montana Power 
would not onlv have their rental payment increased, and have their 
attempts to profit from the sale of the dam thwarted, they would aiso have 
to write the Tribes a large check, and have their future profit-earning 
capabilities reduced as well (Kerr Dam: Place 19971. 
Moatana Power Sells Off Ail of its Power Generating Business 
The power utilities industry consists of three main sectors; generation, 
transmission, and distribution. In December, 1997, the Montana Power 
Companv announced that it would sell its entire generating business through 
an auction process. They would attempt to sell their fourteen dams, and four 
coal-fed plants at Colstrip, valued at over $600 million, about one fourth of 
their 12.7 billion in total assets Company officials stated that the 
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geographical region they claimed as their market, was not large enough to 
successfully compete in deregulated markets. The sale of the generating 
portion of their operation would significantly reduce the burden of 
regulatory complexities. Pius, power officials noted, they could no longer 
afford the risk of fluctuating prices ^MPC Wants Out 1997), Also in 
December, 1997, Montana Power and the Interior Department's Fish and 
Wildlife Service, along with the Tribes, reached a partial settlement of the 
1990 Mitigation Management Plan from the 1985 license agreement. It 
pertained to erosion and wildlife habitat on the north shore of Flathead Lake 
only, but it was a start. Furthermore, there were more delays in the 
environmental mitigation after the power company, the Tribes, and the 
Interior Department ail filed appeals after FERC's final order of 1997 
The spring of 1998 saw water levels on Flathead Lake drop to an 
all-time low^ Some blamed El Nino. Biologists conducted their experiments 
of flow rates, as the 1985 license agreemient and the Final Environmental 
Impact Statement ordered. The minimum flow rate over the dam was held 
at 3.200 cubic feet per second. The persistant drought conditions were not 
helping, but Montana Power could not increase the flow rate even if it 
\\ anted to. Kerr Dam was now" a base-load operation only, Also, in the 
spring of 1998, Montana Power filed a law suit appealing FERC's mitigatory 
decision to higher courts (K.err Dam Included 1998; Partial Settlement 1997). 
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In November, 1998, the Montana Power Company announced that it 
had found a buyer for its generating operation. Pennsylvania Power and 
Light (PPL) would buy the entire operation except for the dam at Miiltow^n 
just east of Missoula. That was not a worthwhile investment for PPL. as over 
6.6 million cubic yards of arsenic and other heavy metals had deposited 
themselves in the bed. and along the banks of the Clark Fork river, due to 
almost a century of intense industry and mining activity in the Butte and 
Anaconda areas up stream. Industrial and mining activities which Montana 
Power and its corporate ties had no small part in themselves (Kerr Dam 
Included 1998). 
PPL paid Montana Power $988 million and, in 1999, assumed its 
operation, as well as its debts, litigation, mitigation, and rentals to the Tribes. 
Would this move mean that the Tribes would now^ have a better business 
partner, one who would not engage in the irresponsible, underhanded, and 
illegal practices of Montana Power? Or would this be a step backward, 
toward underdevelopment again, as the seat of corporate power moved back 
to the east coasf^ Time would tell (Bureau 2000 ). 
Final Mitigation Reached 
The parties involved certainly did take their time on this nearlv 
twenty-vear old issue. However, in the spring of 2000, FERC announced that 
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an agreement to settle further mitigation had been reached. Pennsylvania 
Power and Light, the Interior Department, the Tribes, and FERC, jointly 
petitioned the court for dismissal of the Montana Power law suit against the 
initial mitigation covering the north shore erosion and loss of wildlife 
habitat, as Montana Power was now out of the picture. Their petition 
worked and in March of 2001 it was announced, at last, that final mitigation 
would be awarded and the lawsuit dismissed tJCerr Dam Mitigation 2001 K 
The Tribes were awarded a total of $35 million from PPL. Of this 
amount. $16.2 million was to be applied to fish and wildlife habitat 
aquisition; $10.8 million would be applied toward fish and wildlife 
restoration; and $6.6 million was to be spent on fish hatcheries, fish stocking, 
and reintroduction. Plus the annual mitigation payment was raised to 11.4 
million; and the annual rental payment was now up to $14.4 million (Kerr 
Dam Mitigation 2001). 
After nearly a century of irrigation and hydroelectric development, 
and nearly a century and a half of socioeconomic underdevelopment, the 
dam, which had only recently began paving for itself, was paying 
exponentially more for itself. The Tribes had lived to see the day when their 
conquerors fulfilled their end of the "bargain" by finally acting in their 
selX-appoiiited paternalistic role, established more then a century before. 
The Tribes were now among the nations leaders in terms of Indian 
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self-deterinination. This was due as much to the natural resources with 
which the process of underdevelopment had left them, as to their 
sophisticated political ability to profit from those resources. The Tribes had 
maintained their social and cultural dignity, and identity, as traditional tribal 
peoples, first by non-violently battling their aggressors, and further, by not 
compromising their integrity w^hile doing it. Although they had paid a 
tremendous price, they could claim victory, as well as honor. They were 
beating their enemies, without cheating them. 
Summary and Conctusion 
Questions as to whether or not the Tribes will assume commercial 
operation of the K.err dam and hydroelectric plant, as well as the profits and 
greater self-determination that such an operation would naturally produce, 
still abound on the reservation. The written information on this issue, as 
well as the information gathered during the interviews conducted for this 
project, while they are comparatively minimal, are enough to indicate that 
further study is warranted. Therefore I will refrain from speculating at this 
time. However, the editors of the Char-Koosta. along with tribal studies and 
reports seem to indicate that the Tribes, at least superficially, do appear as if 
a complete take-over is on their agenda. As the thirty-year portion of the 
iiftv-year lease approaches expiration in the year 2015, we will no doubt 
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witness a resurgence of the sociocuitural issues explored and recorded m this 
project. Whether these will be accompanied by the familar socioeconooiic 
issues, however, remains to be seen (Arnold 2002). 
As for this thesis, hopefully it will serve the reader in several primary 
capacities; 1) as a reference to the general historical events in the history of 
the Confederated SaUsh and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Indian 
Reservation, Montana; 2) as a case study in socioeconomic underdevelopment 
in general, for American Indian Peoples, and specifically for the Confedrated 
Tribes using the sociopolitical events surrounding the history of the iCerr 
dam: and 3) as a model or formula for the principles and practices which, 
willingly or unwillingly, have, since the modern era of coloniaUsm, caused 
one people to be subsumed, divided and conquered, or separated and 
assimilated, into a dominant regime, socially, culturally, historically, 
politically, and economically. 
Additionally, through certain themes throughout the text, I have 
intended this thesis to expose certain realities concerning our history as 
Americans, and as Westerners, both european and indigenous. This thesis is 
also, therefore, designed to expose political injustices and economic 
ineguahties which seem to be necessary and unavoidable conditions, not 
unfortunate and unpredictable by-products, of our industrialist, mercantilist, 
capitalist system. Ultimately, my aim is to inform and to invite debate 
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concerning the attributes, as well as the detricaents. of our Western 
eurocentric ways. 
In this giobaiistic age, it may be surprising to some that big business 
was as big as it was. even in the era of the Great Depression. The 
repercussions of the business practices by the key players in this story are 
still reverberating today; be they from the local level, such as with the 
Missoula mercantile monopoly, or from the transnational level as with the 
Electric Bond and Share Company, and the pricing structures of the now 
deregulated power utilities industry. There is a growing awareness within 
the populations of democratic nations that the work of scholars such as 
Andre Guilder Frank, was, and is, more real than most people first imagined. 
it seems that marginalized portions of the population are not so 
because they are retarded in their progress, as those at the core purport 
them to be. It seems they are marginalized, categorized, and 
disenfranchised, by those at the core; who have placed them there, 
specifically so that those at the core can remain at the core. The system not 
only gets them down but keeps them down, while also eliminating other 
options which contain the possibility for those marginalized to circumvent 
the obstacles in their path which seek to impeed their socioeconomic 
progress. 
Throughout the human history of cultures in conflict there have been. 
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and will be. winners and losers. However, it is another situation entirely il" 
the losers are placed there by the winners, specifically so that the winners, 
who also establish the standards and criteria for winning itself, can continue 
to win. In such a case, the economic system is the direct cause of the 
underdevelopment; and therefore, any attempts to use the same system to 
cure the problem, as Einstein once explained, will invariably perpetuate it. 
Furthermore, the explamations as to why certain citizins are not 
prospering are put forth by those who are prospering, and they are claiming 
(as we have heard for a century and a half), that those who are not 
benifitting will not because they are primitive and retarded in their 
progress, or that they simply are not trying hard enough. On the other hand, 
it may be closer to the truth to say that they cannot because the economic 
system currently in place, at least to some degree, purposefully or not. 
creates its losers in order to define and to distinguish its winners. In such a 
case, the worst fears of Adam Smith, forewarned over two hundred years 
ago during the birth of our nation, would now" be realized. I hope that this 
thesis will invite debate into these problematic issues, as none other could be 
more pertinent to our times. 
Finally, I have intended this work to serve as an example of how one 
marginalized group of American citizins have taken the methods put forth 
by those at the core, which have pushed theoi to the periphery (on their own 
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lands), and incorporated those methods into a new paradigm. The 
accomplishments of the Confederated Tribes of the Flathead reservation, 
through their political sophistication, are an excellent example, (and there 
are too few), as to how a marginalized people can use the core, to approach 
the core, and thereby change the definition of the core, by forcing, or 
coaxing, the core into including themselves in it. The legal victories 
pertaining to the lakeshore, the Namen case, and the dam. its rentals, and its 
mitigatory payments, were not all that the Tribes were victorious of during 
the times covered in this project. 
Since the 1980's the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the 
Flathead Indian Reservation declared their homelands a nuclear-free zone. 
They adopted the highest air quality standards possible. They passed 
legislation regulating the transportation of hazardous materials through the 
reservation, as well as the disposal of wastes on the reservation. They also 
won numerous cases against those who challanged right-of-way issues on 
Indian lands, pertaining to power lines and gas lines. They established the 
90,000 acre Mission Mountain Wilderness area, and within it, the Grizzly 
Bear Conservation Zone. They have successfully assumed control over their 
own fish and game management, and established a primitive wilderness area 
around the headwaters of the jocko River, deep into the jocko canyon, and 
reserved it for tribal members only (Bruggers 1987). 
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Kowever, the fight is far from over. The Lakes water quality is still 
suffering due to the partial stagnation that comes with any dam. 
Eutrophication. septic systems, algae, fertilizer, timbercutting, and road 
building, are some of the issues still being discussed. The lake level, for all 
the aforementioned reasons, as well as below average precipitation in recent 
years, continues to create conflict between the Indians and the local white 
population. However, at the time of this writing, the spring of 2002, the 
federally mandated deregulation of the power utilities industry has been 
completed; and the final chapter in the history of the antagonist in our story, 
the Montana Power Company, has also been written. On March 12. 2002, 
Montana Power completely sold out to. and had their assets subsumed under 
another utilities company. Northwestern (Arnold 2002). 
Montana Power is, now, officially, no longer; and the Confederated 
Tribes, remain. Is this in name only? Or will the future chapters of this 
story contain the continuation of the trends we have witnessed thus far? As 
development has now been seen as underdevelopment, will its victims 
re-develop, or un-develop, underdevelopment? Likewise, will consumers 
and tribal members alike, eventually witness the regulation of the 
deregulation of regulation? 
Finally, the ultimate question; what will the Tribes do with the dam in 
2015? Would passing the hat to another copporate giant in the industry 
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perpetuate underdevelopment, or invite further political strategy. Would 
ownership bring increased revenues over and above rental and mitigation 
monies? If so, will they assume control? If not. will they continue with the 
present situation, or sell to a third party? The answer to these questions will 
undoubtedly be determined by the degree to which the Tribes have 
incorporated the white mans economics, his politics, and his government, 
both into, and at the expense of. their traditional ways; or. stated differently, 
the degree to which the Tribes now view the dam. and the revenue 
generated from it, as a new source of cultural identity, along with the 
traditional sources of that identity 
In other words, the answer will undoubtedly lie in the current 
definition of their collective and contextualized cultural identity; which, like 
the sacred waters, by their very nature, are continuously redefining and 
redetermining themselves. 
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